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Foreword
The euro area’s economy emerged from a recession in spring 2013, with the 
sovereign debt and banking crises easing over the course of last year. 
However, a closer look at the performance of individual countries reveals 
that the euro area’s economy is not out of the woods yet. Economic perfor-
mance varied significantly across the euro area’s member states in 2013, with 
imbalances in competitiveness manifesting themselves in persistent debt ac-
cumulation and mass unemployment in the periphery, despite some reforms. 
Expanding on topics that were discussed in previous issues, this year’s report 
of the European Economic Advisory Group at CESifo (EEAG), the thir-
teenth of the series, shows that austerity is still necessary to achieve a rebal-
ancing of relative prices within the euro area and offers a critical analysis of 
the concept of a unified banking system, which suffers from the attempt to 
implicitly socialise legacy assets, rather than offering a convincing bail-in 
strategy. Regardless of the diversity of the euro area, the report emphasises 
the importance of remaining on “The Road to Cohesion” and proposes 
Switzerland as a successful example. Despite its separate language groups, 
Switzerland has managed to build a functioning state with a decentralised 
structure based on the no-bailout principle, after being created as a defence 
union with a common army. 
The EEAG, which is collectively responsible for all parts of the report, con-
sists of a team of six economists from five countries. This year, the Group is 
chaired by Ákos Valentinyi (Cardiff Business School) and includes Giuseppe 
Bertola (EDHEC Business School), John Driffill (Birkbeck College), Harold 
James (Princeton University), Jan-Egbert Sturm (KOF Swiss Economic 
Institute, ETH Zurich) and myself (Ifo Institute and University of Munich). 
The members participate on a personal basis and do not represent the views 
of the organisations that they are affiliated with.
I would like to express my gratitude for the valuable assistance provided by 
the scholars and staff  at CES and Ifo who helped to prepare the report. 
This year’s participants were Nadjeschda Arnold and Christopher Weber 
(assistants to the group), Tim Oliver Berg, Atanas Hristov, Nikolay Hristov 
and Michael Kleemann (economic forecast), Lisa Giani Contini and Julio 
Saavedra (editing), Christoph Zeiner (graphics), Katja Kügler and Elisabeth 
Will (typesetting) and Ines Gross (cover). I also wish to thank Swiss Re for 
hosting our autumn meeting. 
Hans-Werner Sinn
President, CESifo Group
Professor of Economics and Public Finance
Ludwig Maximilian’s University Munich
Munich, 27 February 2014
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Recommendations foR euRope
Chapter 2 SWITZERLAND: RELIC OF THE PAST, MODEL FOR
 THE FUTURE?
• Learn from the Swiss approach to diversity management. The European 
Union faces difficult choices and disagreement within and across its 
member countries. The Swiss approach to diversity management can be 
seen as a useful model for Europe. Europeans have always tried to ho-
mogenise their countries’ national cultures, and cultural heterogeneity 
across European Union member countries is increasingly problematic. 
The Swiss, by contrast, are both very much aware of their internal cul-
tural diversity, and very proud of their country, conscious of the advan-
tages of belonging to it. 
• Embrace pragmatic compromises as a way of laying firm foundations for 
common institutions and policies. The Swiss Confederation’s institutional 
structure is increasingly similar to that which the European Union is 
currently struggling to develop. Swiss history suggests that European cit-
izens and policy-makers may more clearly see the advantages of togeth-
erness, and perhaps find it easier to proceed towards political union, as 
changes in the world’s geopolitical situation make it increasingly neces-
sary for the European Union to deploy a common foreign policy. 
• Adopt both a common legal and regulatory infrastructure, and a compre-
hensive and rigorous fiscal system. European nation states have long im-
plemented single-market frameworks and redistribution schemes that 
have only recently been introduced by the Swiss Confederation. Swit-
zerland, by contrast, has pioneered public debt brakes and relies on the 
threat of bankruptcy to ensure responsible and prudent lending and 
borrowing at lower levels of government. All of these institutional fea-
tures are only slowly and problematically being extended to the euro 
area and the European Union. 
Chapter 3 AUSTERITY: HURTING BUT HELPING
• Euro area policy-makers should deal with the periphery’s debt overhang. 
Debt levels still appear to be far from sustainable levels for several pe-
riphery countries. High debt levels are likely to act as a drag on growth, 
as servicing debt requires the transfer of resources from debtors to credi-
tors. Slow growth, however, will exacerbate the debt overhang problem. 
Debt rescheduling should be seen as a way of dealing with the problem, 
provided that the further reforms required do take place in periphery 
countries.
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• Countries in which the crisis has permanently changed the growth outlook 
need to accept some degree of fiscal austerity and embrace downward wage 
flexibility. Weak domestic demand moderates price and wage inflation, 
supporting the real devaluation path that is needed to restore the com-
petitiveness lost during the boom years. That path can be followed in less 
costly manner and at a faster pace if  wages adjust flexibly.
• Periphery countries should make their labour markets more flexible. 
Productive resources need to be reallocated across industries and firms. 
While austerity deepens the crisis, high unemployment largely reflects 
the slow and painful character of labour reallocation processes in situa-
tions where uncertainty and institutions make firms keen to fire, but re-
luctant to hire. Labour market reforms could considerably accelerate the 
structural reallocation of labour and shorten the recession. 
• The fiscal policy framework in the periphery countries should be strength-
ened to lend more credibility to the fiscal programs. In the absence of 
such a framework, credibility can only be gained through frontloading 
the fiscal programme, which is typically more costly in terms of output 
and employment than a more back-loaded programme. As debt levels 
are still high in some periphery countries, and austerity will be with them 
for some time, such a framework is all the more important to reduce the 
short-term cost of austerity.
Chapter 4 BANKING UNION: WHO SHOULD TAKE CHARGE? 
• The ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment of Financial Institutions needs to 
be as rigorous and transparent in reality as claims suggest it will be. Only 
a full revelation of legacy problems can ensure that the concept of a 
banking union does not appear to be a scheme for channelling resources 
to those euro area member states with weak banking industries. This 
perception would undermine political support for the necessary centrali-
sation of bank supervision, regulation and resolution.
• Clarification of who will pay for the legacy problems revealed by the 
Comprehensive Assessment is essential. The costs should logically be 
borne by the member states responsible for past supervision. Since this 
weakens the link between weak sovereigns and banks in the short run, 
member states should be eligible for ESM support under appropriate 
conditions. 
• The list of creditors exempt from bailing-in should be kept short. The prin-
ciple of bailing-in some creditors of failing banks is sound. But a long 
list of exemptions may make it difficult to ensure that banks have enough 
contingent liabilities to meet reasonable recapitalisation needs. 
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Summary
The world economy showed strong signs of recovery 
in 2013, with the United States providing solid sup­
port. The euro area’s economy also performed better 
last year than in 2012, although its performance var­
ied across the different member states. The sovereign 
and banking crises have also eased, but the situation 
nevertheless remains fragile. Mass unemployment in 
several euro area countries is keeping social tensions 
at a high level; while internal and external rebalancing 
continues in the periphery. The sovereign debt crisis 
may have eased in 2013, but it certainly was not re­
solved; and debt levels increased further. Although 
several reforms on euro area level are being imple­
mented, their outcome and impact remain uncertain. 
This year’s EEAG report emphasises that supporting 
cohesion between member states, as well as maintain­
ing fiscal and regulatory discipline, is crucial for 
Europe.
Chapter 1 of the report discusses the immediate macro­
economic outlook for the global economy, with a par­
ticular focus on the European situation. Chapter 2 fo­
cuses on Switzerland, and specifically on the lessons 
that Europe can learn from the Swiss experience in 
maintaining cohesion while supporting diversity, and 
in reaching pragmatic compromises in the creation of 
common institutions and policies. Chapter 3 analyses 
the much debated issue of austerity and highlights 
that fiscal discipline is not only needed to ensure the 
long­term sustainability of public debt, but also for 
external rebalancing, which is vital to the long­term 
sustainability of the euro. Finally, Chapter 4 looks at 
plans and measures to implement a banking union in 
Europe and discusses who will pay for future banking 
crises, and who will end up footing the bill for the la­
test crisis.
Chapter 1
Macroeconomic Outlook
Last year saw a slight acceleration in the pace of glob­
al economic expansion. Global development was – as 
in the years prior to 2013 – characterised by strong 
heterogeneity amongst individual regions. For the first 
time in over four years, the developed countries, and 
particularly the United States and the United King­
dom, became the driving forces behind the current 
and ongoing economic recovery. 
The emerging economies will nevertheless continue to 
grow at rates that are higher than those seen in indus­
trialised countries; but their pace of growth is, for 
structural reasons, unlikely to increase this year. 
Several key emerging economies are experiencing a 
marked flattening out of their population growth, 
which slows down the increase in labour force poten­
tial and thus also reduces potential growth. In addi­
tion, China sustains losses vis­à­vis other emerging 
markets due to the relatively rapid increase in its la­
bour costs, which noticeably impacts competitiveness. 
Moreover, there are a growing number of signs to sug­
gest that the potential of the Chinese model of growth 
based on capital accumulation is slowly running out 
of steam. 
In the developed economies, real GDP growth rates 
gradually started to increase in 2013. In the United 
States, the contractionary impetus provided by fiscal 
policy was more than compensated for by improved 
domestic demand. Private consumption in the United 
States will probably continue to grow, supported by 
further improvements in the employment and housing 
markets, as well as to lending conditions. Business in­
vestment should also benefit from the recovery in do­
mestic demand and the continued pursuit of highly 
expansionary monetary policy, which will secure rela­
tively favourable refinancing conditions. Finally, the 
fiscal impulse will be less contractionary than last 
year. 
In Japan, monetary and fiscal policy has been ex­
tremely expansionary since the beginning of 2013, 
which boosted private consumption and investment 
expenditure, while the domestic export industry 
reaped the benefits of a severely weakened yen. Al­
though this scenario has allowed Japan’s economy to 
expand strongly during the past winter months, its 
economic growth is expected to gradually decline over 
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the year, as the positive fiscal impulse is bound to ebb 
away, while structural problems are likely to persist.
Most importantly for the world economy, spring 2013 
saw the European Union finally emerge from the re­
cession that had plagued it since the end of 2011. The 
EU economy has recorded moderate growth since 
then and has finally ceased to choke the world econo­
my. This development was supported by reduced fiscal 
austerity, as well as fading uncertainty regarding the 
future of the currency area. 
Several euro area countries nevertheless continue to 
suffer from very high public and/or private debt. The 
situation in the Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and 
Greek banking sectors also remains highly fragile. In 
addition, these economies are suffering from both a 
lack of  competitiveness and weak domestic demand, 
as the price adjustments required have not fully mate­
rialised. Progress with necessary fundamental struc­
tural reforms is slow due to sturdy socio­political re­
sistance, the generous provision of  aid funds from the 
European relief  package, the relaxation of  fiscal poli­
cy objectives granted by the European Commission at 
the beginning of  2013, as well as the European 
Central Bank’s (ECB) measures to reduce country­
specific risk premiums on interest rates. Many gov­
ernments have seen these measures reduce both their 
previously very high funding costs and massive mar­
ket pressure to carry out structural reforms. At the 
same time, however, these policy measures have 
helped to take the existing anxiety out of  the financial 
markets and thereby support the moderately chang­
ing economic climate in Europe. Without a strong 
self­reinforcing economic recovery the sustainability 
of  such accommodating policies may, however, be 
called into question. 
Overall, the economic situation in the euro area re­
mains unclear. The moderate recovery that began last 
spring is nevertheless expected to continue this year; 
and this change compared to the previous two years 
does imply a positive impulse for the world economy. 
The negative impulse coming from fiscal austerity 
measures is expected to weaken further. In addition, 
net exports will also have a favourable effect, both due 
to the continuing weak imports noted in crisis coun­
tries and the moderate upturn in the world economy. 
Finally, the ongoing pressure on domestic prices in 
some of the structurally weak countries is expected to 
lead to an improvement in their international compet­
itiveness. Accordingly, the euro area is likely to benefit 
somewhat more strongly from the recovery in world 
trade than in the past. 
Domestic demand in the United Kingdom is likely to 
undergo an increasing revival this year, supported by 
an improvement in the asset positions of private 
households and expansionary monetary policy. 
All in all, total economic production in the world 
looks set to increase by 3.0 percent in 2014, following 
2.3 percent in 2013. 
Inflation is expected to accelerate slightly in the ad­
vanced economies, with the exception of the euro 
area. The effect of the value added tax increase sched­
uled for April 2014 is playing an important role in 
Japan. Given the moderate development of commod­
ity prices in recent months, inflation in emerging econ­
omies is not expected to provide any incentive to tight­
en monetary policy. 
Chapter 2
Switzerland: Relic of the Past, Model for the Future?
In the aftermath of World War II, European nations 
started to deploy economic integration as the means 
to the end of achieving cultural and political conver­
gence. Switzerland is an interesting exception in this 
context: It allows different cultures and fiercely inde­
pendent political entities to coexist within its bounda­
ries, has only slowly integrated its internal economic 
and institutional structure, and has not taken part in 
the European unification project that is challenged by 
the current crisis. The second Chapter of this year’s 
EEAG report studies the origins and recent evolution 
of the Swiss Confederation’s socio­political configura­
tion, and outlines how some of its features may be 
adapted for use in the European Union.
The critical tensions that currently threaten to derail 
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union are largely 
absent in Switzerland because the Swiss Confederation 
is very different from the European nation states, 
which traditionally aimed to build consensus around 
centralised institutions through cultural assimilation. 
That approach unfortunately tended to trigger intra­
European wars, is currently challenged by globalisa­
tion and migration trends, and is extremely unlikely to 
be implementable at the European Union level. 
Switzerland largely refrained from engaging in the na­
tion­building phase of European history, remained 
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neutral in its wars, and long maintained a fiscally de­
centralised and traditional type of socio­economic or­
ganisation, similar to that which prevailed throughout 
Europe before the Industrial Revolution. Swiss hist­
ory and current policy issues, however, are deeply con­
nected with those of its European neighbours, which 
have interacted with its economy through fiscal as well 
as market channels. Indeed, Europe influenced Swit­
zerland’s social and political configuration as the 
Swiss Confederation’s cohesion was fostered by the 
need to defend itself  from aggression.
Switzerland currently faces many of the welfare state 
and financial problems that trouble its European 
neighbours. It has developed an internal common 
market linked to the European Union’s, its federal so­
cial insurance schemes are approaching the size and 
unsustainability typical of continental European na­
tions, and it has faced financial and monetary crises 
similar to those that threaten to break up the euro 
area. The Swiss socio­political structure, however, ap­
pears in a better position than supranational European 
Union institutions to find pragmatic and democratic 
solutions to those problems: It supported early and ef­
fective implementation of public deficit restraints, and 
like the United States (but unlike European federal 
countries) refrains from debt mutualisation, relying 
on bankruptcy risk to deter excessive borrowing by 
sub­national public bodies. 
Switzerland enjoys a successful policy performance re­
cord despite its deep internal cultural heterogeneity. 
The country’s need to confront such heterogeneity 
may, in fact, be the key factor explaining its proverbial 
stability and its ability to devise and implement sensi­
ble economic policies. In Switzerland, cooperation is 
rooted in the “Konkordanz” principle of compromise 
between heterogeneous special interests with decen­
tralised decision powers. This principle was developed 
after a civil war and required to manage the peaceful 
coexistence of cultures ranging from the Germanic, 
catholic, rural, and conservative cultures of the origi­
nal Cantons, to the Protestant, Romanic, and enlight­
ened culture of Geneva, through a large variety of 
multi­dimensional local cultural specificities. 
Language and culture influence economic and politi­
cal interactions even more forcefully than voting 
rights and tax obligations not only within Switzerland, 
but also within and across European countries. Nation 
states traditionally root cooperation, solidarity, and 
market integration in processes of cultural assimila­
tion. Swiss history however suggests that cooperation 
and trade across culturally different societies, while 
neither easy nor riskless, is certainly possible and 
fruitful. Differences do not need to be eradicated when 
public policies and institutions seek cooperative solu­
tions to common problems, and durable compromises 
are cemented by the self­enforcing realisation that 
breaking agreements in pursuit of immediate gains 
would entail larger losses. 
Switzerland is becoming more similar to its European 
neighbours in various ways, and more tightly integrat­
ed with their financial, fiscal, and market structure. 
Europe may, in turn, benefit from becoming more 
Swiss in its approach to solving the key issue of defin­
ing and designing a new set of policies and political in­
teractions that works consistently both at lower levels 
than that of legacy countries, and across the bounda­
ries of historical nations. At the same time as the Swiss 
Confederation implements some institutional features 
of the European socio­economic system, the European 
Union might find it useful to implement some Swiss in­
stitutional features that are looser and less centralised 
than in traditional nation states, but pragmatically fo­
cused on the administrative, legal, monetary, and fiscal 
instruments that support market relationships, and 
held together by the common foreign policy and shared 
external concerns. The strength of such concerns may 
become more apparent as the evolution of the world’s 
geo­political configuration makes it necessary for 
Europe to assert its common economic interests with­
out the support of the United States.
Chapter 3
Austerity: Hurting but Helping
Since the sovereign debt crisis erupted in the euro 
area, there has been much discussion about the costs 
and benefits of fiscal adjustment or austerity during a 
recession. However, it also must be emphasised that 
austerity and the recession are also part of the adjust­
ment process. In the course of this process the external 
imbalances of the euro area periphery countries are 
reduced, and the production factors that were mis­
allocated in these countries during the pre­crisis boom 
get reallocated to their long­term sustainable use. It 
follows that neither austerity nor the recession was 
completely avoidable.
During the run­up to the crises optimistic expecta­
tions about income convergence generated an invest­
11 EEAG Report 2014
Summary
ment, and more specifically a construction boom in 
the periphery accompanied by ballooning current ac­
count deficits financed by private capital inflows. This 
demand expansion generated a faster rise in prices, in­
cluding real­estate prices, in the periphery than in the 
core. This eroded the competitiveness of the periphery 
countries, which reinforced the increase in current ac­
count deficits. In addition, the boom also resulted in a 
misallocation of resources within countries across dif­
ferent activities and firms. After the onset of the finan­
cial crisis private capital flows stalled, and in some cas­
es even reversed; and the investment boom collapsed 
causing a recession. 
Initially policymakers in the periphery perceived the fi­
nancial crisis as a temporary demand shock and, with 
the exception of Ireland, reacted with fiscal expansion 
in 2008 and 2009 to offset its recessionary effects. 
However, the shock turned out to be a combination of 
a longer­lasting negative demand and supply shock. 
The negative demand shock in the periphery was long­
er­lasting than in a normal recession because house­
holds in the periphery downwardly revised their expec­
tations about the speed of convergence to the euro area 
core. A more permanent supply shock originated from 
the pre­crisis misallocation of production factors. 
Once the crisis erupted, many firms realised that the 
employment levels of the boom years would not only 
be unsupported in the short term, but also in the long 
run. Thus production factors, and particularly labour, 
had to be reallocated across firms and economic activi­
ties, resulting in sharply falling employment levels. 
The financial crisis led to the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Firstly, the tax revenues of the boom years, par­
ticularly from the construction industry, were unsus­
tainable in the long run. The sharp decline in tax reve­
nues had a negative effect on government balances. 
Secondly, the collapse of the construction boom led to 
rising delinquency rates at the periphery banks. As the 
quality of the loan portfolio of the periphery banks 
deteriorated, governments had to bail out some of 
their banks, leading to a further worsening in fiscal po­
sitions. Thirdly, the initial efforts of the periphery gov­
ernments to offset the recessionary effects of the finan­
cial crisis turned out to be ineffective, as the latter faced 
a more permanent demand and supply shock, instead 
of a temporary demand shock. In fact, the expansion 
itself  led to further deterioration in fiscal balances.
The on­going adjustment in the euro area periphery is 
characterised by slowly declining prices relative to the 
core, by the reallocation of resources across activities, 
and by a slow improvement in external balances. The 
adjustment in prices is crucial both to external balanc­
es and labour reallocation, but hampered by several 
factors. Firstly, prices are sticky, so shocks are ab­
sorbed by a fall in output and employment to a larger 
extent. Secondly, extensive credits granted by the na­
tional central banks and fiscal rescue funds reduced 
pressure to implement austerity measures and hence 
slowed the pace of reform. Thirdly, expectations about 
the future path of prices were influenced by expecta­
tions regarding the break­up of the euro area. If  the 
euro area were to break up, the currencies of periph­
ery countries would devalue, and their prices would 
rise relative to those of the core countries. In periods 
when such a break­up was expected, prices in the pe­
riphery rose faster (fall slower) than in the absence of 
such expectations. In other words, such expectations 
slowed down internal devaluation in the periphery 
countries. Fourthly, labour market rigidities in the pe­
riphery countries make labour reallocation particular­
ly slow, leading to a prolonged recession. 
The adjustment towards a labour allocation and rela­
tive prices that are consistent with smaller external 
balances is accompanied by a recession, as is usually 
the case with any large­scale reallocation of labour. 
The recession provides incentives for periphery firms 
to reduce their prices and wages, which, in turn, induc­
es the reallocation of labour. Consequently austerity 
did not cause the recession in itself, but it contributed 
to it. A certain amount of austerity is a necessary part 
of the post­financial crisis adjustment. Hence, neither 
the austerity nor the recession was completely 
avoidable.
Chapter 4
Banking Union: Who Should Take Charge?
The European Union is putting in place a scheme for a 
banking union. The concept of a banking union has 
come to mean the centralisation of banking regula­
tion, supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance at 
the level of the euro area, with a common regulatory 
rule­book, supervisor, resolution authority, and de­
posit insurance scheme. In short, it amounts to apply­
ing single market principles to banking.
An EU Regulation for the “Single Supervisory Me­
cha nism” came into force in November 2013. One 
year later, in November 2014, the ECB is due to take 
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over supervision of  the 130 largest and most impor­
tant financial institutions in the euro area. Before that 
date, it will carry out an assessment of  the balance 
sheets of  those institutions, with a view to identify 
and remedy existing problems: the so­called legacy 
issues.
The European Commission has put forward a propos­
al for a Single Resolution Mechanism, on which agree­
ment between the Council of the European Union 
and the Commission has now been reached. They aim 
to reach an agreement with the Parliament by May 
2014, so that the regulation can be enacted. A com­
mon system of deposit insurance has not been given 
much attention yet, but is a relatively less urgent issue, 
given existing national provisions, which have been re­
inforced by changes made in December 2013, and 
slightly improved co­ordination of which will provide 
a reasonable interim solution. 
The main argument in favour of a banking union is 
that fiscally weak governments and fragile banking 
systems have become too closely connected. In addi­
tion, many banks operate across national boundaries 
within the euro area. For these reasons, regulation and 
supervision could be more effectively performed by 
one supervisor; while the resolution of such banks 
could be achieved more cleanly and quickly by a single 
euro area authority than by national authorities at­
tempting to coordinate with each other. Another ar­
gument often put forward is that national regulators 
have become too close to the banks they regulate, too 
susceptible to political pressure, too prone to delaying 
intervention and have incentives to offload costs onto 
the euro area as a whole. According to this line of ar­
gument, centralised supervision will be better supervi­
sion. There are euro­area­wide spill­over effects from 
a bank failure in a member state. Even small banks 
can have systemic effects. 
It is efficient to pool resources to provide insurance for 
the costs of bank failure, rather than having individu­
al member states pay for failures that occur in each ju­
risdiction. Pooling resources goes some way towards 
addressing the problem of institutions that are “too 
big to fail”. 
In addition, if  the ECB is to act as lender of last resort 
to euro area banks, it needs information on their sol­
vency, it must supervise them, it requires control, and 
it needs to be able to resolve failing institutions.
The principal arguments against centralisation are 
that it effectively represents a scheme for transferring 
resources to the financially weak states from the rest; 
and that it places too much power and responsibility 
in the hands of a single institution.
The idea of having a banking union follows many in­
terventions by the EU authorities since the financial 
crisis that were aimed at solving the euro area’s public 
debt and banking problems, and have enjoyed little 
success to date. These measures can be divided into 
four groups: (i) providing loans (”bailouts”) to heavily 
indebted governments unable to access commercial 
markets; (ii) reinforcing banking regulation; (iii) reviv­
ing the “Stability and Growth Pact” in the form of the 
new “Fiscal Compact”, with the aim of increasing the 
credibility of member states’ plans for fiscal consoli­
dation; and (iv) the ECB’s provision of liquidity to 
banking systems and its policy of low interest rates. 
However, none of these measures has had the desired 
effect of lowering interest rates for private sector bor­
rowers in periphery member states to the level of the 
rates paid in Germany and other fiscally sound, typi­
cally northern, euro area member states. Only the 
ECB’s policy of “Outright Monetary Transactions”, 
announced in September 2012, but not yet actually 
used in practice – the euro area’s long sought­after 
”big bazooka” – has met with partial success. 
It is not yet clear how effective the banking union will 
prove in insulating the banking system and public fi­
nances from each other in periphery member states, in 
improving the standards of bank supervision, and in 
providing a more effective mechanism for resolving 
failing institutions. A great deal depends on how the 
comprehensive assessment of banks’ balance sheets is 
undertaken in 2014, the rigour with which the legacy 
issues are identified, and the financing methods used. 
Looking further ahead, after the ECB takes over su­
pervision in November 2014, the banking union’s im­
pact will depend on the effectiveness of supervision 
and regulation by the ECB, and the way that the reso­
lution regime operates.
The resolution authority is intended to draw as little 
as possible on public funds, and to use the resources 
of banks and their creditors to resolve failed institu­
tions instead. The Single Resolution Mechanism, ac­
cording to current EU proposals, bails in creditors, in 
reverse order of seniority, but only after a large num­
ber of bank liabilities have been exempted. There is 
concern that the list of exemptions is too long, and 
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that banks will have insufficient liabilities that may be 
bailed­in to meet the costs of resolution: the targeted 
minimum of 8 percent may too low. As a back­up, the 
proposed “Single Resolution Authority” will accumu­
late a 55 billion euros fund, raised by a levy on banks, 
to be used when the resources of institutions under 
resolution have been exhausted. But this Single Bank 
Resolution Fund is likely to be too small to be useful. 
In any case, it will not be fully accumulated until 2026, 
prior to which individual countries will remain partly 
responsible for the costs of bank resolutions in their 
own jurisdictions, if  the bailing­in of the banks’ credi­
tors is insufficient. This has an ambiguous effect on 
the attempt to separate sovereigns from banks. On the 
one hand, it reduces the possibility of disentangling 
banks and sovereigns concerning legacy assets, on the 
other hand it reduces the incentives of banks to fur­
ther load their balance sheets with new toxic govern­
ment bonds and turns the entire European banking 
system into a tool to absorb even more government 
bonds. On current plans, a scheme for a euro­area­
wide mutual backstop to the Single Bank Resolution 
Fund will be devised, but it may not come into effect 
until 2026.
While the banking union could, in principle, prove a 
useful institution for pooling risk among states, im­
proving the standards of bank supervision and regula­
tion, and reversing the fragmentation of euro area 
banking, there remains a distinct possibility that it 
will, in fact, substantially act as a means of channel­
ling resources from financially sound, predominantly 
northern member states to southern periphery states 
with financial and banking problems.
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MacroeconoMic outlook
1.1 Introduction
The world economy has experienced a slight acceler-
ation in economic growth since summer 2013 and is 
expected to gradually gain further momentum in 
2014. Producer and consumer confidence improved 
in most major regions of  the world. For the first time 
in four years, industrialised countries became the 
driving force behind the economic recovery. 
Accompanied by a monetary policy that remains ex-
tremely expansionary, private debt reductions in the 
United States and the United Kingdom advanced, 
and fiscal policy in the euro area was no longer as re-
strictive as in previous years. Most importantly, un-
certainty regarding the future of  the euro area con-
tinued to fade. 
At the same time major emerging economies under-
went a period of faltering. This was partly due to, or 
at least triggered by, uncertainty regarding the gradual 
tightening of monetary policy in the United States last 
summer. Turkey, India, Indonesia, Brazil and South 
Africa in particular had to cope with rapid outflows of 
foreign capital. As a result, the refinancing conditions 
for both the private and public sectors deteriorated 
and their currencies devaluated quite sharply. 
During the summer the euro area recovered from a 
recession that had lasted over a year. The trigger for 
the recovery can be traced back to September 2012 
when the European Central Bank (ECB) introduced 
the so-called Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
programme, which basically implies an insurance 
scheme against extreme events for government bond 
holders in the euro area. This served to relieve the in-
terest burden faced by governments affected by the 
crisis and allowed them easier access to capital mar-
kets once again. At the same time, it reduced the pres-
sure to implement austerity programmes and thereby 
supported a return to less restrictive fiscal policy. 
The recovery is characterised by a pronounced het-
erogeneity among individual member countries. 
The situation remains fragile and susceptible to 
critical distortions in many of  these countries. 
Quite a few still face large private and/or public 
debts. In those countries that are most clearly af-
fected by the crisis, i.e. Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, the steep upward trend in 
loans at risk is as strong as ever. As argued in previ-
ous reports, the core of  the problem lies in their 
lack of  competitiveness (EEAG 2013, Chapter 2; 
EEAG 2012, Chapter 2). Unless competitiveness is 
restored, it is only a matter of  time before some of 
these countries fail to repay their foreign debt. 
Unfortun ately, an irreconcilable conflict exists be-
tween short- and long-term solutions. Measures 
that tend to be beneficial for the cyclical position 
of  an economy in many cases delay the restoration 
of  competitiveness through real depreciation, 
thereby impeding long-term recovery.
We do expect countries affected by the crisis to con-
tinue to gradually improve their international com-
petitiveness by further reducing (relative) price lev-
els. Since private debt is often still very high and un-
employment rates are also at historically high levels, 
domestic demand in these countries is, for the mo-
ment, likely to continue to decline. In addition, al-
though they have improved, refinancing conditions 
remain rather poor due to the unstable situation of 
the banking system, and as such are hindering in-
vestment activity. The reduced restrictiveness of  fis-
cal policy in recent times has acted as a stabiliser for 
short-term domestic demand. However, to the same 
extent that this discourages or postpones structural 
reforms, it also, in turn, weakens the forces that 
boost long-term competitiveness. The continued 
pursuit of  expansionary monetary policy also serves 
to support the economy. 
All in all, real gross domestic product (GDP) is ex-
pected to rise by 1.2 percent in the European Union 
this year. Whereas production in the crisis countries 
will increase only slightly (Spain and Portugal) or con-
tinue to dwindle (Cyprus, Greece and Italy), more ro-
bust economies like the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Germany will experience a boom. 
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1.2 The current situation
1.2.1 The global economy
Last year saw a slight acceleration 
in the pace of global economic 
expansion. Both world industrial 
production and world trade expe-
rienced slight gains in 2013 com-
pared to 2012 (see Figure 1.1). 
Thereby, global development was 
– as in preceding years – charac-
terised by strong heterogeneity 
amongst individual regions. 
While the economic situation in 
the advanced countries increas-
ingly improved, some major 
emerging economies underwent a 
phase of weakness triggered not 
only by cyclical, but in many cas-
es by structural factors, too. Thus, 
for the first time in over four 
years, the developed countries 
were the driving force behind the 
current economic recovery. Over-
all, the global rate of expansion 
was considerably more moderate 
than in the years prior to the fi-
nancial crisis. 
Whereas the economic climate 
improved during the first half  of 
2013 in Asia and North America, 
sentiment in Europe only started 
to follow this positive trend after 
the recession in the euro area offi-
cially ended, while Latin America 
even went into bust mode (see 
Figure 1.2). 
Not only the timing, but also the 
driving forces behind the mild re-
coveries in large parts of the world 
differed greatly from region to re-
gion and from country to country. 
Private households in the United 
States were in a position to expand 
their consumer spending, as they 
were supported by the improve-
ment in their financial situation, 
favourable developments in the 
housing market and the increasing 
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elucidation of the employment situation. The contrac-
tionary impetus provided by fiscal policy was more 
than compensated for. Activity in the construction sec-
tor also experienced faster growth. Lastly, the economy 
benefited from the continued and highly expansionary 
monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve. 
In Japan, monetary and fiscal policy has been ex-
tremely expansionary since the beginning of 2013. 
This boosted private consumption and investment ex-
penditure, while the domestic export industry reaped 
the benefits of a severely weakened yen. 
Most importantly for the world economy, by the 
spring of  2013 the European Union was finally in a 
position to free itself  from the ongoing recession, 
which had plagued it since the end of  2011. It has re-
corded moderate growth since then and has therefore 
ceased to choke the world economy. This develop-
ment was supported by reduced fiscal austerity, as 
well as fading uncertainty regarding the future of  the 
currency area. 
Although consumer and producer sentiments have 
strengthened almost everywhere in the euro area in re-
cent months, the economic situation of individual 
countries remains highly heterogeneous. Several euro 
area countries continue to suffer from very high public 
and/or private debt. Furthermore, the situation in the 
Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Greek banking sec-
tors is still highly fragile. In these countries, the shares 
of impaired loans are increasing steadily, thereby bur-
dening bank balance sheets. In addition, these econo-
mies are suffering from both a lack of competitiveness 
and weak domestic demand, as the price adjustments 
required have not fully materialised. The necessary 
fundamental reforms are delayed due to sturdy socio-
political resistance, the generous provision of aid 
funds from the European relief  package, the relaxa-
tion of fiscal policy objectives granted by the European 
Commission at the beginning of 2013, as well as ECB 
measures to reduce country-specific risk premiums on 
interest rates. Many governments have seen these 
measures reduce their previously very high funding 
costs, and with it the massive market pressure to carry 
out structural reforms. At the same time, however, 
these policy measures have helped to take the existing 
anxiety out of the financial markets and thereby sup-
port the moderately changing economic climate in 
Europe. Without a strong self-reinforcing economic 
recovery the sustainability of such accommodating 
policies may, however, be called into question. 
In a number of major emerging economies, the pace 
of economic expansion has continued to diminish 
since last autumn, albeit to different degrees. Both cy-
clical and structural factors are crucial in this respect. 
Many emerging economies struggled under the very 
weak demand from advanced economies. In the ma-
jority of the emerging world, government deficits are 
moderate and national debt is still relatively low. Some 
countries like China and Brazil used the existing fiscal 
and political room for manoeuvre to, at least partly, 
compensate for this weak demand from advanced 
economies by means of investment programs.
Russia, Brazil and other Latin American countries 
suffered from stagnating or declining commodity 
prices. In many cases, another important factor was 
the after-effects of  gradual monetary and fiscal do-
mestic tightening, which took place until about mid-
2012. On top of  that, many emerging countries faced 
some rapid outflows of  foreign capital last summer, 
which significantly deteriorated the refinancing con-
ditions for their private and public sectors and set 
numerous currencies under a massive devaluation 
pressure. This turmoil was partially a response to 
the slowdown in economic growth in the emerging 
economies. How ever, tensions in the financial and 
foreign exchange markets were primarily triggered 
by signals that a gradual tightening of  monetary 
policy in the United States might be initiated earlier 
than anticipated by financial market participants. 
While many regions of  the world were confronted 
with a temporary slowdown in capital inflows, cur-
rency devaluations against the US dollar and rising 
bond yields, these adjustments were particularly 
pronounced in the emerging markets (Turkey, India, 
Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa), where public and 
private debtors were in an especially vulnerable posi-
tion regarding devaluations of  domestic currencies. 
These economies have relatively high short-term 
funding needs denominated in US dollars. The re-
sulting capital flows were stabilised by the end of  the 
summer due to base rate increases and foreign ex-
change market intervention on the part of  several of 
these countries’ central banks, as well as the decision 
of  the US Federal Reserve to postpone tapering of 
its quantitative easing policy at that time. Although 
this effectively contained financial market turmoil, 
the refinancing conditions for households, business-
es and the state have – in many cases – remained 
more restrictive since the summer than they were 
previously.
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In addition, the growth decline 
in emerging markets also under-
lies structural factors. Several 
key emerging economies are 
faced with a marked flattening 
of  their population growth, 
slowing down the increase in la-
bour force potential and also re-
ducing potential growth as a re-
sult. In addition, China has sus-
tained losses versus other emerg-
ing markets due to a relatively 
rapid increase in its labour costs 
in recent years, which noticeably 
impacted China’s competitive-
ness. Moreover, there are in-
creasing signs suggesting that 
the potential of  the Chinese 
growth model based on capital 
accumulation is slowly being ex-
hausted. As a result of  the exces-
sive capacities that have been es-
tablished in many areas, further 
investments appear less profita-
ble and therefore less attractive. 
China’s relatively advanced state 
of  economic development de-
creases the scope for productivi-
ty improvements through the 
adoption of  existing advanced 
technologies. In Brazil, by con-
trast, the lack of  infrastructure 
and strong government interven-
tionism are diminishing the country’s attractiveness 
as an investment location. In India, difficulties in the 
banking sector, energy supply shortages and the 
over-regulation of  many industry sectors are very 
likely to impede economic expansion. Although all 
of  these structural factors have been present for 
some time now, their effects were more than com-
pensated for in the first three years after the severe 
downturn in the winter of  2008/2009 by the stimu-
lating effects of  massive expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policy measures.
The overall weak development of  the world econo-
my, together with stagnating or declining raw mate-
rial prices, allowed world inflation to remain around 
or slightly below 3½ percent in 2013, which was al-
ready the case throughout most of  2012 (see 
Figure 1.3). 
1.2.2 United States
In the United States, economic developments were driv-
en by fiscal policy last year to quite a large extent. At the 
beginning of 2013, the payroll tax rate was raised by 2 
percentage points, and income tax on the wealthy was 
also increased. In March, the so-called “sequester” – 
with cuts in discretionary federal spending – took effect. 
The combined impact of these measures slowed down 
the economy. Most of the dampening impulses started to 
phase out last summer. Whereas both government con-
sumption and investment plummeted during the winter 
of 2012/13, investment contributed positively again in 
the third quarter of last year. As a result, the expansion 
rate of real GDP accelerated from an annualised 1 per-
cent during the previous winter to over 2.5 percent last 
summer (see Figure 1.4). At the beginning of the fourth 
quarter, the budgetary dispute paralysed the federal ad-
ministration for two weeks, again with a dampening ef-
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fect on the overall economy.1 The direct demand effect of 
a two-week “government shutdown”, associated in-
creased economic uncertainty and the implementation 
of some restrictive measures already planned for in the 
spring did result in subdued development during the 
fourth quarter of last year. In addition, the strong stock-
building tendency of the third quarter stopped almost 
completely. The annual US real GDP growth rate conse-
quently turned out to be 1.9 percent in 2013. 
Private consumption and investment expenditure con-
tributed differently to the overall acceleration in US 
economic growth last year. Private households com-
pensated for the tax burden at the 
beginning of the year almost ex-
clusively by lowering their savings 
rate. While private consumption 
growth therefore remained re-
markably stable throughout most 
of the year and increased its pace 
during the fourth quarter (see 
Figure 1.5), most of the observed 
dynamics came from movements 
in stocks. Whereas inventory in-
vestment generated a negative 
growth impulse at the end of 
2012, it provided strong growth 
impulses over the first half  of 
2013, and again during the third 
quarter when a normalisation of 
the weather conditions – as com-
pared to the extremely dry weath-
er in 2012 – led to an unusually 
strong increase in stocks in the 
agricultural sector. As far as pri-
vate fixed investment is con-
cerned, low growth in the first 
quarter of 2013 merely compen-
sated for strong investment activi-
ties at the end of 2012 brought 
1    As Democrats and Republicans were un-
able to agree on a new budget law by the 
end of the fiscal year on 30 September 
2013, the necessary legal grounds for the 
approval of budgetary funds were lacking. 
Consequently, all non-security authorities 
of the US federal government had to cease 
their activities by 1 October. On 16 October, 
one day before the onset of technical insol-
vency due to the simultaneously reached 
statutory debt ceiling, only a minimal con-
sensus for a transitional budget was initial-
ly reached. By mid-December, Democrats 
and Republicans had managed to agree on 
a draft budget for the next two years. This 
draft was approved in mid-January 2014 by 
both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives.
forward in anticipation of the then forthcoming fiscal 
consolidation. Ever since, private residential and non-
residential construction activities have strongly sup-
ported overall private fixed investment. By contrast, 
equipment investment was particularly sluggish com-
pared to other investment components. 
After a weaker phase during last summer, the labour 
market has now stabilised. On average, about 200,000 
jobs were created per month during the months of 
August to November. This allowed the unemployment 
rate to fall from 7.9 percent at the beginning of 2013 
to 6.7 percent in December (see Figure 1.6). Never-
a) In constant prices, seasonally adjusted and work-day adjusted.
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, last accessed on 31 January 2014.
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theless, the increase in employment is still below aver-
age compared to past recovery phases in the United 
States and the unemployment rate is falling largely 
due to a continued drop in the participation rate.
After coming down in 2012, inflation stayed low, but 
was relatively volatile during 2013 (see Figure 1.7). As 
indicated by the much more stable core inflation rate, 
i.e. the rate of inflation excluding energy and food 
costs, the observed volatility was primarily due to 
changes in energy prices. Overall, actual inflation 
reached an average of 1.5 percent in 2013.
1.2.3 Asia
China’s economy picked up speed over the course of 
2013. After a trough in the first quarter of 2013, real 
GDP growth continued to in-
crease throughout the year, re-
sulting in an annual growth rate 
of 7.7 percent. Fiscal policy 
turned expansionary until mid-
2013 to circumvent a further re-
duction in economic growth ob-
served during the winter of 
2012/13. The fiscal measures 
mainly constituted a temporary 
increase in public investment. 
Although the service sector con-
tinues to outperform other areas 
of the economy and overtook in-
dustry in terms of size last year, 
overall strong economic develop-
ment was also underlined by a 
substantial increase in industrial 
production in recent months. The 
main catalyst was expanding cap-
ital investment, while private con-
sumption generated smaller im-
pulses. China’s economic growth 
continues to be based heavily on 
investment, with over 50 percent 
of overall growth last year linked 
to this demand component. In 
particular, the sharp rise in resi-
dential construction has led to a 
significant boost in investments. 
Due to feeble global demand, ex-
ports generated little economic 
momentum last year. Another 
reason for weak Chinese exports 
is the relatively sharp increase in unit labour costs in 
recent years. China is slowly losing its ability to com-
pete with other emerging markets as a result. In addi-
tion, some Asian emerging countries were faced with 
currency devaluations last year, making them more re-
luctant to import goods and services from China. 
Export growth to the European Union only seems to 
have overcome its persistent weakness since the last 
quarter of 2013, thereby reflecting recent economic 
progress in that region. 
Inflation in China has steadily increased from below 
2 percent at the end of 2012 to about 3 percent at the 
end of last year. However, it is doubtful whether this 
can be regarded as an indication of a permanent in-
crease in inflation. Core inflation still seems anchored 
at levels below 2 percent and producer prices in the in-
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dustrial sector have been declining since March 2012. 
The latter can be interpreted as an indication of over-
capacities in this sector.
The strong growth in house prices appears more wor-
risome. Despite signs of a slowdown, these growth 
rates are still multiples of overall inflation rates. The 
real-estate boom was caused by the low interest rates 
that state-owned banks are allowed to offer house-
holds on their savings and limited possibilities for in-
vesting abroad. For many households investing in re-
al-estate is the only viable option. A liberalised capital 
market would, in principle, have prevented such a de-
velopment from emerging. However, now that the 
bubble exists, there is a risk that liberalisation will act 
as the trigger to burst it.
The growth rate in the Japanese economy lost dynam-
ics during the second half  of  2013. The pace of  eco-
nomic expansion in Japan was nevertheless still high-
er than in most other OECD countries, and clearly 
above average from an historical perspective. The 
Japanese government primarily stimulated the econo-
my by means of  its expansionary fiscal policy. Private 
consumption took a breather, after performing ex-
ceedingly well in the first half  of  the year. Public in-
vestment and private construction spending remained 
strong, reaching double digit growth rates. By con-
trast, growth in private equipment investment slowed 
somewhat. After having shrunk throughout 2012 and 
stagnating early last year, the upturn in the second 
quarter of  2013 generated hopes for a stronger turna-
round. It is disappointing for the current government 
that this turnaround so far failed to materialise, as the 
medium-term success of  its policy is based on the 
participation of  private investors in the upswing. 
Weak demand from emerging Asian markets caused 
by recent currency turmoil did exert downward pres-
sure on net exports. This unexpected downturn mani-
fested in rising inventories. The temporary nature of 
this downturn is also reflected by the overall improved 
business situation and the sentiment of  large compa-
nies. Real GDP is expected to have risen by 1.6 per-
cent in 2013.
The Japanese central bank continued to pursue its ex-
pansionary monetary policy in 2013. In order to 
achieve its new inflation target of 2 percent, it mas-
sively expanded the central bank money stock; since 
the beginning of 2013, the Bank of Japan’s monetary 
base has risen by about 50 percent. Although this has 
not been reflected in other money supply aggregates to 
date, the inflation rate turned positive in early summer 
and stood at 1.5 percent in November. This was par-
tially due to the steady rise in domestic energy prices. 
However, even excluding the prices of food and ener-
gy, consumer prices started to rise in November by 
0.6 percent, which was the highest value recorded for 
the core inflation rate in the last 15 years. The recent 
increase in consumer prices is only marginally notice-
able in the average annual inflation rate, which turned 
out to be 0.3 percent on average in 2013. 
The pace of economic expansion in India accelerated 
slightly in the second half  of 2013, after declining 
steadily since the fall of 2011. The main reason for this 
acceleration was the positive impact of fiscal policy. 
Private consumption, however, remained feeble. On 
the production side, the pace of economic growth in 
agriculture, as well as in the services sector and manu-
facturing, remained low. India was temporarily con-
fronted with large capital outflows, leading to a depre-
ciation of its currency of about 20 percent against the 
US dollar during the summer. The risk of a prolonged 
cessation of foreign capital injection caused the cen-
tral bank in India to follow a more restrictive mone-
tary policy – three increases in its key interest rate ma-
terialised since autumn – which, in turn, dampened 
the business cycle, but did stabilise the external value 
of the Indian rupee. Structural problems, like deficien-
cies in infrastructure and bottlenecks in energy supply 
are, at least partially, to blame for the overall weak 
economic developments in India from an historical 
perspective. Real GDP growth is expected to have 
again been only 3.9 percent last year. At 11.5 percent, 
the annual inflation rate, on the other hand, remains 
far above its average value.
After a feeble 2012, the economies of the Asian Tiger 
countries (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) gained momentum during 2013. This was 
mainly due to a strong upturn in private consumption. 
Despite continued weakness in foreign demand, for-
eign trade made a positive contribution to growth in 
South Korea, where exports to the United States and 
to the European Union in particular increased. In ad-
dition, the expansionary economic policies of the 
South Korean government supported the recovery. 
Inflation is still below average by historical standards, 
enabling a continuation of expansionary monetary 
policies. All in all, overall economic production is like-
ly to have risen in the fourth quarter at a similar rate to 
the previous quarter. 
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After their above-average growth in 2012, the emerg-
ing Asian countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia 
and the Philippines) posted lower growth rates in 2013. 
Weak external demand and the decline in investments 
have had a negative impact on all of these economies 
except the Philippines. Inadequate institutions, unnec-
essary bureaucracy and inefficiencies in the financial 
sector also hampered growth. The Philippines once 
again appears to be the exception here.
Unlike the others, the biggest of these economies, 
Indonesia, has faced substantial capital outflows since 
mid-2013. The Indonesian rupiah fell by around 30 per-
cent against the US dollar over the course of the year. 
Short-term liabilities, as well as current account deficits, 
which had been increasing for several years, have made 
the country susceptible to shifts in market sentiment. 
Taken together, these eight East Asian countries are 
expected to have seen – as in 2012 – an increase in total 
real GDP of 3.8 percent in 2013.
1.2.4 Latin America
The moderate pace of expansion observed since 2012 
in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezu­
ela, Colombia and Chile) continued throughout 2013. 
This was especially driven by Brazil and Argentina, 
the two largest economies of the region. However, real 
GDP growth also slowed down significantly in 
Mexico. In addition to weaker external demand (espe-
cially from the United States), which led to a decline in 
industrial production, the government reduced its ex-
penditure and lower construction activity was record-
ed. Colombia and Chile remained relatively robust by 
comparison. Here, the expansion of real GDP did 
slow down due to weaker external and domestic de-
mand, but not to as great an extent as in the countries 
mentioned above. 
In Brazil, the base rate (BACEN Selic target rate) 
gradually increased from 7.25 percent in April to 
10 percent by the end of last year. By contrast, mone-
tary policy in most other countries of the region be-
came more expansionary. This was especially true of 
Mexico, where the Banxico overnight interbank rate 
was reduced from 4.5 percent in March to 3.5 percent 
in October 2013, which marks an historical low. 
In anticipation of rising yields in the industrialised 
countries, the currencies of the countries of Latin 
America have been subjected to strong downward 
pressure since May 2013. The Brazilian Real had de-
preciated by around 20 percent against the US dollar 
by the end of August. After the US Central Bank’s an-
nouncement in September that it would postpone the 
tapering of its asset buying program, the situation in 
the international capital markets calmed down again. 
Despite the negative impact of these strong exchange 
rate reactions last summer, Latin American countries 
are far less vulnerable than in previous (currency) cri-
ses. In addition to flexible exchange rates, most coun-
tries in the region have substantial foreign exchange 
reserves at their disposal, which are sufficient to stabi-
lise their exchange rates in case of an emergency. A 
certain amount of risk, however, is attached to high 
foreign currency liabilities. In many of these countries 
the vast majority of external debt is recorded in for-
eign currency, making the holders vulnerable to cur-
rency devaluations. 
In total, the Latin American economies are expected 
to have grown by 2.5 percent last year. In general, in-
flation rates have fallen since mid-2013, after having 
increased previously. The exceptions to this rule are 
Venezuela and Argentina, where inflation rates re-
mained double-digit. Annual inflation in the region 
was 6.9 percent in 2013, following 6.2 percent in 2012.
1.2.5 The European economy
The cyclical situation
In spring the economy of the European Union 
emerged from a recession that had lasted over a year 
and has since been able to expand slightly. The EU 
economy nevertheless remains in pretty bad shape, as 
it is still characterised by a pronounced heterogeneity 
among individual member countries and remains 
fragile and susceptible to critical distortions in the fi-
nancial market. Several member states still carry with 
them enormous private and/or public debt, often gen-
erated in the decade prior to the crisis. Given the weak 
economic development and low inflation rates of the 
past five years, the debt, despite consolidation efforts, 
increased even further. In some cases, the sustainabili-
ty of public debt by international investors is still be-
ing called into question. Accordingly, Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland and Spain have not been able to refi-
nance themselves, or only at capital market conditions 
that were politically considered unacceptable, in the 
past three years. This has made them dependent on 
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grants from international institutions, like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ECB; or 
they merely preferred the conditions required by these 
organisations above to those imposed by the capital 
market. The situation of the banking sector is also 
very fragile in many countries. In Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and Italy, the steep upward trend in loans at 
risk remains strong. Indeed, the political inability of 
these countries to implement timely and, where neces-
sary, drastic restructuring of the banking sector, con-
tributes to the difficulties experienced by the EU 
economy. 
As argued in previous reports, the core of the problem 
lies, however, in its lack of competitiveness (EEAG 
2013, Chapter 2; EEAG 2012, Chapter 2). The credit 
bubble has made some countries too expensive. In 
these countries, devaluations via price restraint are re-
quired at a scale of up to 30 percent in order to facili-
tate the restoration of competitiveness within the euro 
area. Implicit loan assistance, via TARGET2 balances 
(see EEAG 2013, Chapter 2) and the loans of the in-
ternational community have served to alleviate the 
problems so far, but they have probably also protract-
ed the real solution of the issue at hand by making the 
lack of competitiveness somewhat more bearable. 
Nevertheless, some progress has been made. Table 1.1 
reveals that unit labour costs in the private economy 
did increase substantially, with average annual rates of 
well-above 3 percent in the crisis countries, since the 
introduction of the euro and before the euro crisis. 
During the last four years, these four countries have, 
on average, seen a decline in these unit labour costs. 
When taking into account the structure of competi-
tion in both export and import markets and exchange 
rate developments, to get a measure of international 
competitiveness, the picture remains largely un-
changed. Although relative unit labour costs increased 
considerably during the 1999–2009 period, we have 
seen a strong decline since then. Another, albeit more 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 94, November 2013. 
 
Table 1.1 
Labour costsa) 
  
Compensation 
per employeeb) 
Real compen-
sation costsc) 
Labour 
productivity 
Unit labour 
costs 
Relative unit 
labour costsd) Export performance
e) 
  
1999 
– 
2009 
2010 
– 
2013 
1999
–
2009 
2010
–
2013 
1999
–
2009 
2010
–
2013 
1999
–
2009 
2010
–
2013 
1999
–
2009 
2010 
– 
2013 
1999
–
2009 
2010 
– 
2013 2013 
Germany 1.0 2.3 0.2 0.8 0.4 1.2 0.5 1.3 – 1.3 – 1.3 0.7 1.6 – 1.3 
France 2.7 2.5 0.9 1.2 0.6 0.9 2.2 1.2 0.6 – 1.0 – 2.6 – 0.6 – 1.6 
Italy 1.8 2.1 – 0.5 0.8 – 0.4 0.0 3.0 1.2 1.5 – 1.3 – 3.7 – 0.4 – 2.3 
Spain 3.1 1.5 – 0.3 1.3 0.4 2.1 3.5 – 2.3 1.8 – 4.4 – 0.9 1.9 2.8 
Netherlands 3.2 1.7 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.2 2.6 1.0 1.2 – 1.5 – 0.1 0.2 –0.1 
Belgium 2.6 2.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 2.2 1.8 1.0 – 0.4 – 1.7 – 1.1 – 1.5 
Austria 2.2 2.1 0.7 0.2 0.9 0.4 1.2 1.8 – 0.3 – 0.3 –0.3 – 0.7 – 0.2 
Greece 4.9   1.8   1.7 – 0.2 4.1 – 4.5 1.9 – 6.9 – 1.5 – 4.1 – 0.4 
Finland 3.1 3.0 1.7 1.1 1.0 0.9 2.3 1.8 0.7 – 1.5 – 1.1 – 4.2 – 3.3 
Ireland 4.6 0.6 2.1 0.6 1.9 1.6 3.5 – 2.3 2.6 – 4.8 2.2 – 1.2 – 1.4 
Portugal 3.8 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.6 3.2 – 1.4 1.1 – 2.5 – 1.4 2.5 4.4 
Slovakia 8.1 3.3 4.0 2.2 3.7 2.7 3.1 0.4 3.7 –1.8 2.6 5.4 4.1 
United Kingdom 3.9 1.9 1.7 – 0.4 1.3 0.4 2.7 1.6 – 1.5 0.1 – 1.6 – 1.5 0.6 
Sweden 3.1 2.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.9 0.5 – 1.3 3.2 – 0.5 – 1.2 – 3.3 
Denmark 3.3 2.1 1.0 – 0.1 0.5 1.3 3.2 0.5 1.8 – 2.4 – 0.2 – 2.2 – 0.7 
Poland 4.6 7.2 1.1 5.2 3.7 3.6 2.3 1.4 – 0.6 – 0.2 2.9 1.2 3.0 
Czech Republic 6.0 3.4 3.8 3.2 3.2 0.3 2.4 1.1 3.8 – 0.4 3.0 1.8 – 1.4 
Hungary 8.1 3.1 2.0 0.2 2.4 0.0 6.6 1.6 3.6 – 2.2 4.4 1.1 2.3 
Iceland 6.6 5.4 1.1 1.3 2.1 – 0.4 5.3 6.8 – 3.2 5.5 1.5 – 1.9 – 0.3 
Norway 4.6 4.3 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.6 0.4 4.5 3.6 2.9 3.5 – 3.2 – 4.8 – 3.0 
Switzerland 1.8 1.3 0.7 1.1 0.6 0.5 1.5 0.2 0.7 3.0 – 0.2 – 1.2 0.3 
Japan – 1.1 0.9 0.1 2.3 0.7 2.0 – 1.5 – 1.6 – 1.8 – 5.8 – 3.3 – 1.6 – 2.6 
United States 3.6 2.3 1.5 0.7 1.8 1.4 1.9 1.0 – 1.6 – 2.2 – 1.7 – 0.7 – 0.9 
China                 3.6 6.9 11.4 5.7 5.9 
a) Growth rates for the total economy. – b) Compensation per employee in the private sector. – c) Compensation per employee 
in the private sector deflated by the GDP deflator. – d) Competitiveness: weighted relative unit labour costs. – e) Ratio between 
export volumes and export markets for total goods and services. A positive number indicates gains in market shares and a 
negative number indicates a loss in market shares. 
Table 1.1
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crude, measure of competitiveness is the GDP defla-
tor. By incorporating the public sector and not cor-
recting for productivity gains, this measure is bound 
to react at a slower pace and to a lesser extent. Never-
theless, some degree of convergence is also depicted by 
this measure (see Figure 1.8).
Although a significant part of the adjustment in the 
observed improvement in the trade balances (see 
Figure 1.9) is due to the strong decline in imports in 
crisis-afflicted countries, some of it is also achieved by 
improved competitiveness. In Portugal and Spain im-
proved competitiveness has indeed already been re-
flected by gains in market shares. This is not yet the 
case for both Ireland and Greece. Whereas for Greece 
a clear reduction in the loss of export shares can be 
observed, data on Ireland calls into question whether 
an appreciable improvement in its competitiveness has 
been achieved. However, as Ireland already has a 
structural trade balance surplus, this also does not ap-
pear to be needed. The other crisis countries, however, 
are at the start of a long adaptation process during 
which they will become more competitive again by 
gradually deflating relative to other countries within 
and outside of the euro area. It still remains unclear 
whether these societies will be able to withstand the re-
sulting stress, or whether political forces shall prevail 
that seek a quicker fix to the competitiveness problem 
via exiting the euro and devaluating domestic 
currencies.
The necessary price and wage reductions have been 
slowed down by the fact that, in many places, the 
goods and labour markets are still not sufficiently flex-
ible. This diminishes competition and innovation pres-
sure by means of market entry barriers. However, sev-
eral member countries have initi-
ated reforms to address such 
structural deficiencies over the 
past few years. Nonetheless, it 
will take some time before the 
necessary reforms are fully imple-
mented, and even more time until 
their positive effects can actually 
be observed. The problem is that 
reduced demand, which consti-
tutes a prerequisite for recovery, 
entails great hardships on the 
population, potentially leading to 
social destabilisation and unrest. 
Due to reduced tensions in finan-
cial markets allowing policymak-
ers to relax fiscal consolidation ef-
forts, the economy of the euro 
area was able to start expanding 
again after it had shrivelled since 
the fourth quarter of 2011. Pro-
duction not only increased in 
countries such as Germany and 
Austria that already enjoyed rela-
tively good economic conditions, 
but structurally weak economies 
like France, Belgium, the Nether-
lands and Finland started to grow 
again after facing recessionary 
tendencies in varying degrees pre-
viously. The recovery was even 
felt in the countries severely af-
fected by the crisis like Portugal 
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and Ireland. In Italy and Greece, 
the recession lost strength. All in 
all, real GDP is expected to have 
declined by 0.4 percent in the euro 
area and, with a growth rate of 0.0 
percent, it stagnated in the 
European Union in 2013 com-
pared to 2012.
Although fragile, the recovery has 
been supported to date by final 
domestic demand (see Figu-
re 1.10). With the benefit of hind-
sight a key trigger to this more 
positive turn in the cyclical devel-
opment of the euro area was the 
ECB’s introduction of its OMT 
programme in September 2012. 
This free insurance scheme on 
government bonds of crisis coun-
tries that lowered government 
bond spreads considerably served 
to relieve the interest burden of 
governments affected by the crisis 
and facilitated their access to cap-
ital markets. This, in turn, al-
lowed governments to take a 
more relaxed stance on budgetary 
discipline, as shown by public 
consumption growth, which 
turned positive again by the end 
of 2012. The stabilisation of in-
vestor confidence that emanated 
from the OMT projected more 
optimism about the survival of the monetary union 
and led to a general increase in confidence indicators 
across all sectors (see Figure 1.11). The investors ven-
tured into more investments, and private households 
started spending more eagerly. Consequently, domes-
tic demand in the crisis countries shrank to a lesser 
extent than in previous years, while expansion in pri-
vate consumption and investments in the economical-
ly healthier markets accelerated slightly. In early 2013 
private consumption started growing again in the 
European Union as a whole, after two years of con-
tinuous decline (see Figure 1.12). This was followed by 
positive investment growth from the second quarter 
onwards.
By contrast, export activities showed irregular tenden-
cies both across countries, as well as in the European 
Union as a whole. While Spain and Portugal, for ex-
ample, succeeded in increasing their market shares in 
non-European markets after the catastrophic collapse 
of 2009, the shares of France and Italy subsided sig-
nificantly. After declining export activities during the 
winter of 2012/13, a strong pick up was observed for 
the European Union as a whole during the second 
quarter. This, however, did not continue during the 
second half  of the year.
The feeble economy and the negative short-term effects 
of the necessary structural adjustment processes imple-
mented by many member states have yet hardly had any 
positive impact on the still very unfavourable European 
labour market situation to date. The aggregate unem-
ployment rate for both the European Union and the 
euro area only managed to stabilise at historically high 
levels (see Figure 1.13). Accordingly, real wage increases 
generally turned out to be modest, which on the one 
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hand restrained private consump-
tion growth, but on the other con-
stitutes a basic prerequisite for the 
restoration of competitiveness. A 
higher unemployment rate is also 
associated with larger concerns 
about preserving one’s own job, as 
well as with lower re-employment 
opportunities in the event of dis-
missal. This serves to further 
dampen consumer confidence. 
Nevertheless, for some time now, 
the Irish and Portuguese labour 
markets have shown some signifi-
cant improvements. In France and 
the Netherlands, the labour market 
situation also started to improve 
slightly by the end of last year. In 
Belgium, Finland, Italy and Spain, 
a turn for the better, however, is not 
yet discernible. 
The unfavourable employment 
situation and the weakness of do-
mestic demand has been causing 
the inflation rate in the euro area 
to drop since the middle of last 
year in all member countries, al-
beit to varying degrees. This trend 
has been supported by a decline 
in energy prices, the slight appre-
ciation of the euro and the fading 
impact of past consumption tax 
increases introduced in many 
member states to raise tax reve-
nues. As a result, the inflation rate 
for the euro area steadily 
dropped from 3.0 percent in 
November 2011 to 0.7 percent in 
October 2013, before increasing 
slightly in the following month 
to 0.9 percent (see Figure 1.14). 
Core inflation, which is adjusted 
for fluctuations in energy prices 
and prices of unprocessed food 
and therefore better reflects euro 
area specific developments, has 
also been declining since the au-
tumn of 2011. It reached 0.9 per-
cent in December. Although the 
downward trend was present in 
almost all member countries, na-
Source: Eurostat, last accessed on 31 January 2014.
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tional inflation rates show a high degree of heteroge-
neity. Now that the tax increases have largely passed 
through to inflation rates, the remaining and still con-
siderable dispersion reflects the diversity of the com-
petitive situation of the countries. 
Differences across Europe
In Germany, the European debt crisis and weak devel-
opments in world trade did depress the overall econo-
my during the winter of 2012/13. The economic situa-
tion has improved substantially since. Nevertheless, 
the contribution of the external sector did not turn 
out to be positive in 2013. Although exports did pick 
up, imports grew to an even greater extent. Larger 
quantities were imported from third countries, while 
imports from within the euro area declined. The good 
income prospects and favourable financing conditions 
have become increasingly noticeable. As a result, busi-
ness confidence substantially increased. Consumers 
also regained more confidence in the future. This ben-
efited both consumption and equipment investment, 
with the latter gaining momentum in the spring after 
having fallen for one-and-a-half  years. In addition to 
the reduced uncertainty of investors about economic 
progress, gloomy corporate earnings prospects have 
brightened during the year. Due to the still slightly be-
low-average utilisation of production capacities in the 
summer months, the pace of increase in equipment in-
vestment remained, however, comparatively low.
After a bad start due to adverse weather conditions, 
cons truction investment remained on an upward 
course. It has already benefited for some time from the 
flight into German assets and 
out of their foreign counter-
parts. All in all, domestic de-
mand was the main driving force 
behind the German economy 
since spring last year. Additional 
impetus was generated by re-
pairs induced by the flooding of 
particular regions. Real private 
consumption also rose in an eco-
nomically robust manner. This 
was promoted by both good la-
bour market conditions, which 
combined with low inflation, has 
led to considerable real wage in-
creases and a decline in the pro-
pensity to save. Overall, the 
strong decline at the end of 2012 
caused real GDP in 2013 to have only exceeded its 
2012 level by 0.4 percent.
The demand for labour remained high. The average 
number of working hours increased owing to a reduc-
tion in short-time work, as well as an increase in over-
time associated with a catching up of winter-related 
production losses. At the same time, the readiness to 
recruit new staff  members remained high, so that so-
cial security contributions increased at a steady pace. 
Nevertheless, the unemployment rate did not decrease 
substantially. The reasons for this were the immigra-
tion from Central and Eastern Europe and the 
European crisis countries and a rising labour force 
participation of nationals. 
Due to longer average working hours, unit labour 
costs, which rose sharply in the winter of 2012/13, 
could slightly subside again. Also due to the fall in en-
ergy prices, inflation remained moderate throughout 
the year. Overall, the consumer price level increased 
by 1.6 percent last year.
After developing strongly in the second quarter of 
2013, the economy of France is likely to have shrunk 
again during the second half  of the year. The repeated 
fall back into recession was mainly due to falling ex-
ports and weakened private investment. On the other 
hand, private and public consumption continued to 
contribute positively to growth. This is also reflected 
by imports, which have shown a strong increase in the 
course of last year. All in all, real GDP basically stag-
nated with an overall growth rate of 0.2 percent rela-
tive to 2012.
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During the first nine months of last year, the unem-
ployment rate continued to increase, albeit at a re-
duced pace, only to slowly start its descent in October, 
reaching 10.8 percent on average in 2013, which is 
more than double the German rate. 
The rise in consumer prices declined significantly. This 
was not only due to the under-utilisation of capacities, 
but also as a result of declining energy and food pric-
es. The average inflation rate for 2013 amounted to 
only 1.0 percent, after 2.2 percent in 2012.
The economy of the United Kingdom picked up noticea-
bly in the course of 2013. In particular, domestic demand 
rose sharply; both private consumption and gross fixed 
capital formation expanded strongly due to improved 
sentiment in the private sector, which was also induced by 
programmes like the government-backed help-to-buy-a-
home initiative. The trade deficit, however, widened in the 
second half of 2013, thereby offsetting the decrease ob-
served during the first half of that year. Exports dropped 
significantly, while imports showed a moderate increase. 
Overall, real GDP in the United Kingdom is expected to 
have risen by 1.9 percent last year.
Despite the strong upturn, the situation of the labour 
market still remains bleak. The unemployment rate 
has remained virtually unchanged until the end of 
summer and has only been coming down slowly since. 
The average unemployment rate for 2013 turned out 
to be 7.5  percent. As a result, the rise in wages re-
mained moderate. Until the end of summer the infla-
tion rate basically stuck at a level of around 2.7 per-
cent. The price-raising effects that resulted from the 
increase in government-regulated prices basically nul-
lified the general tendency in other price components 
to slow down in pace. In October 2013, when these 
price-raising effects apparently expired, inflation fell 
to 2.2 percent. 
The Italian economy has been in a recession since 2011. 
The high uncertainty about the course of the economic 
policy of the current and previous governments weighs 
heavily on private consumption and investment. In ad-
dition, potential growth is unlikely to be above zero 
percent given the structural problems related to the la-
bour market, education, infrastructure and energy. 
The tax and social security burden has, especially for 
companies, turned exceptionally high in comparison to 
international standards. Furthermore, Italy is vulnera-
ble due to its substantial public debt amounting to 133 
percent of GDP in 2013, which particularly affected 
capital market interest rates. Real GDP is expected to 
have fallen by 1.9 percent last year.
 
For the first time in almost three years, the economy of 
Spain stopped shrinking after summer last year. There 
is increasing evidence that Spain has finally bounced 
off the economic and financial bottom and that the im-
plemented reforms are starting to show initial successes, 
albeit small ones. The banking sector in Spain was re-
capitalised and the aid program agreed-upon with the 
European Union was successfully implemented. 
Additionally, price competitiveness of firms has im-
proved somewhat in recent years and the current ac-
count balance has, for the first time in fifteen years, on 
average been in surplus last year. A large share of the 
improved current account position, however, can be 
traced back to the collapse of the domestic economy 
and the resulting decline in imports. Nevertheless, a sig-
nificant part can be related to improvements in exports. 
Despite the changes for the better, real GDP is expected 
to have fallen once again by – 1.2 percent in 2013 rela-
tive to 2012. As a result, the unemployment rate has not 
yet managed to break its upward trend and reached an 
average of 26.5 percent last year. 
The Central and Eastern European member countries of 
the European Union (Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) have mostly experienced a 
devaluation of their currencies and/or have been able to 
improve their competitiveness during recent years. 
Combined with the slow recovery of the euro area, this 
has supported export growth and allowed industrial pro-
duction to increase in all countries of the region, except for 
Croatia. Whereas the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Croatia suffered from an economic decline during 2012 
and the first half of 2013, they managed a turnaround 
during the second half. In the region, a positive growth 
contribution is provided by private consumption. Reduced 
unemployment allowed consumption to grow again last 
year. A mere stabilisation in consumption levels was only 
achieved in the Czech Republic and Croatia. Government 
spending growth has also passed its peak and investments 
remain a weak point in the region. Gross fixed capital for-
mation declined last year in almost all countries. Related 
to this is weak credit growth. Since the global financial cri-
sis, the region has experienced a decrease in the foreign li-
abilities of other European parent banks in particular. 
Vast differences can be observed across the individual 
countries. Whereas Hungary was affected most grievously 
by a deduction of cross-border capital, the Czech Republic 
and Poland hardly suffered from this at all. 
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1.3 Fiscal and monetary policy 
in Europe
1.3.1 Fiscal policy
In the face of historically high 
budget deficits and growing public 
debts in the advanced world, many 
governments have continued their 
efforts to consolidate their finances. 
Of the larger advanced economies, 
Japan and the United Kingdom 
were clear exceptions. According to 
OECD measures of the structural 
government deficit, both saw a 
clear deterioration last year (see 
Figure 1.15). 
Most countries in the euro area have indeed adopted 
massive fiscal austerity measures in the last few years. 
The restrictive degree of fiscal policy was particularly 
strong in those member countries (Cyprus, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal) that either could not fully refinance 
themselves in the capital markets and were therefore de-
pendent on financial assistance from the European 
Commission, the IMF and the ECB, often summarised 
as the “troika”, or at times had to worry about their ac-
cess to capital markets (Spain and Italy). Independent 
of the structural deficit measures used (OECD, IMF 
or the European Commission), these measures all re-
veal that substantial reductions in structural deficits 
have been accomplished since 2010. 
Similarly, primary balances, i.e. fiscal positions correct-
ed for interest payments, have also, despite the reces-
sionary conditions under which 
this had to prevail, been improved 
in Ireland, Portugal and particu-
larly in Spain over this period. 
Nevertheless, this has not been 
sufficient to reduce their public 
debt burden. Furthermore, the 
austerity measures only proved 
sufficient in Italy to reach the 
three-percent-mark established in 
the Maastricht Treaty. Spain, 
Greece and Portugal were once 
again off-track last year. In the 
case of Greece, this was largely 
due to one-off effects in the sec-
ond quarter of 2013, when the 
deficit was strongly influenced by 
capital transfers related to three bank recapitalisations 
and a bank resolution. The transfer was triggered by 
banking problems caused by the default on Greek gov-
ernment bonds the previous year. As a result, Greece’s 
deficit deteriorated from 9.0 percent of GDP in 2012 to 
a staggering 13.6 percent last year and its debt-to-GDP 
ratio is expected to have increased to 176.2 percent (see 
Table 1.2). Albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, the fiscal 
situation in Cyprus also deteriorated further. 
The restrictive impulse was much milder in 2013 than in 
the previous years – or even turned positive – not only in 
these crisis countries, but also in many other cases. When 
measured by the change in the primary balances, other 
countries besides Greece and Cyprus in which fiscal poli-
cies turned accommodative include, in decreasing order, 
Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Sweden, and 
Finland (see Figure 1.16). Besides in Spain, Ireland and 
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Portugal, clear negative impulses, on the other hand, 
were set by the governments of Denmark, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, Bel gium, the Netherlands, France and 
Romania last year. 
Over the course of this year, the public authorities will 
also proceed with implementing austerity measures. 
However, the contractionary fiscal impulse is likely to be 
lower than last year. To some extent this is a natural phe-
nomenon in any austerity programme: Maintain ing the 
savings of the previous year does not lead to an addition-
al negative impulse – only further cuts do that and these 
are bound to decrease over time. Never theless, another 
reason for the restrictiveness of fiscal policy to continue 
to decline is the worsening of debt discipline caused by, 
among other things, the willingness of the European 
Commission to tolerate cyclical deviations from the pre-
viously agreed deficit paths, as long as the implementa-
tion of structural reforms continues. Given the difficulty 
of distinguishing between structural and cyclical ele-
ments, this is, in a world driven by political considera-
tions, bound to be interpreted selectively. Furthermore, 
in autumn 2012 and in spring 2013 the Eurogroup, i.e. 
the finance ministers of the member states inside the euro 
area, decided to loosen consolidation requirements for 
several countries (Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Spain and 
France), even although the European Union and the 
IMF have already granted both Greece and Ireland fur-
ther extensive relief on their debt services. Finally, fiscal 
consolidation efforts in Portugal are also likely to be de-
Table 1.2 
Public finances 
  Gross debta) Fiscal balancea) 
  1999–2007 2008/2009 2010– 012 2013 1999–2007 2008/2009 2010–2012 2013 
Germany 63.8 70.7 81.1 79.6 – 2.2 – 1.6 – 1.6 0.0 
France 61.8 73.7 86.1 93.5 – 2.7 – 5.5 – 5.7 – 4.2 
Italy 106.5 111.3 122.3 133.0 – 2.9 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 2.8 
Spain 49.4 47.1 72.7 94.8 0.2 – 7.8 – 9.9 – 6.8 
Netherlands 51.7 59.6 66.8 74.8 – 0.5 – 2.5 – 4.4 – 3.3 
Belgium 98.6 92.5 97.8 100.4 – 0.4 – 3.3 – 3.9 – 2.9 
Austria 64.7 66.5 73.0 74.8 – 1.8 – 2.6 – 3.2 – 2.5 
Greece 103.3 121.3 158.5 176.2 – 5.3 – 12.8 – 9.8 – 13.6 
Finland 42.1 38.7 50.5 58.4 3.9 0.8 – 2.0 – 2.6 
Portugal 59.9 77.7 108.8 127.8 – 4.1 – 6.9 – 6.9 – 5.9 
Ireland 31.9 54.3 104.2 124.4 1.6 – 10.5 – 17.3 – 7.2 
Slovakia 40.9 31.7 45.6 54.3 – 5.3 – 5.1 – 5.8 – 3.0 
Slovenia 26.2 28.6 46.7 63.2 – 2.3 – 4.1 – 5.3 – 5.8 
Luxembourg 6.4 15.0 20.0 24.5 2.4 1.3 – 0.4 – 0.9 
Latvia 12.7 28.4 42.3 42.5 – 1.6 – 7.0 – 4.3 – 1.4 
Cyprus 64.3 53.7 73.1 116.0 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 6.0 – 8.3 
Estonia 5.0 5.8 7.5 10.0 0.7 – 2.5 0.4 – 0.4 
Malta 61.4 63.7 69.2 72.6 – 5.1 – 4.2 – 3.2 – 3.4 
Euro area 69.0 75.0 88.7 95.5 – 1.9 – 4.2 – 4.7 – 3.1 
United Kingdom 40.6 59.5 83.8 94.3 – 1.5 – 8.2 – 7.9 – 6.4 
Sweden 51.5 40.7 38.8 41.3 1.3 0.6 – 0.1 – 1.1 
Denmark 44.3 37.0 44.8 44.3 2.4 0.3 – 3.0 – 1.9 
Poland 43.2 49.0 55.6 58.2 – 4.1 – 5.6 – 5.6 – 4.8 
Czech Republic 25.2 31.6 42.0 49.0 – 3.9 – 4.0 – 4.1 – 2.9 
Romania 19.5 18.5 34.4 38.5 – 2.6 – 7.4 – 5.1 – 2.5 
Hungary 59.8 76.4 81.4 80.7 – 6.4 – 4.1 – 0.8 – 3.1 
Croatia     50.7 59.6     – 6.4 – 5.4 
Bulgaria 46.2 14.2 17.0 19.4 0.6 – 1.3 – 2.0 – 2.0 
Lithuania 20.5 22.4 38.9 39.9 – 1.8 – 6.4 – 5.4 – 3.0 
European Unionb) 61.8 68.3 83.1 89.8 – 1.7 – 4.6 – 5.0 – 3.5 
United States 59.7 79.8 99.1 106.0 – 2.1 – 9.7 – 9.6 – 5.8 
Japan 166.1 201.0 228.1 243.5 – 6.0 – 7.3 – 9.8 – 9.5 
Switzerland 63.3 50.1 49.1 48.2 0.2 1.2 0.2 0.2 
a) As a percentage of gross domestic product. For the European countries, definitions according to the Maastricht Treaty. For 
the United States, Japan and Switzerland, definitions are according to the IMF. –  b) Before 2009 the European Union does not 
include information on Croatia. 
Sources: European Commission, Autumn 2013; IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2013. 
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layed as the Portuguese constitu-
tional court annulled numerous 
austerity measures. This necessitat-
ed savings in other fields, jeopardis-
ing a timely implementation. The 
negative fiscal impulse connected 
to the relief program agreed upon 
in spring 2013 will only increase 
significantly in Cyprus. Overall, the 
public deficit ratios are likely to 
continue to decline, albeit in a less 
pronounced manner than initially 
planned and less dynamically than 
in previous years.
1.3.2 Monetary conditions and 
financial markets
Monetary conditions
Monetary policy in the major advanced economies re-
tained its degree of expansion during 2013. In the face 
of their very low policy rates, nearing zero percent (see 
Figure 1.17), the central banks of the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Japan largely continued 
their unconventional measures of monetary easing. In 
addition, the central banks have for some time now re-
sorted to a more intensive communication policy (for-
ward guidance) in order to increase the effectiveness 
of their monetary policies. For instance, the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of England tied the future path 
of the main policy rate and the degree of monetary ex-
pansion to specific economic goals like the unemploy-
ment rate. Accordingly, medium-term interest rate ex-
pectations will be kept low and refinancing conditions 
will remain favourable until the economic recovery 
has gained sufficient momentum. 
In early November 2013 the ECB surprisingly lowered 
its interest rate for open market operations by a fur-
ther 25 basis points to 0.25 percent. This step benefit-
ed those banks that have so far only managed to keep 
afloat with the help of these ECB refinancing loans. 
Interest rates on the interbank money market largely 
remained unaffected by this cut. Since the summer of 
2012, the interest rate for secured loans with a matu-
rity of three months (Eurepo) has been close to zero 
percent; for unsecured credits (Euribor) with the same 
maturity, just over 0.2 percent had to be paid. Instead 
of a fall, a slight increase in both rates has been ob-
served since the interest rate cut. 
The interbank money market is still not functioning 
properly, especially in the crisis countries, making 
banks there rely on the refinancing credits provided by 
the ECB. However, the risk premium for unsecured 
three-month loans fell in recent months by a further 
0.05 percentage points to about 0.15 percentage points 
by the end of last year. This premium is only margin-
ally higher than premiums observed before the out-
break of the crisis. Nevertheless, both the daily turno-
ver on the interbank market and the stock of cross-
border interbank loans remain significantly lower 
than before the onset of the crisis. 
ECB refinancing funds were almost exclusively pro-
vided to the crisis countries. Well above 80 percent of 
the regular open market operations were conducted 
with commercial banks in the countries affected by 
the crisis. The heavily indebted commercial banks in 
these countries benefit from ECB interest rate cuts as 
the latter allow them to fund the purchase of signifi-
cantly higher yielding securities at a lower cost. These 
commercial banks widened their holdings of domestic 
government bonds between late 2011 and October 
2013 by almost 300 billion euros. The resulting profits 
allowed them to form new equity to compensate for 
the losses incurred due to the holdings of toxic loans 
and uncollectible credits. 
Despite this support, the problems of the banking sec-
tor in the crisis countries remain significant. This is re-
flected by the historically high proportion of non-per-
forming loans. Nevertheless, the assessment of capital 
markets has improved with regard to potential risks in 
the banking sector in the crisis countries. Both the pre-
miums on credit default securities of the largest banks 
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and yields on covered bonds, which constitute impor-
tant funding instruments for many financial institutions, 
have been falling steadily since early 2012. For one thing, 
this was due to the significant decline in the government 
bond yields of crisis-afflicted countries following ECB’s 
announcement of the OMT programme in September 
2012 that allows for unlimited purchases of government 
bonds of countries under the ESM or EFSF umbrella. 
This development was, however, also supported by in-
creased government recapitalisations and other inter-
ventions in the banking sector as of 2012.
Overall, however, the situation in the credit markets of 
the crisis countries was still significantly more strained 
than in the rest of the euro area. The interest rate on 
newly-granted loans to companies in the crisis coun-
tries only followed the downward trend in the money 
market interest rates to a limited degree. The spread 
between money market and lend-
ing rates continues to be histori-
cally large. This is especially true 
for the crisis-afflicted countries 
(see Figure 1.18). At the same 
time, the decrease in loan portfo-
lios over the past three months is 
significantly greater in these crisis 
countries than elsewhere in the 
euro area. In addition to demand-
related factors, due to the signifi-
cantly weaker economic situation, 
supply-related credit market fac-
tors are also likely to play a signifi-
cant role. This is corroborated by 
both the Bank Lending Survey 
(BLS) and the Survey on the ac-
cess to finance of SMEs (SAFE) 
for the euro area. These surveys 
show that the lending conditions 
of banks in the crisis countries re-
main significantly more restrictive 
than in the rest of the euro area.
For the euro area as a whole, the 
volume of outstanding bank loans 
to the private sector continued to 
decline. Lending to non-financial 
corporations, which accounts for 
roughly half of total credits to the 
non-financial sectors of the econ-
omy, was most significantly affect-
ed in this respect (see Figure 1.19). 
The outstanding amount of con-
sumer credit also continued its descent, whereas the 
amount of mortgages basically remained constant 
throughout 2013.
The ECB will maintain its expansionary policy and 
keep the main refinancing rate unchanged at 0.25 per-
cent this year. Due to the heavy under-utilisation of 
capacities and the extremely weak economic perfor-
mance in the euro area as a whole, inflation rates will 
remain well below the ECB target of close to, but be-
low 2 percent. 
The decline in risk premiums on capital markets in the 
crisis countries is expected to continue, albeit more 
moderately than before, in 2014. In the rest of the euro 
area, the capital market interest rates will show a slight 
increase. This is largely due to the increase in capital 
market interest rates in the United States, where eco-
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nomic developments will unfold far more positively 
than in the euro area. As a result, lending rates in the 
rest of the euro area will also rise slightly, while they 
are expected to remain unchanged in the crisis coun-
tries. Underlying this assessment is the assumption 
that the supply-related restrictions in local credit mar-
kets will gradually abate.
The Bank of England has made a commitment to 
continue with its very expansive monetary policy. It 
announced publicly, as part of its forward guidance 
policy, that the interest rate will remain unchanged at 
0.5 percent as long as the unemployment rate exceeds 
7 percent. This presupposes, however, that the medi-
um-run inflation rate will remain below 2.5 percent. 
Similarly, inflation expectations should remain firmly 
anchored. The program for the purchase of asset-
backed securities is still being implemented and 
reached a volume of 375 billion 
British pounds by the end of 
2013. The aim of the program is 
to provide liquidity to commer-
cial banks under favourable con-
ditions and avoid a stronger in-
crease in capital market interest 
rates, which could thwart the eco-
nomic recovery. These monetary 
policy measures have helped to 
ease tensions in credit markets. 
Lending by commercial banks to 
the private non-banks, i.e. non-fi-
nancial private enterprises and 
households, has recently in-
creased. In addition, the condi-
tions for granting credit have im-
proved. Lending rates to the non-
financial private sector have been 
steadily declining across the 
board since the summer of 2012, 
despite yields on government 
bonds being on a clear upward 
trend since spring of last year.
Bonds, stocks and foreign 
exchange markets
In the late summer of 2012, the 
ECB announced its readiness to 
purchase the government bonds 
of individual euro area countries 
under certain specific conditions 
and thus to support their courses (OMT programme). 
This notification relieved the concern felt by many in-
vestors with regard to a potential payment default of 
individual countries, or even about a potential 
breakup of the monetary union, thus allowing the 
previously sharply rising risk premiums on private 
and public debt instruments from several member 
states to fall. 
These implicit guarantees provided by the ECB with 
its OMT programme, together with the permanent 
rescue fund, ESM, have – by reversing the divergence 
process of government bond yields within the euro 
area (see Figure 1.20) – managed to bring the synthet-
ic euro area benchmark 10-year government bond 
yield back to levels observed for the United States and 
the United Kingdom (see Figure 1.21). At the same 
time, the international normalisation of risk prefer-
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ences shifted asset allocation 
away from government bonds to-
wards other bonds and in particu-
lar stocks. As a result, both gov-
ernment bond yields and stock 
market indexes were able to stay 
on the upward trend that they set 
in mid-2012. 
Measured in local currencies, the 
Dow Jones industrial average, 
the Nikkei 225, the FTSE 100 
and the Euro STOXX 50 im-
proved by 22.5 percent, 59.4 per-
cent, 11.1 percent and 14.8 per-
cent respectively during 2013. 
Except for the Japanese Nikkei 
225, the improvements were fair-
ly similar from a euro area per-
spective (see Figure 1.22). When 
converting the gains of  the 
Nikkei 225 into euros, they were, 
due to the realised depreciation 
of  the Japanese yen, clearly re-
duced, albeit, with 22.6 percent, 
still considerable. Whereas Euro 
STOXX 50 developments, as 
measure for overall euro area 
stock developments, clearly 
lagged behind those of  Japan 
and the United States in particu-
lar, looking at member-state spe-
cific movements reveals that the 
German stock markets have kept 
pace with those in the United 
States in recent years (see 
Figure 1.23). 
After having increased during the 
second half  of  2012, the dollar-
euro exchange rate remained 
more or less stable during the 
first part of  2013. Subsequently, 
there was a steady, but small ap-
preciation against the US dollar 
(see Figure 1.24). A similar pic-
ture emerges when looking at real 
effective changes, i.e. when cor-
recting for inflation differentials 
and weighting by export shares: 
there has been an overall steady 
appreciation of  the euro since 
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mid-2012 (see Figure 1.25). As far as the other major 
currencies in the world are concerned, the yen depre-
ciated substantially during the winter of  2012/13. 
This largely reflected the change in monetary policy 
of  the Bank of  Japan and fast-changing sentiment in 
financial markets regarding the importance of  so-
called safe haven currencies. The real effective ex-
change rate of  China appreciated throughout a large 
part of  last year, a process that started in autumn 
2012. This reflects both the somewhat higher inflation 
rate in China compared to most of  its trading part-
ners, and the continued moderate appreciation of  the 
renminbi against the US dollar, as allowed for by the 
Chinese central bank.
1.4 The macroeconomic outlook
1.4.1 Assumptions, risks and uncertainties 
The present forecast is based on the assumption that 
no further escalation of  the euro crisis is to be expect-
ed. In that sense, it is also assumed that the financing 
of  public budgets in Greece, Ireland and Portugal is 
guaranteed until at least the end of  the forecasting pe-
riod. Ireland already meets its capital requirements 
almost completely through the capital market, while 
the relief  programmes granted to Greece and Portugal 
expire this year. Accordingly, these two countries 
should, in principle, return to the international capi-
tal markets. However, since both Portugal and Greece 
need to refinance considerable volumes of  public debt 
in 2015 and 2016, a complete return to private capital 
markets appears, especially in the second case, unlike-
ly.2 Given weak economic development, we expect 
that the international community, represented by the 
troika, will therefore already grant Greece in particu-
lar further financial assistance this year. This will, giv-
en our assumptions, be achieved without creating new 
political tensions, which, in turn, will further strength-
en the confidence of  investors, consumers and pro-
ducers within the euro area. As a result, the refinanc-
ing conditions for commercial banks, as well as pri-
vate households and businesses, are not forecast to 
deteriorate any further. 
The most crucial prerequisite here is that, despite re-
duced pressure on governments to carry out austerity 
programmes, the structural adjustments in the euro 
area continue, albeit at a more moderate pace. The 
lowering of the collateral requirements that must be 
satisfied to obtain liquidity from the ECB in combina-
tion with the TARGET2 system, the rescue packages 
of the troika together with the loosening of fiscal tar-
gets granted by the European Commission at the be-
ginning of 2013 and the introduction of the OMT 
programme by the ECB all have one thing in common: 
By lowering market-oriented refinancing costs, they 
tend to reduce willingness to embrace structural re-
forms to promote international competitiveness. At 
the same time, however, the above measures alleviate 
short-term liquidity constraints. All in all, finding the 
right balance is not an easy task. We assume that the 
long-term structural view has not been lost from sight, 
as that would, at some stage, trigger the next round of 
escalation in the euro crisis. 
A possible decoupling of long-term inflation expecta-
tions, which still oscillate at around 2 percent, from 
the ECB target poses another 
risk. This forecast is based on the 
assumption that no long-term de-
flation is to be expected on aver-
age in the euro countries. Given 
the expected slow economic re-
covery, the euro area-wide infla-
tion rate is likely to settle well be-
low the ECB’s inflation target of 
just under two percent. However, 
a long period of low inflation 
could lead to a downward revi-
2    Portugal did already manage to success-
fully auction longer-term government 
bonds in January and is likely to start build-
ing a cushion this year (like Ireland did be-
fore exiting its program) in order to ease the 
transition and gain market confidence. 
Whether it will fully succeed in this attempt 
remains to be seen.
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sion of long-term inflation expectations among inves-
tors, consumers and producers. As it is unlikely that 
the ECB will further reduce nominal interest rates, the 
decline in inflation expectations would result in an in-
crease in real interest rates and reduce the willingness 
of investors and consumers to spend. In addition, 
wage dynamics would be more moderate. These ad-
justments would further slow down actual inflation 
and thus serve to confirm the downward adjustment 
of inflation expectations. This could ultimately lead to 
a spiral of inflation declines and successive reductions 
in inflation expectations, which could eventually result 
in a permanent deflation phase. Since nominal wages 
tend to be downwardly rigid, deflation would, by in-
creasing the real cost of labour, lead to persistent un-
deremployment. The present forecast assumes that 
medium- to long-term inflation expectations remain 
anchored to the ECB’s target of below, but close to 
two percent. For this to happen the structural reforms 
targeted by several euro area countries will actually 
have to be implemented. This would prevent a perma-
nent reduction in long-term growth and inflation 
expectations.
A further risk to this forecast lies in the formation of 
price bubbles by means of the highly favourable liquid-
ity provision. This might trigger undesirable volatilities 
in asset and currency markets. Furthermore, since the 
outbreak of the financial crisis, uncertainty about in-
flation developments has increased significantly. 
Therefore, risks do arise from the various expansion-
ary monetary measures undertaken by the central 
banks in advanced economies around the world.
What finally constitutes a significant risk for a major 
improvement in the euro area is 
slow progress with reforms and 
the restructuring of the banking 
sector. Many banks in Europe, es-
pecially those in the crisis-afflict-
ed parts, require restructuring. 
Whether the dismantling of this 
time bomb is done quickly 
enough is difficult to tell. The for-
mation of a banking union is an 
important step in this process, 
and we do assume that the neces-
sary steps will be taken on time. 
Some, albeit minor, risks also 
emerge from the elections for the 
European Parliament. It cannot 
be ruled out that the gains of the anti-European par-
ties are so substantial that they are going to be able to 
block outstanding changes in legislation. 
1.4.2 The global economy
The current global economic expansion will continue 
this year, albeit gaining momentum only moderately. 
The Ifo World Economic Survey and a number of oth-
er indicators of producer and consumer expectations 
suggest that sentiments have improved in most regions 
of the world (see Figure 1.26). 
In contrast to the past five years, however, the emerg-
ing markets of Asia and Latin America will no longer 
be the driving force behind economic acceleration. 
This role will be fulfilled by advanced economies like 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and to a less-
er extent Japan and the euro area. Nonetheless, the 
emerging economies will continue to expand at rates 
that are higher than those in industrialised countries. 
But their pace of growth is, also for structural reasons, 
unlikely to increase during the forecast period. Hence, 
whereas the contribution of Asia in particular to 
world economic growth will remain large, it is the in-
crease in the growth contributions by North America 
and Western and Central Europe that will make the 
difference to world economic growth as compared to 
last year (see Figure 1.27).
In the developed economies, the growth rates of real 
GDP should gradually increase during 2014. Private 
consumption in the United States, supported by fur-
ther improvements in the employment, housing mar-
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ket and lending conditions, is likely to increase at an 
accelerated pace. Business investments should also 
benefit from the recovery in domestic demand and still 
very expansionary monetary policy, which will secure 
relatively favourable refinancing conditions. Finally, 
the fiscal impulse in the advanced economies will be 
less contractionary than last year. 
Over the course of  the year, fiscal stimuli programmes 
initiated last year in, for example, China, Brazil and 
South Korea to compensate for weak demand from 
the advanced economies will be phased out, so that 
fiscal policy in most emerging countries is likely to be 
neutral. Triggered by the forthcoming elections, pub-
lic investment programs are only expected to stimu-
late the economy moderately in India.
Domestic demand in the United Kingdom is likely to 
undergo an increasing revival this 
year, as it will be supported by the 
improvement in the asset posi-
tions of private households and 
expansionary monetary policy. 
The economic situation in the 
euro area remains obfuscated. 
Several member countries still 
have to struggle with some mas-
sive structural problems. 
Nevertheless, a moderate recov-
ery is expected to continue during 
the forecast period, and this 
change compared to the previous 
two years does imply a positive 
impulse for the world economy. 
The negative impulse coming 
from fiscal austerity measures will 
decrease further. In addition, net 
exports should also have a favour-
able effect, both due to the con-
tinuing weak imports noted in cri-
sis countries and the moderate 
pick-up of the world economy. 
Finally, on-going pressure on do-
mestic prices in some of the struc-
turally weak countries (Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece) is ex-
pected to lead to an improvement 
in their international competitive-
ness. Accordingly, the euro area is 
likely to benefit to a somewhat 
greater extent from the recovery 
of world trade than in the past. In 
Japan, the highly expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy, as well as the depreciation 
of the yen, have allowed the economy to expand 
strongly during the past winter months. During the 
rest of the year, however, economic growth is expected 
to gradually decline, as the positive fiscal impulse is 
bound to ebb away, while structural problems are like-
ly to persist.
All in all, the total world economic production will 
probably increase this year by 3.4 percent, after 
2.8  percent last year (see Figure 1.28). Accordingly, 
world trade is expected to have expanded by just 
2.0 percent in 2013, and should rise by 4.9 percent this 
year (see Table 1.A.1). The current accounts of most 
emerging countries will continue to deteriorate due to 
unfaltering robust growth in the realm of domestic de-
mand. In the euro area, however, the still very feeble 
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domestic economy should help to improve the current 
account balance. The current account deficit of the 
United States is likely to remain virtually unchanged. 
The acceleration of growth in goods imports is expect-
ed to be almost fully compensated for by a decline in 
net imports of gas and oil in the United States. 
Inflation is expected to rise slightly in the advanced 
economies, with the exception of the European Union, 
during the forecast period. An important role in Japan 
will be played by the effect of the value added tax in-
crease scheduled for April 2014. Given the moderate 
development of commodity prices in recent months, 
inflation in emerging economies is not expected to 
provide any reasons for tightening monetary policy. In 
countries like India and Indonesia, the base rate in-
creases implemented last summer are likely to slightly 
dampen the currently rather high inflation during the 
forecast period.
1.4.3 United States
Partially due to legal limitations, some of  the spend-
ing cuts in the federal budget in the United States 
resulting from the sequester and the budget deci-
sions made at the end of  last year will become effec-
tive early this year. Fiscal policy will remain restric-
tive, as the extension of  the entitlement period to 
unemployment benefits and the more favourable de-
preciation rules for companies were permanently 
discontinued at the beginning of  this year. Even al-
though the new budget proposal of  December 2013 
provides relief  of  about 65 billion US dollars com-
pared to the nationwide budget cuts implied by the 
original sequester, no further tax increases will now 
take place and the defence budg-
et will not be reduced again. 
However, some social expendi-
ture is supposed to be curtailed 
more than originally planned. 
The decline in government con-
sumption expenditure observed 
at the federal level this winter 
should subsequently give way to 
some slight increases again, 
thereby taking off  the brakes ac-
tivated by the sequester. 
Now that the US Federal Reserve 
has decided to taper its bond pur-
chasing program of Treasury se-
curities and agency mortgage-
backed securities and has signalled that it will wind 
down this quantitative easing policy steadily through 
2014, assuming the US economy will develop as ex-
pected, the uncertainty surround ing US monetary 
policy should also fade. While maintaining the base 
rate at its historic low of 0 to 0.25 percent, US mone-
tary policy will remain very expansionary throughout 
the year. 
Overall, the growth rate of the US economy is bound 
to increase during the year. The impact of tax increas-
es on private consumption will weaken. Improving re-
al-estate market conditions should foster construction 
activity and reduce the indebtedness of households, 
thereby stimulating consumer demand. Little impetus, 
however, is to be expected from foreign trade. The ac-
celeration of export growth as a result of the some-
what improved economic conditions around the world 
is expected to be more or less compensated for by in-
creased import growth caused by improved domestic 
conditions.
All in all, for the United States the increase in real 
GDP of 1.9 percent noted last year will probably ac-
celerate to about 2.6 percent this year (see Figure 1.29). 
The inflation rate is expected to increase from the 
1.5 percent recorded last year to 1.9 percent in 2014. 
Moreover, a decline in the unemployment rate from 
an average of  7.4 percent in 2013 to 6.4 percent this 
year is to be expected. Owing to the economic re-
covery and additional austerity measures undertak-
en in the federal budget, the budget deficit will im-
prove in the current fiscal year to just below 3 per-
cent of  GDP.
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1.4.4 Asia
In China, the government’s monetary policy stance is 
expected to remain unchanged this year. Despite the 
moderate increase in inflation rates throughout last 
year, inflation still remains well below average. 
Moderate positive impulses will be generated by fiscal 
policy. In particular, tax cuts for businesses and invest-
ments in the expansion of the railway network are 
planned. Leading indicators point to a continuation 
of the short-term dynamics. The pace of economic 
growth will, at least in the short run, not attenuate sig-
nificantly. The structural change and the associated re-
duction in the excess capacity of the industry sector 
will lead to a slowdown of trend growth. Given the 
feeble external demand for Chinese products, real 
GDP growth is expected to materialise at 7.5 percent 
this year. Inflation will accelerate moderately to 
3.3 percent in 2014 (after 2.6 percent in 2013). 
The political leadership in Beijing plans to fundamen-
tally restructure the Chinese economy in the coming 
years. In this context the factors of production in par-
ticular are to be shifted piecewise from investment and 
export-driven toward service- and domestic-market-
oriented sectors. This change is primarily to be 
achieved through a number of structural reforms. 
Accordingly, the Hukou System – the official control 
system regarding place of residence – is to be liberal-
ised, which will likely lead to an acceleration in the de-
gree of urbanisation. Furthermore, the Chinese gov-
ernment is planning a land reform, whereby restric-
tions on the use of collectively-owned land and par-
cels should be relaxed. A profound liberalisation of 
the financial sector and reforms in public administra-
tion and budgeting have also been promised. However, 
these structural reforms are unlikely to unfold their ef-
fects during this year.
In Japan, fiscal policy is bound to exert a restrictive ef-
fect: the consumption tax is set to rise from 5 percent 
to 8 percent in April. However, in order not to jeop-
ardise the economy, another economic stimulus pack-
age is due to be launched. Supported by the unabated 
strengthening in sentiment among large companies 
and expected anticipatory effects in the first quarter 
owing to the increase in the consumption tax and the 
recovery of the economic situation in key export mar-
kets, real GDP is expected to grow by 1.5 percent this 
year. Prices are likely to grow vigorously at 2.7 per-
cent, of which about 2 percentage points will be due to 
the increase in the consumption tax. A risk for the 
forecast period is posed by Japan’s conflict with China 
over an island group in the East China Sea. Should 
this conflict take a turn for the worse, it could lead to a 
boycott of Japanese products and negatively affect the 
economy.
The short-term outlook for India has become less pes-
simistic. Early indicators like the production of elec-
tricity, coal and cement, moved upward. In addition, 
the monsoon season went smoothly, so good harvests 
were made at the end of last year, which is bound to 
generate some positive stimuli for India’s important 
agricultural sector and reduce the pressure on food 
prices.
Given the relatively weak economic conditions that 
persist in India, the Reserve Bank of India is not ex-
pected to increase its base rate any further. Fiscal pol-
icy, in particular via public investment spending, will 
stimulate the economy. Government infrastructure 
projects in particular are expected to contribute to a 
revival in overall investment activity. Consumption is 
also expected to pick up slightly. Overall, economic 
activity is expected to increase slowly over the year, re-
sulting into a growth rate of 5.6 percent. The inflation 
rate will probably fall to 9.2 percent in 2014, after an 
estimated 11.5 percent in 2013.
For the East Asian countries (Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore 
and Hong Kong) either an accelerated or an un-
changed high rate of expansion is expected for this 
year. An increase in private consumption is likely to be 
the main driving force behind this expansion. It is sup-
ported by income generating activities and job crea-
tion programmes implemented by the different gov-
ernments. Against this background, and in anticipa-
tion of a modest recovery in exports to the euro area 
and the United States, overall economic production 
this year is likely to rise to 4.5 percent. The inflation 
rate is expected to amount to 3.4 percent this year, fol-
lowing 3.0 percent in 2013. Part of this acceleration is 
due to the reduction in energy subsidies in Indonesia 
implemented this year.
1.4.5 Latin America
In 2014, the Latin American region, i.e. Brazil, Mexi­
co, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia and Chile, is ex-
pected to grow by 2.9 percent. The increase in real 
GDP in Mexico is likely to gather pace again owing to 
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improved economic prospects for 
the United States. Although the 
FIFA World Cup in 2014 will, 
through increased investment ac-
tivities and foreign demand, give 
some impulses to the Brazilian 
economy, growth in the country 
will remain below its long-run 
average. 
1.4.6 The European economy
The cyclical situation
Albeit at a moderate pace, the 
economic recovery in the euro 
area is expected to continue this 
year (see Figure 1.30). Almost all sentiment and confi-
dence indicators are following upward trends virtually 
everywhere in Europe. The driving force will be for-
eign trade (see Figure 1.31). Exports are likely to ben-
efit from further improvements to conditions in the 
Unit ed States, as well as robust developments in Japan 
and in the majority of emerging economies. 
Furthermore, European domestic demand is expected 
to stabilise somewhat, which will partly be due to a no-
ticeable reduction in the restrictiveness of fiscal policy. 
Combined with a further reduction in the uncertainty 
of private households and businesses regarding eco-
nomic and political developments, this will have an in-
creasingly positive effect on their willingness to spend 
and invest.
The heterogeneity between the individual member 
states will, however, remain very 
high. Business cycle develop-
ments in economically strong 
countries like Germany and 
Austria will experience a clear re-
covery. There, strong exports and 
investment-related domestic de-
mand will continue to improve 
the labour market situation and 
thereby real wage developments. 
This will, in turn, allow private 
consumption to support further 
economic growth. The positive 
domestic and external economic 
outlook, the extremely favourable 
refinancing conditions and the 
still high degree of risk aversion 
of investors, will allow overall investment in such 
economies to accelerate. Finally, no contractionary 
impulses are to be expected from fiscal policy. 
Accordingly, in these countries, growth in domestic 
demand will contribute significantly to the increased 
pace of expansion. 
Economic growth is likely to be somewhat weaker in 
countries such as Belgium, France, Italy and the 
Netherlands, which, although spared the fate of being 
labelled crisis countries under the aegis of the troika, 
are still struggling with country-specific structural 
weaknesses. Italy and France, for instance, have not 
yet responded to their loss of price competitiveness 
with the wage restraints observed in some other coun-
tries. Therefore, both these countries are expected to 
continue to lose world market shares and benefit rela-
tively little from the economic upturns in Germany, 
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the United States, the United 
Kingdom and a number of 
emerging markets.
Albeit at a decreasing rate, do-
mestic demand is expected to de-
cline further this year in the crisis 
countries. Private and/or public 
debt is still very high in these na-
tions. This burden will weaken ag-
gregate demand even further. The 
situation in the labour market is 
also expected to deteriorate fur-
ther, although only slightly. This 
will put additional stress on real 
income development and, there-
fore, on consumption. Private in-
vestment is also likely to continue 
to shrink, because the domestic 
economic outlook will improve, 
but at an extremely slow pace. At 
the same time, refinancing condi-
tions for firms, due to the still 
fragile state of the banking sector, 
are likely to remain unfavourable. 
Only reduced fiscal consolidation 
efforts will provide some support 
for domestic demand. Significant 
positive contributions to the de-
velopment of aggregate economic 
output will be provided by contin-
uously shrinking imports. 
Exports of Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece are also in-
creasingly likely to rise. All of 
these countries, albeit to quite 
varying degrees, are in the process 
of succeeding in improving their 
price competitiveness – at least 
relative to the stronger economies 
in Europe. Given the austerity policies, and in particu-
lar the wage moderation observed in Spain, Portugal 
and Greece over the past two years, this trend is likely 
to continue in 2014. Accordingly, these countries will 
increasingly benefit from the robust economies inside 
and outside of the euro area and will be able to in-
crease their world market shares. 
This year, the aggregate economies of the euro area 
and the European Union are expected to grow by 0.7 
and 1.2 percent, respectively. Whereas real GDP will 
continue to shrink in Cyprus, Greece, Slovenia, and 
Italy, it will expand at an above average rate in 
Belgium, Malta, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Swe-
den, Ireland, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and 
most of the Central and Eastern European EU mem-
ber countries (with the exceptions of Slovenia and 
Croatia) (see Figure 1.32). 
Given the feeble economic momentum, employment 
in the European Union will start to grow again in 2014 
after having been in decline since mid-2011 (see 
Figure 1.33). Nevertheless, this will not be enough to 
have a strong impact on the unemployment rate. The 
latter is likely to remain at an average of 12.2 percent 
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in the euro area and 10.8 percent in the European 
Union this year (see Figure 1.34). The substantial dif-
ferences in economic development between the vari-
ous member states are expected to be accompanied by 
continued high dispersion in the national unemploy-
ment and wage developments. In the face of domestic 
economic weaknesses in many member countries, the 
inflation rate will be considerably lower than the 2 per-
cent target set by the ECB. We expect it to weaken fur-
ther to an average of 1.1 percent in the euro area in 
2014. For the European Union the figure is expected 
to amount to 1.3 percent.
Differences across Europe
The German economy has probably performed 
above its potential this winter. This is, among other 
considerations, indicated by the significant rise in 
the Ifo Business Climate Index 
during last autumn and in the 
early winter. Assuming the la-
tent uncertainty regarding polit-
ical and economic developments 
in the crisis countries of  the euro 
area does not materialise into 
any critical upheavals in interna-
tional capital markets, this 
buoyancy should continue. 
Private consumption is expected 
to expand at an accelerated pace 
in view of  the favourable em-
ployment situation and rising 
real earnings, which should ben-
efit retail and consumer-related 
service providers. The upturn in 
the construction sector is ex-
pected to continue. This is un-
derlined by increasing backlogs, 
particularly in residential con-
struction. Even non-residential 
construction, which previously 
struggled during the economic 
downturn, is expected to in-
crease. In terms of  public con-
struction, an improvement in 
municipal finances is to be not-
ed. Moreover, as part of  the 
flood relief  fund, resources will 
flow into Germany’s public civil 
engineering sector.
In view of rising export expecta-
tions, favourable financing conditions and currently 
close to normally utilised production capacities, in-
vestment in machinery and equipment is bound to 
increase. 
The uptick in global demand and the stabilisation of 
euro area economies will provide fresh stimuli for 
Germany’s export sector. However, over the course of 
the year, German exporters will lose some competi-
tiveness to most of their trading partners. Given the 
relatively weak demand in the euro area, the total in-
crease in German exports will also remain short of 
world trade. Since imports are likely to expand at an 
accelerated rate thanks to strong domestic demand, 
the trade surplus will slowly continue to diminish and 
net exports will again contribute negatively to real 
GDP growth this year. All in all, real GDP is expected 
to grow by 1.9 percent in comparison to 2013.
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In the wake of the expansion of the German economy, 
employment growth will initially accelerate somewhat. 
Towards the end of the year, certain shortages in some 
labour market areas – especially of highly skilled 
workers – will become increasingly noticeable and the 
dynamism of employment growth is therefore expect-
ed to fall slightly. The unemployment rate is expected 
to decline slightly from an average of 5.2 percent in 
2013 to 5.0 percent this year. 
Inflation looks set to remain moderate. The pricing 
pressure resulting from wage increases will, to some 
extent, be offset by rising labour productivity. Overall, 
the consumer price level this year is likely to be 1.6 per-
cent higher than in 2013.
Business tendency and consumer surveys in France 
suggest that its economy will probably move out of 
the doldrums by the end of this winter. However, the 
major upturn hoped for will most likely fail to materi-
alise. Private consumption spending will be negatively 
affected by the increase in unemployment and low 
wage growth. The stimuli for real disposable income, 
and thereby private consumption, are only expected to 
come from continuing low inflation. The inflation rate 
is expected to stay at around 1.0 percent. The unem-
ployment rate is forecast to rise from last year’s 
10.8  percent to 11.0 percent over the course of this 
year. Private investment is also likely to contribute 
only slightly to an increase in GDP. Firstly, profit 
prospects for French companies are currently rather 
poor. Secondly, the reductions in corporate taxes and 
labour costs, as announced by the French govern-
ment, have essentially failed to materialise. The lack 
of will to pursue reforms on the part of the govern-
ment is also a major reason for the low potential 
growth rate ascribed to the French economy and the 
associated lack of price competitiveness of French 
companies. Therefore, despite some revival of the 
global economy, no positive stimuli are to be expected 
from exports either. Only public consumption and in-
vestment look set to stabilise the economy in the short 
run, as any austerity measures that have been agreed 
upon with the European Commission, and which 
would be required to reduce the public deficit, have 
been postponed until 2015. All in all, real GDP will 
basically stagnate in 2014 with a growth rate of 
0.2 percent.
Prospects for a continued economic recovery in the 
United Kingdom are quite favourable. Business senti-
ments have reached elevated levels in large parts of the 
economy. Even in the construction sector, the business 
climate improved. This was particularly driven by an 
increase in property prices. After falling for basically 
the last five years, it appears that house prices in the 
United Kingdom reached a trough at the end of 2012 
and have been steadily increasing ever since. Consumer 
confidence also rose, albeit in a subdued manner. One 
of the supporting factors here has been the improved 
financial position of households. 
The government is expected to stick to its plan to 
maintain a consolidation course until the fiscal year of 
2017/18. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the defi-
cit will only be reduced slightly this year to avoid over-
burdening the economy. It will therefore only decrease 
to 5.3 percent of GDP, after settling at around 6.4 per-
cent last year. As a result, the government debt-to-
GDP ratio will increase further to about 97 percent in 
2014, following 94.3 percent last year. 
Overall, real GDP in the United Kingdom is expected 
to rise by 2.6 percent this year. A driving force behind 
the recovery is likely to be a robust expansion of do-
mestic demand, stimulated by favourable credit condi-
tions and the already advanced deleveraging of the 
household sector. At the same time, exports can be ex-
pected to rise as a result of the economic recovery of 
major trading partners. Despite the recovery, however, 
capacities are likely to remain underutilised keeping 
investment and price pressure subdued. The UK’s in-
flation rate will settle at about 2.2 percent this year. 
The situation in the labour market remains quite tense 
and a rapid decrease in the unemployment rate is not 
to be expected. The unemployment rate could fall un-
der 7 percent towards the end of the year. This would 
prompt the Bank of England to gradually reduce the 
degree of its extremely expansionary monetary policy. 
The challenge will be to accomplish this without caus-
ing disruptions in financial markets and thereby con-
straining the economy.
Italy is not expected to emerge from its economic re-
cession before summer this year. Even if  it should do 
so, a broadly-based recovery is unlikely as the uncer-
tainty surrounding government policy is bound to re-
main high. On average, with an annual growth rate of 
–  0.1 percent, real GDP will basically stagnate in a 
year-over-year comparison. The slight economic re-
covery in the second half  of 2014 will not be signifi-
cant enough to bring about a turnaround in the labour 
market. Italy’s unemployment rate is expected to rise 
from last year’s average of 12.2 percent to 12.6 percent 
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this year. As a result, the real disposable income of 
households will weigh on consumption. Some relief  to 
the household budget is to be expected from a further 
drop in inflation. It is expected to decrease as a result 
of the continuing under-utilisation of production ca-
pacities from an average of 1.3 percent in 2013 to 
1.0 percent in 2014. This might be interpreted as initi-
ating the much-needed process of improving price 
competitiveness in the Italian economy. 
The somewhat sub-normal rate of capacity utilisation, 
together with unfavourable financing conditions, consti-
tute the reasons why no substantial economic stimuli are 
to be expected from gross private investment in Italy. In 
addition, high tax and social security burdens continue 
to take their toll on Italian companies. The structural 
benefits from the scheduled reduction of this burden in 
the next two years counter-financed by a reduction in 
government spending will not emerge immediately. Net 
foreign trade is expected to contribute positively to over-
all growth. However, this will be caused by a decline in 
imports, rather than an increase in exports. Imports are 
expected to be adversely affected by declining household 
incomes. Only fiscal policy is expected to have some 
short-term stabilising effects on the economy. Despite 
the high level of public indebtedness, no significant con-
solidation measures are scheduled. Hence, this short-
term stabilising effect may result in a long-term destabi-
lisation. A new escalation of the euro crisis thus repre-
sents a clear downside risk to this forecast.
Spain still has a long way to go before becoming com-
petitive and healthy again. Persistently high under-uti-
lisation of production capacities is likely to cause the 
inflation rate to fall even further. After 1.6 percent last 
year, the average inflation rate for this year is forecast-
ed to reach – 0.1 percent. This decline in the general 
price level improves the competitiveness of Spanish 
companies, supporting the export economy. On the 
part of private and public consumption, however, no 
positive impulses are to be expected. The private sec-
tor is heavily indebted and will have to continue work-
ing on reducing its debt. For the first time in years, 
gross private investment will probably be able to in-
crease slightly this year, as foreign demand for Spanish 
capital goods is likely to increase. The construction in-
dustry is expected to reduce its pace of decline. 
Overall, real GDP is expected to grow moderately 
with a rate of 0.5 percent this year. 
During the last quarter of 2013 the number of regis-
tered unemployed persons started falling. Although a 
substantial share of this decline was due to migrant 
workers returning to their home countries and the 
long-term unemployed dropping out of the system, 
some of it can be interpreted as a first sign that the la-
bour market reforms and wage restraints implemented 
in Spain are starting to take effect. Nevertheless, from 
a year-over-year perspective, the unemployment rate is 
still expected to increase slightly to an average of 
26.7 percent this year (after 26.5 percent in 2013).
The susceptibility of the Spanish economy to external 
shocks remains high. Private household indebtedness 
is hardly improving, while the government deficit and 
debt are still high. In addition, the banking system re-
mains vulnerable, with a large amount of toxic loans 
on the banks’ balance sheets. So far, we have probably 
only seen the tip of the iceberg in this respect. Hence, 
the downside risks to this forecast remain substantial.
In Central and Eastern Europe the signs of an econom-
ic revival are increasing. Most of these countries will 
continue to benefit from their improved competitive-
ness positions built up in recent years and the slow eco-
nomic recovery of the euro area. Growth in the region 
largely depends on demand from the euro area. Not 
only exports, but also credit demand, are expected to 
increase slightly this year because of positive economic 
prospects on the one hand, and as a result of further 
base rate cuts by some of the central banks in the re-
gion on the other. These cuts are possible thanks to the 
sharp decline in inflation rates. Impulses also come 
from a revival in domestic demand fuelled by the eas-
ing of austerity measures on the part of governments. 
This easing is feasible since, with the exception of 
Hungary, most already have comparably healthy state 
finances, which is supported by their credit ratings. 
Overall, an acceleration in growth is slowly emerging 
in the region this year. This also applies to the three 
largest economies in the region: Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Romania. With already comparatively 
high growth rates, the outlook for the Baltic States, 
however, is fraught with uncertainty, as these coun-
tries have recently begun to feel the impact of the eco-
nomic slowdown in Russia. 
References
EEAG (2012), The EEAG Report on the European Economy 2012, 
CESifo, Munich, http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/EEAG-2012.pdf.
EEAG (2013), The EEAG Report on the European Economy 2013, 
CESifo, Munich, http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/EEAG-2013.pdf.
45 EEAG Report 2014
Chapter 1
Appendix 1.A
Forecasting tables
Table 1.A.1 
GDP growth, inflation and unemployment in various countries	  
  Share of GDP growth CPI inflation Unemployment rated) 
  total GDP in % in % 
  in % 2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
Industrialised countries:                   
European Union 26.6   – 0.4   0.1   1.2   2.6   1.5   1.3   10.5   10.9   10.8   
Euro area 19.4   – 0.7   – 0.4   0.7   2.5   1.4   1.1   11.4   12.1   12.2   
Switzerland 1.0   1.0   1.9   2.2   – 0.7   – 0.2   0.3   4.1   4.4   4.4   
Norway 0.8   3.3   2.0   2.5   0.7   2.1   1.9   3.3   3.2   3.2   
Western and Central Europe 28.4   – 0.2   0.2   1.2   2.4   1.5   1.3   10.3   10.7   10.6   
US 25.9   2.8   1.9   2.6   2.1   1.5   1.9   8.1   7.4   6.4   
Japan 9.5   1.4   1.6   1.5   0.0   0.3   2.7   4.6   4.4   4.3   
Canada 2.9   1.7   1.7   2.2   1.5   1.1   1.7   7.5   7.3   7.2   
Industrialised countries (total) 66.6   1.3   1.1   1.9   1.9   1.3   1.7   8.7   8.6   8.2   
Newly industrialised countries:                 
Russia 3.2   3.4   1.3   2.0   5.1 6.7 6.0     
China 13.1   7.7   7.7   7.5   2.7 2.6 3.3     
India 2.9   3.8   3.9   5.6   9.3 11.5 9.2     
East Asiaa) 6.3   3.8   3.8   4.5   3.1 3.0 3.4     
Latin Americab) 7.8   2.6   2.5   2.9   6.2 6.9 6.8     
Newly industrialised countries (total) 33.4   5.1   4.8   5.2   4.4   4.9   4.9         
Totalc) 100.0   2.5   2.3   3.0               
World trade growth in %   2.4   2.0   4.9               
a) Weighted average of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore and Hong Kong. Weighted with  
the 2012 levels of GDP in US dollars. – b) Weighted average of Brasil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia and Chile.                      
Weighted with  the 2012 level of GDP in US dollars. – c) Weighted average of the listed groups of countries. – d) Standardised            
unemployment rate.           
Source: EU, OECD, IMF, ILO, National Statistical Offices, 2013 and 2014: EEAG Forecast. 
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Table 1.A.2 
GDP growth, inflation and unemployment in the European countries	  
  Share of GDP growth Inflationa) Unemployment rateb) 
  total GDP in % in % 
  in % 2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
Germany 20.3 0.7 0.4 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.6 5.5 5.2 5.0 
France 15.7 0.0 0.2 0.2 2.2 1.0 1.0 10.2 10.8 11.0 
Italy 12.5 – 2.5 – 1.9 – 0.1 3.3 1.3 1.0 10.7 12.2 12.6 
Spain 8.5 – 1.6 – 1.2 0.5 2.4 1.6 – 0.1 25.0 26.5 26.7 
Netherlands 4.8 – 1.2 – 1.0 0.7 2.8 2.5 1.3 5.3 6.7 7.1 
Belgium 2.9 – 0.1 0.2 1.2 2.6 1.2 1.3 7.6 8.4 8.6 
Austria 2.4 0.9 0.3 1.5 2.6 2.1 1.8 4.3 4.8 4.7 
Greece 1.7 – 6.4 – 3.9 – 1.2 1.0 – 0.9 – 0.6 24.3 27.4 28.0 
Finland 1.5 – 0.8 – 1.2 0.7 3.2 2.2 1.6 7.7 8.2 8.3 
Portugal 1.4 – 3.2 – 1.6 0.3 2.8 0.4 0.0 15.9 16.5 15.4 
Ireland 1.2 0.2 0.0 2.1 1.9 0.5 0.8 14.7 13.1 12.5 
Slovakia 0.5 1.8 0.9 1.7 3.7 1.5 1.7 14.0 14.2 13.9 
Slovenia 0.3 – 2.5 – 1.7 – 0.3 2.8 1.9 1.3 8.9 10.2 11.0 
Luxembourg 0.3 – 0.2 1.9 2.1 2.9 1.6 1.7 5.1 5.9 5.7 
Latvia 0.2 5.0 4.6 4.0 2.3 0.0 2.0 15.0 12.1 11.2 
Cyprus 0.1 – 2.4 – 5.5 – 3.8 3.1 0.6 0.6 11.9 16.1 18.1 
Estonia 0.1 3.9 1.3 3.5 4.2 3.4 3.4 10.2 8.6 8.5 
Malta 0.1 0.8 1.9 1.3 3.2 1.0 1.5 6.4 6.4 6.0 
Euro areac) 74.4 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.7 2.5 1.4 1.1 11.4 12.1 12.2 
United Kingdom 13.7 0.1 1.9 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.2 7.9 7.5 7.1 
Sweden 3.1 0.9 0.8 1.9 0.9 0.4 0.9 8.0 8.0 7.8 
Denmark 1.9 – 0.4 0.4 1.7 2.4 0.5 0.8 7.5 6.9 6.7 
EU 21c) 93.1 – 0.5 0.0 1.1 2.5 1.5 1.3 10.7 11.2 11.2 
Poland 2.9 1.9 1.4 2.5 3.7 0.8 1.2 10.1 10.4 10.0 
Czech Republic 1.2 – 1.0 – 1.5 1.3 3.5 1.3 1.0 7.0 7.0 6.5 
Romania 1.1 0.7 3.0 4.0 3.4 3.2 2.7 7.0 7.3 6.9 
Hungary 0.8 – 1.7 1.1 2.0 5.7 1.8 2.0 10.9 10.4 10.0 
Croatia 0.4 – 2.0 – 0.7 0.5 3.4 2.4 2.0 15.9 17.0 16.0 
Bulgaria 0.3 0.8 0.6 2.0 2.4 0.5 1.0 12.3 13.0 12.0 
Lithuania 0.2 3.7 3.0 3.2 3.2 1.2 1.5 13.4 11.8 10.9 
New Membersd) 6.9 0.6 1.1 2.4 3.8 1.5 1.6 9.6 9.8 9.3 
European Unionc) 100.0 – 0.4 0.1 1.2 2.6 1.5 1.3 10.5 10.9 10.8 
a) Harmonised consumer price index (HICP). – b) Standardised unemployment rate. – c) Weighted average of the listed coun-
tries. – d) Weighted average over Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria and Lithuania. 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, IMF, 2013 and 2014: EEAG Forecast. 
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Table 1.A.3 
Key forecast figures for the European Union	  
        2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Percentage change over previous year 
Real gross domestic product   1.6 – 0.4 0.0 1.2 
   Private consumption   0.3 – 0.7 0.1 0.7 
   Government consumption   – 0.2 – 0.2 0.4 0.2 
   Gross fixed capital formation   1.6 – 3.0 – 2.7 1.9 
   Net exportsa) 
 
  0.9 1.1 0.4 0.2 
Consumer pricesb)     3.1 2.6 1.5 1.3 
        Percentage of nominal gross domestic product 
Government fiscal balancec)   – 4.4 – 3.9 – 3.5 – 2.7 
  
  
  Percentage of labour force 
Unemployment rated)     9.7 10.5 10.9 10.8 
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous year). – b) Harmonised consumer price index 
(HCPI). – c) 2013 and 2014: Forecasts of the European Commission. – d) Standardised unemployment rate. 
Source: Eurostat, 2013 and 2014: EEAG Forecast. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.A.4 
Key forecast figures for the euro area 
        2011 2012 2013 2014 
        Percentage change over previous year 
Real gross domestic product   1.6 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.7 
   Private consumption   0.3 – 1.4 – 0.5 0.3 
   Government consumption   – 0.1 – 0.5 0.2 0.0 
   Gross fixed capital formation   1.6 – 4.1 – 3.2 1.2 
   Net exportsa) 
 
  0.9 1.5 0.5 0.5 
Consumer pricesb)     2.7 2.5 1.4 1.1 
        Percentage of nominal gross domestic product 
Government fiscal balancec)   – 4.2 – 3.7 – 3.1 – 2.5 
        Percentage of labour force 
Unemployment rated)     10.1 11.4 12.1 12.2 
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous year). – b) Harmonised consumer price index 
(HCPI). –  c) 2013 and 2014: Forecasts of the European Commission. – d) Standardised unemployment rate. 
Source: Eurostat, 2013 and 2014: EEAG Forecast. 
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Appendix 1.B
Ifo World Economic Survey (WES)
The Ifo World Economic Survey (WES) assesses 
worldwide economic trends by polling transnational 
as well as national organizations worldwide about cur-
rent economic developments in the respective country. 
This allows for a rapid, up-to-date assessment of the 
economic situation prevailing around the world. In 
January 2014, 1,121 economic experts in 121 countries 
were polled. WES is conducted in co-operation with 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 
Paris.
The survey questionnaire focuses on qualitative infor-
mation: on assessment of a country’s general econom-
ic situation and expectations regarding important eco-
nomic indicators. It has proved to be a useful tool, 
since economic changes are revealed earlier than by 
traditional business statistics. The individual replies 
are combined for each country without weighting. 
The “grading” procedure consists in giving a grade of 
9 to positive replies (+), a grade of 5 to indifferent re-
plies (=) and a grade of 1 to negative (–) replies. 
Grades within the range of 5 to 9 indicate that positive 
answers prevail or that a majority expects trends to in-
crease, whereas grades within the range of 1 to 5 reveal 
predominantly negative replies or expectations of de-
creasing trends. The survey results are published as ag-
gregated data. The aggregation procedure is based on 
country classifications. Within each country group or 
region, the country results are weighted according to 
the share of the specific country’s exports and imports 
in total world trade.
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Switzerland:
relic of the PaSt, Model 
for the future?*
2.1 Introduction
Like every European country and Europe itself, Swit­
zerland is a collection of diverse communities connected 
by a web of markets and policies. The socio­economic 
institutions that link people and land have always 
evolved through history, as communication technolo­
gies altered the cultural significance of existing borders, 
while trade and factor mobility altered local govern­
ments’ ability to enforce taxes and regulations. This 
Chapter reviews the often quaint and always intriguing 
ways in which such phenomena operate in Switzerland, 
and discusses whether and how the Swiss Confederation’s 
past history and current Swiss policy issues may help us 
to understand the parallel evolution and similar prob­
lems experienced by other European economies and so­
cieties. At a time of critical crisis for Europe’s Economic 
and Monetary Union project, it is very useful to study 
the role of social and cultural factors in shaping the 
challenges and opportunities of economic union and di­
versity management. National and cultural identities 
currently play a prominent role in European economic 
policy debates. In July 2012, for example, positions on 
banking union were taken by groups of economists who 
identified themselves as “German speaking”, rather 
than as taxpayers of specific countries, or members of 
some other economic interest group. 
Swiss citizens feel that they belong to their country in 
a way that approximates national feelings, but differs 
from those that prevailed over the last couple of cen­
turies in other parts of Europe. The Swiss are very 
much a nation in a sense, because they are very proud 
of their country and there is no discussion whatsoever 
of breaking it up. Part of the reason for the absence of 
break­up tensions is, however, that the Swiss Con­
federation does not rely on cultural homogeneity to 
build consensus around centralised institutions – an 
approach, typical of European nation­states, that is 
increasingly less effective within countries, and ex­
tremely unlikely to work at the European level. 
Instead, the Swiss are linked by a relatively loose (but 
tightening) institutional framework, held together by 
pragmatic awareness that common problems need 
common solutions. 
Many who hope that Europe will develop a more cohe­
sive political structure are fond of De Rougemont’s 
(1965) picture of Swiss federalism. Observing the Swiss 
indeed offers the authors and readers of this chapter 
plentiful opportunities to rehearse all the relevant issues 
of market and policy integration, including tax compe­
tition, financial regulation, labour mobility, currency 
adoption, and monetary and fiscal policies. As we shall 
see, Switzerland has become more similar to its neigh­
bour countries and more tightly integrated with their 
financial, fiscal, and market structure. And Europe may 
arguably, in turn, benefit from becoming more Swiss in 
its approach to solving the key issue it faces, namely 
that of defining and designing a new set of policies and 
political interactions that works consistently both at 
lower levels than that of legacy countries, and across 
the boundaries of historical nations. 
2.2 The Swiss way 
The Swiss Confederation includes 26 cantons: 4 French­
speaking, 1  Italian­speaking, 3 French­German bilin­
gual cantons, 1 German­Rhaetoromanic­Italian trilin­
gual canton and 17 German­speaking ones. Its citizens’ 
social and political rights and obligations are tradition­
ally derived from their membership of a commune, 
which is generally based on ancestry (“ius sanguinis”) 
rather than place of birth (“ius soli”). The notion of a 
“place of origin” was established in the 18th century, 
when a child was entered in the citizen registry of his or 
her father’s commune. The commune is still reported, in 
passports and other documents, where other countries 
show their citizens’ place of birth. These historical 
roots help us to understand why the Swiss socio­eco­
nomic model is not as individualistic as that of more 
market­oriented countries, but does privilege local po­
*  We thank Richard Baldwin, Florian Eckert, Gebhard Kirch­
gaessner, Marko Koethenbuerger, Winfried Koeniger, Rafael Lalive 
and Benjamin Ryser for valuable feedback. All remaining errors are 
the authors’ own.
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litical interactions and choices over broader and longer­
range schemes and projects. In Switzerland a modern, 
urban, market­oriented view of the world coexists with 
rural traditionalist roots. The Swiss do not like to be 
controlled by a distant government and like their pri­
vacy to be strictly protected, especially in financial mat­
ters, but do control each other’s individual behaviour. 
In small communes, in the neighbourhoods of larger 
towns, and in work places, rules are strictly enforced not 
only by formal policing, but also by less formal yet no 
less stringent monitoring by peers, who strongly feel 
that law and order should be preserved, and that it is 
their duty to defend common property and quiet 
against destructive and disruptive behaviour.
2.2.1 Institutional structure
Many of Switzerland’s more than 2,500 communes 
are still small enough to allow all important decisions 
to be taken by annual (or more frequent) general as­
semblies. Most of the population lives in larger com­
munes, where decisions are approved by more mod­
ern, but still very frequent and comprehensive voting 
procedures. A similarly broad spread of decision pow­
er is observed at the top federal level of the Swiss po­
litical system: Legislative power is perfectly shared by 
the National Council (where cantonal representation 
is roughly proportional to their population) and by 
the Council of States (where 20 cantons are represent­
ed by 2 councillors and the other 6 by 1); there are fre­
quent referendums on popular legislative initiatives; 
executive power is exercised by a government in which 
all major parties are usually represented. 
This direct democracy and consociational (“Konkor­
danzdemokratie”) political model tends to imply a de­
centralised structure for economic policies and institu­
tions (Kirchgaessner, 2013). Cantons’ and communes’ 
tax income, wealth, and specific goods and services: 
The Federal Act on the harmonisation of the direct tax­
es of cantons and municipalities of 2000 and 2001 regu­
lates their types, bases, and assessment timing, but al­
lows tax rates to differ widely. The Federation imposes 
an income tax that is steeply progressive, but only 
reaches 11.50 percent maximum average and 13.20 per­
cent maximum marginal tax rates. Value added tax is 
levied by the Federation since 1995 at a current stand­
ard rate of 8 percent,1 and at even lower rates on con­
venience goods and lodging. This is exceptionally low 
1 In order to refinance the invalidity insurance system, this rate has 
been set at 8 percent until 2017. In 2018, it will revert back to 
7.6 percent.
compared to other OECD countries. A value added tax 
(VAT) was introduced much later than income taxes, so 
it has not yet had much time to rise. In both cases, tax 
rate increases are constrained by the fact that Swiss vot­
ers and cantons care less (to date) about federal tax rev­
enues than those of lower levels of government.
Social assistance used to be a responsibility of the com­
mune of origin, which until late 2012 was still responsi­
ble for a share of the benefits drawn by any needy citi­
zens: Such benefits are now the responsibility of the 
cantons for their residents, and have become less neces­
sary as federal social schemes were introduced. These 
include a basic pay­as­you­go pension scheme (AHV, 
“Alters­ und Hinter lassenen versicherung”), which to­
gether with the disability insurance scheme (IV, “Invali­
den ver sicherung”) constitutes the first pillar of Swit­
zerland’s social insurance. The federal government also 
establishes and enforces the rules of the mandatory un­
employment insurance scheme (ALV, “Arbeitslosen ver­
sicherung”) but lower­level regional offices are respon­
sible for the implementation of counselling, monitor­
ing, and activation policies. Switzer land’s second wel­
fare pillar consists of occupational funded pension 
plans, mandatory for employees and optional for the 
self­employed; health insurance is similarly compulso­
ry, and privately run by competing schemes rather than 
by a national health service. 
Many policies and institutions are decentralised in 
Switzerland. Only a few tertiary education and re­
search institutes are federal; secondary and tertiary 
education is organised by the cantons; and primary 
schools are run by communes subject to cantonal leg­
islation, which, in turn, is at least in principle, but in 
practice only slowly and partially, subject to federal 
rules and supervision. The Federal Constitution in 
Switzerland is renewed at irregular intervals, and the 
version that has been in force since 2001 provides for 
common primary education standards (Article 62). It 
also provides for freedom of establishment (Article 24) 
and of commerce (Article 27), and establishes a man­
date “to create a unified Swiss economic area” 
(Article  95). Implementation of these principles re­
quires legislation that is only being very slowly drafted 
and approved (or rejected) by the cantons. The 
“Accord inter­cantonal sur l’harmonisation de la sco­
larité obligatoire” (“HarmoS”) was joined at its 2007 
inception by 11 cantons and has been in force since 
August 2009. It now covers 76.2 percent of the popu­
lation after another 7 cantons joined in 2010. The 
Accord has, however, been rejected by 7 cantons rep­
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resenting 13.5 percent of the population, and the re­
maining cantons have not yet decided upon the issue. 
Cantons regulate professional qualifications, with a 
few exceptions (for example, the medical professions 
are regulated at the federal level). As a result, services 
markets remain less than fully integrated within 
Switzerland (Cottier and Oesch, 2012). 
The “Accord inter­cantonal sur les marchés publics” 
of 1994 (revised in 2001) provides for only some com­
petition­oriented regulation of public procurement. 
Two other key institutions are organised at the federal 
level of government. Article 99 of the Federal 
Constitution establishes that an independent central 
bank, the Swiss National Bank (SNB), should con­
duct monetary policy in the interests of the country as 
a whole, and maintain adequate foreign currency and 
gold reserves. Two thirds of its profits, net of divi­
dends to shareholders at a rate of a maximum 6 per­
cent, are paid to the cantons, and the other third is 
paid to the Confederation. The SNB’s mandate is to 
balance price stability and business cycle considera­
tions, with price stability as a priority. 
The Constitution also envisions a federal army, organ­
ised into four regional commands that liaise with can­
tonal authorities, but obey only Federal Council deci­
sions. All male Swiss citizens between 19 and 34 are 
subject to low­paid military service (around two thirds 
are deemed fit for it, the others perform civilian ser­
vices, or pay 3 percentage points of additional income 
tax until the age of 30), and about 5 percent of the 
force is professional. The Swiss have supported this 
military structure in three referenda. The latest refer­
endum rejected the proposal to abolish compulsory 
military service by a vast majority of 73 percent in 
September 2013. Of the previous two, the referendum 
held after the New York terrorist attacks more strong­
ly supported Switzerland’s military structure than its 
predecessor held in 1984.
2.2.2 Taxes
While other federal countries also decentralise many 
public expenditure decisions, a key specific feature of 
the Swiss institutional layout is the decentralised tax 
system. This provides a rich field for research into tax 
competition, which theoretically implies stronger 
pressure on the public sector’s performance, but also 
lowers revenue­raising power, and hence reduces the 
ability to spend on public goods and redistribution 
(see Feld and Kirchgaessner, 2001; Feld et al., 2003, 
and their references). 
To detect the pressure exercised by “yardstick” compe­
tition on service providers across jurisdictions, it is 
necessary to identify instances where taxpayers are 
unlikely to exert pressure by threatening to choose a 
different jurisdiction. An interesting illustration is off­
ered by the fact that in most of Switzerland, church 
taxes are levied at the parish level, can differ across 
Catholic and Protestant confessions, and tend to be 
similar across churches of different denomination in 
nearby locations (Egger et al., 2012). Swiss parishes 
are more likely to set performance examples for each 
other than to be trying to steal members from each 
other, as they might in more individualistic societies 
(like the United States) where people are much freer 
than in Europe to change communities. Such yard­
stick competition must be much weaker in countries 
with more centralised arrangements (as in Germany, 
where church tax rates are set at the federal level for 
individuals who choose to declare a religion).
Theory predicts, and Swiss evidence confirms, that de­
centralisation of tax policies should lower tax revenue 
through tax competition, and shift its composition 
from taxes to user charges. Not surprisingly, high­in­
come people are more likely to live in low­tax localities 
within Switzerland. The French­speaking cantons tra­
ditionally charge higher rates but, as predicted by tax 
competition pressure, cantonal income tax rates are 
lower when the tax rates of their neighbours are low, 
and the lowest tax rates can be seen in Zug, Schwyz 
and Nidwalden, which neighbour rich Zurich where 
the tax rate is higher. 
Tax competition, however, is clearly not strong enough 
to make either taxation or high­tax areas disappear. 
This is partly for institutional reasons. In Switzerland, 
inter­cantonal redistribution takes place through a 
federal equalisation system that has slowly grown over 
time and, like redistribution across municipalities 
within cantons, takes into account the extent to which 
locally­raised revenues exploit the economy’s fiscal po­
tential. Like the expenditure co­financing mechanisms 
of such federal fiscal systems as those of the United 
States and Germany (Egger et al., 2010), this partially 
counteracts incentives to engage in tax competition 
(Smart, 1998; Koethenbuerger, 2002). 
The intensity of competition is, however, also limited 
by the fact that agglomeration economies improve 
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productivity and make it possible to afford better 
amenities. A large and well­located community like 
Zurich, or New York, can charge higher taxes than its 
smaller neighbours, and still offer an attractive after­
tax income. In Switzerland, competition across juris­
dictions may also be weakened by the fact that tradi­
tionally local institutions and socio­political interac­
tions offer limited support to broader economic inter­
actions. Locally administered social and pension 
rights are an obvious obstacle to mobility, and such 
institutional barriers used to be very strong in 
Switzerland. All employers have been required to par­
ticipate in mandatory pension schemes since 1985, but 
these second pillar pension rights were not fully port­
able until 1995. However, additional contributions to 
local occupational pension schemes (of which there 
were over 17,000 in the early 1980s, and thousands still 
exist) may still not be fully portable.
More interestingly, cultural features also reduce the 
relevance of purely economic incentives to relocate in 
order to exploit tax differentials. Eugster and Parchet 
(2011) show that while there is competition in income 
taxes at the language border, its spatial reach is re­
stricted to 20 km from Switzerland’s language bor­
ders. Swiss data also offer many other indications that 
differences of language (and potato cooking recipes, 
work attitudes, and presumably more general cultural 
features) influence many important economic phe­
nomena not only within Switzerland, but indeed with­
in each Swiss canton. After taking into account rele­
vant structural economic factors, no independent in­
fluence of local language and tax rates can be detected 
on entrepreneurship indicators (Bergmann, 2011), 
and financial capital mobility is presumably even less 
strongly, if  at all, influenced by the cultural differences 
that restrain labour mobility. On the Latin­speaking 
side of the “Roestigraben” boundary of German­
speaking Switzerland, which does not always coincide 
with cantonal boundaries, there is a tendency to make 
more intense use of similar or even identical unem­
ployment benefit entitlements (Bruegger et al., 2009), 
and exports are more likely to be directed to France or 
Italy than to Germany or Austria (Egger and 
Lassmann, 2011).
2.2.3 International comparisons
If  not language, culture and institutions do change 
across the boundaries of the Swiss Confederation. 
The cantons and communes of the Confederation do 
not only differ from each other, but are also on the 
whole different from the European Union (EU) coun­
tries that completely surround them. We briefly illus­
trate some key differences by comparing aggregate 
Swiss indicators to those of the country’s neighbours 
and fellow language speakers (Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy) and, for reasons that will become 
clear if  they are not already, to those of Belgium and 
the United States. 
The first panel of Figure 2.1 shows that Switzerland’s 
purchasing­power­adjusted GDP per capita, while 
comparable to that of the United States, is far higher 
than that of its immediate neighbours, chiefly because 
of the very high employment rate of Swiss residents 
(second panel of Figure 2.1): Hours per worker are in 
the middle of the group’s range (third panel of 
Figure 2.1), and productivity per hour worked is actu­
ally lower in Switzerland than in all comparison coun­
tries except for Austria and Italy (fourth panel of Figure 
2.1). That productivity difference partly reflects differ­
ences in capital intensity and in the employed labour 
force’s educational qualifications. Over time, Figure 2.2 
shows that after accounting for such observable factors, 
Switzerland’s residual total factor productivity has not 
grown as fast as in some of its neighbouring countries: 
It slumped during the 1990s, recovered sharply before 
the Great Recession, and is currently stagnating. 
The data shown in Figure 2.3 highlights an interesting 
Swiss peculiarity: The country’s income inequality is 
quite different from its European neighbours. In 
Switzerland, taxes and subsidies reduce inequality 
only a little, and even less – albeit from a much lower 
level – than in the United States. Such cross­country 
comparisons are possible only for one rather recent 
year in the OECD set of comparable data, where 
Switzerland’s inequality is, at the same time, the lowest 
for gross incomes and one of the highest for disposa­
ble incomes. Tax competition makes it difficult to im­
plement redistribution schemes, and a “race to the 
bottom” outcome may not be surprising in a country 
where a very large share of tax revenues is raised by 
sub­central levels of government, and three quarters 
of local taxes are on income (rather than on consump­
tion, sales, and property, as is the case in the United 
States and other federal systems). 
It is important, however, to note that there is neverthe­
less some redistribution.2 Currently, roughly a third of 
2 See Swiss Federal Statistical Office, http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/
portal/de/index/news/publikationen.html?publicationID=5391.
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the Swiss Confederation’s budget, 
which only amounts to some 
10 percent of GDP, is spent on so­
cial welfare; about a quarter of 
the basic AHV pay­as­you­go 
pension scheme, and about half  
of the other IV disability insur­
ance scheme, are funded by feder­
al VAT and income tax revenues, 
rather than by contributions of 
current workers and employers. In 
addition, as shown in Figure 2.4, 
the incidence of mandatory pri­
vate social schemes is very high in 
Switzerland (the highest in the 
OECD database at some 7  per­
cent of income). These schemes 
bring its overall publicly provided 
or regulated social expenditure to 
a level comparable to those of its 
European neighbours, and much 
higher than in the United States 
where, as in the United Kingdom 
and also in the Netherlands, pri­
vate voluntary social expenditure 
largely fills the gap to total social 
expenditure, which largely reflects 
variation in income levels and de­
mographic factors. In Switzerland, 
government entities pay 21 per­
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cent of total health expenditure, and the mandatory 
health insurance system 35 percent; the rest is covered 
by other schemes, and roughly a third of the total is 
paid directly by private households and other direct 
private funds.
2.3 The Swiss exception in history and in Europe
The facts briefly reviewed above indicate that 
Switzerland is richer, more employed, and less dynam­
ic than its European neighbours. In that group, its pol­
icies stand out in three related respects: Its institution­
al and political structures are relatively loose and de­
centralised, its taxes and public social expenditure are 
relatively low, but its military is centralised. We have 
also noted, however, that during the last 20 years the 
Swiss Confederation has introduced and refined im­
portant changes in those and other fields. 
The starting point of that relatively recent evolution 
was a configuration that, while peculiar in modern 
Europe, was quite common in earlier times. Like the 
cantons’ colourful coats of arms, in fact, the Swiss so­
cio­economic landscape was until recently, and in 
some respects remains, similar to that which prevailed 
in medieval times, when the range of economic inter­
actions was limited by institutions, as well as by 
technology. 
A thousand years ago, the Holy Roman Empire provid­
ed a basic legal and cultural framework for trade, but the 
European economic system was far from free. Peasants 
were tied to their lord’s land, and tariffs were charged 
whenever people or goods crossed a bridge or city wall. 
In what is now central Switzerland, the Zahringer and 
Kybourg feudal dynasties became extinct in the 13th cen­
tury (unlike their Augsburg and Savoy neighbours that 
later expanded to the East and West to play important 
roles in European history). The Holy Roman emperor 
then granted a special status to the rural valleys around 
the Gotthard pass: Like Imperial Free Cities, some of 
which were also established in the area, they would be 
subordinate only to his central authority, and were pop­
ulated by free men rather than by serfs tied by feudal ob­
ligations to the land and to a religious or lay local lord. 
The first federation agreements across such entities were 
established sometime in the 13th century (1291, accord­
ing to myth) between Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden 
(later split into Obwalden and Nidwalden). A web of 
mutual support agreements later formed, with Lucerne 
in 1332, Zurich in 1351, Glarus and Zug in 1352, and 
Berne in 1353. A “Tagsatzung” central legislative and 
executive council had only very limited powers in this 
Old Confederacy of German­speaking free cities and 
rural communities that often fought each other. The Old 
Confederacy later expanded to include Fribourg and 
Solothurn in 1481, Basel and Schaffhausen in 1501, and 
Appenzell in 1513. Within it, economic activity was 
much freer than in the still medieval fiefdoms that sur­
rounded it. While the rural areas provided mercenaries 
for European wars, city dwellers engaged in commerce 
and craft activities, heavily regulated by guilds, often 
dominated on a hereditary basis by successful families, 
and still subject to onerous taxes and tariffs. 
2.3.1 Nation building (or not)
The events that progressively disrupted this socio­eco­
nomic configuration of Europe are well known. On the 
cultural and political side, the au­
thority of lay and religious sover­
eigns was challenged by increas­
ingly widespread access to educa­
tion and information. Even before 
the Enlightenment and the French 
revolution, the 1555 Peace of 
Augsburg established a “cuius re­
gion, eius religio” framework for 
the regulation of cultural diversity 
across areas of the Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation, as 
it was then called. The Peace of 
Westphalia established the princi­
ple that the rulers of each autono­
mous region, and the Emperor 
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himself, should not interfere in the internal affairs of 
other regions. On the economic side, trade spread with­
in and to some extent across the boundaries of these 
states, workers were freed of their ties to the country­
side and specialised, and large­scale production could 
be organised in factories and cities. Between the seven­
teenth and nineteenth century, a process of nation for­
mation and industrial revolutions swept Europe, and 
eventually reorganised its political and economic land­
scape around bureaucracies and constitutional democ­
racies at the level of more or less well­defined national 
entities, along the borders of which trade was restricted 
and war, in the absence of imperial authority, was the 
normal way to resolve conflicts when diplomacy failed. 
This process proceeded unevenly across Europe. Very 
small “pebble states” like San Marino, Monaco, the 
Channel Islands, Andorra, Liechtenstein, and 
Luxembourg have preserved their rather medieval 
character to this day; smaller states, such as Savoy and 
Bavaria, long served as buffers between increasingly 
militant European “powers”. The Old Swiss 
Confederation briefly aspired to be a power in the dec­
ades around 1500, conquering large portions of 
Burgundy and Northern Italy. But the cantons did not 
unite against the French reaction to this move: Those 
that did not retreat were defeated in 1513, the 
Confederation pledged eternal neutrality, and 
Switzerland thereafter stayed on the sidelines of a na­
tion­building phase of European history. The original 
cantons were content to rent mercenaries to European 
powers and to rule over the French, Italian, and 
German­speaking areas that remained under their 
joint control. Their landlord role there was similar to 
that of the English or Prussian landlords’ domination 
of Irish or Slavic peasantry. 
Nation­building interfered with such old­fashioned 
arrangements when the French invasion in 1798 and 
subsequent Austro­Russian attacks forced the cantons 
to tighten their ties. The Swiss all together negotiated 
Republican status with the French in 1803, and in 
1815 the Council of Vienna implemented the Swiss 
sovereignty that had been recognised in 1648. It was at 
this stage that new cantons were formed (some French­ 
and Italian­speaking, some German­speaking) and 
Switzerland reached its current configuration.3 The 
new Confederation struggled for decades with the 
3 Only the separation of Jura from Berne in 1979 altered it since 
then. The Vorarlberg region voted in 1919 by an 81 percent majority 
to join Switzerland, but this was opposed by Austria as well as by the 
winning side of World War I, and not supported by the Swiss 
government.
need to adopt a form of government that would, on 
the one hand, allow it to deal with its more modern 
nation­state neighbours, and reconcile its internal dif­
ferences on the other. 
The tension between progressive federalists and con­
servatives (who favoured the previous loose organisa­
tion of very independent cantons) was settled after the 
brief civil war of the cantons in 1848 by swift negotia­
tion of a new constitution, closely patterned along the 
federalist lines of the United States of America, with a 
directorial rather than a presidential form of govern­
ment. The Constitution established bottom­up com­
mune­based citizenship, but endowed the Confederation 
with only very limited tax and regulatory powers, and 
did not aim at building national solidarity. It did trans­
form the previous cantonal militias into a federal army, 
removing from the cantons the right to wage war with 
the very small military forces that remained under their 
control: The army draft, a powerful nation­building 
tool, remains to this day a key element of the Swiss so­
cio­political infrastructure. It did not at all deploy the 
other main nation­building tool: To this day, as noted 
above, primary schooling is largely locally organised in 
Switzerland, and does not serve the identity­building 
purpose it has in traditional nations. 
The year 1848 not only marks the beginning of mod­
ern Switzerland, but also a watershed for the spread, 
speed, and intensity of nation­building efforts in 
Europe. Unrest prodded France, Belgium, Germany, 
and Austria­Hungary to evolve towards constitution­
al and nationalistic governance, and the Savoy­ruled 
Kingdom of Sardinia to launch an Italian national 
project. Nations were glued together by military pow­
er, as well as by the cultural homogeneity generated by 
government­organised education, and by safety nets 
meant to prevent the social exclusion of and unrest in 
an urban working class that could no longer rely on 
village common properties and family networks for 
collective support. The employment­related old­age 
and sickness benefits introduced in unified Germany 
by Bismarck in the 1870s were largely motivated by 
the desire to build national cohesion and maintain in­
ternal peace (with obvious competitiveness implica­
tions. To control race­to­the­bottom tensions, Ger­
many at the turn of the century tried, and failed, to 
achieve agreement with its trading partners on mini­
mum welfare provision standards). The introduction 
and development of elaborate government redistribu­
tion systems and socio­political rights and obligation 
also required increasingly formal regulation of immi­
62EEAG Report 2014
Chapter 2
gration and citizenship, whether on the basis of ances­
try, as until recently in Germany and Italy, and in 
Japan, or on the basis of birthplace and/or parents’ 
residence, as in France and in the United States. 
The nation­building phase of European history gener­
ated about two major wars per century, a source of 
technological and organisational progress, as well as 
of destruction, pain, and suffering. In other nations, 
organisational progress and industrialisation fostered 
economic growth and technological innovations. In 
Switzerland, by contrast, economic prosperity was 
achieved by managing to keep out of European wars 
after fierce initial battles with neighbouring regions. 
The Swiss mercenaries did fight for other countries 
until the 18th century, but since the formation of the 
new Federation they have not taken part in any 
European war. Of course, not every European country 
could have stayed out of the European wars that were 
triggered by national politics. Neutrality was natural 
for Switzerland, a country of German and French 
speakers who would have found it difficult to choose 
sides in wars that were fought by France and Germany 
against each other. 
2.3.2 Interactions with Europe
Despite an inclination towards neutrality and a desire 
to shape its own society and future, Switzerland’s for­
tunes were always deeply intertwined with European 
history and markets. The Swiss would clearly not be do­
ing so well if their prosperity had to be based on open­
ing and managing bank accounts for each other. They 
benefit from their freedom to formulate and implement 
independent policies within an integrated set of mar­
kets, and from their ability to exploit that opportunity, 
exerting regulatory and fiscal competition on larger, 
less homogeneous, and more inertial economies. 
Both the Confederation’s economic opportunities and its 
institutional structure were significantly influenced by its 
neighbours’ revolutions and wars. For example, bank ac­
count secrecy was enforced by criminal (rather than just 
civil) law in 1934, primarily in reaction to France’s pros­
ecution of Swiss bank executives, and other efforts to 
prevent foreigners from opening Swiss bank accounts in 
order to evade taxes.4 Surrounded by fascist dictator­
4  To improve Switzerland’s self­esteem and foreign image (and ap­
pease the sizable domestic minority that does not like to shelter for­
eign tax evaders) it was later emphasised that tightening of bank se­
crecy in the 1930s was chiefly meant to help German Jews to shelter 
their assets from the Nazi regime, also a reaction to another type of 
neighbouring­nation policy.
ships, Switzerland in the inter­war period built the self­
image of a country that was no longer divided along eth­
nic and economic domination lines, and could be united 
and strong. A federal income tax was introduced in 1941 
in would­be temporary support of the need to defend the 
country against the German­Austrian­Italian invasion 
that was carefully planned, but eventually not carried 
out, as well as against several mistaken bombing raids by 
American plane formations. 
While Switzerland’s geographical position made it 
easy for it to partake of Europe’s economic progress, 
the Swiss economy long remained as medieval as pos­
sible for a country surrounded by nations where uni­
form legal and institutional frameworks made eco­
nomic interactions possible beyond the circle of per­
sonal acquaintance and customary trust. Even al­
though freedom of economic establishment was envi­
sioned in the 1848 Constitution, and freedom of 
commerce in the 1874 Constitution, Switzerland has 
only much more recently begun to implement such 
principles, and to develop the welfare state safety nets 
and insurance schemes that make labour mobility pos­
sible within nations and beyond the boundaries of vil­
lage­based socio­economic relationships.
Switzerland largely skipped the nation­building phase 
of European history, and the many associated wars, 
revolutions, hyperinflation, and excessive fluctuations 
resulting in social and political crisis episodes. Not sur­
prisingly, it (and all the small “pebble states” other than 
Luxembourg) also remained on the sidelines of the 
European integration process that, in the wake of 
World War II, began to use market unification as a ve­
hicle of cultural convergence, with the ultimate aim of 
preventing further wars. The many peculiarities of 
Switzerland’s society and economy that originate in its 
non­national character make it feel that it can provide 
“growth, stability, and cohesion” independently, and 
lead it to remain separate within Europe not only politi­
cally, but also by economic barriers. A 1992 referendum 
narrowly rejected Swiss membership in the European 
Economic Area at the Confederation level (but the 
polls were in favour of it in all non­German cantons). 
This left Switzerland free to selectively adopt European 
Union rules and regulation (“autonomer Nachvollzug”). 
The evolution of Swiss institutions has since been influ­
enced strongly by this process. The Swiss Single Internal 
Market Act was only introduced in 1996, when 
Switzerland adopted the product market specifications 
harmonised in 1992 across the boundaries of all the 
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European Union countries that had long since removed 
technical barriers to trade. The act was revised in 2004 
and, like its European Union supranational counterpart, 
does not do much to unify services markets, which re­
main strongly segmented within Switzerland. And just as 
the European Court of Justice plays a key role in the im­
plementation of the Single Market within the European 
Union, in Switzerland the principles laid out in the 2004 
revision of the Internal Market Act make it possible for 
its courts to enforce the freedom of services provision 
that canton­level regulation has been restricting despite 
constitutional provisions. Since Switzerland adopted 
European product specifications unilaterally, it was im­
possible for its own requirements to be taken into ac­
count by single market rules (for example, electric appli­
ances sold in the European Union may be equipped with 
any of the plugs that fit one of the many sockets installed 
in the member countries, but not with the peculiar offset 
ground socket used in Switzerland). It still maintains 
some explicit trade barriers (most notably in food and 
agricultural products). Labour mobility between 
Switzerland and the European Union, while hampered 
(as is, after all, the case within the European Union) by 
the poor harmonisation of social and labour policies, 
was harmonised with the rules that apply within the 
European Union by the Agreement on the Free 
Movement of Persons that came into force on 
1 June 2002, and was subsequently reaffirmed by plebi­
scite in 2009. These bilateral agreements are less perma­
nent than European treaties: In mid­2013 the Federal 
Council invoked a safeguard clause of the Agreement, 
not only to extend existing limits to labour mobility from 
new European Union member countries, but also to es­
tablish annual quotas for the long­term employment of 
all European Union citizens. A referendum in February 
2014, aimed at “regaining control of immigration into 
Switzerland,” adds to pressure against the bilateral la­
bour mobility agreement with the European Union.
2.4 Crises 
During the crises regularly generated by capitalist de­
velopment, markets show their limitations and the ex­
tent and character of collective policies play an even 
more crucial role than in normal times. A shrinking 
pie can make it difficult for societies to remain cohe­
sive, but facing a common problem may foster solidar­
ity and ease coordination. 
During the 1930s Great Depression, in an increasingly 
tense geo­political situation, Switzerland generated a 
new consensus around a kind of national solidarity. At 
present the deep connections between Switzerland and 
Europe imply that its problems are much more similar 
to those of its neighbours than may be expected. Its 
welfare state, while much less pervasive than that of tra­
ditional continental European nations, faces serious 
sustainability problems. The actuarial present value of 
Swiss pension plan liabilities often far exceeds that of 
their assets, as is also the case for the partially funded 
plans that should pay the pensions of cantonal civil 
servants, and will only be able to do so as a result of 
pension cuts and additional public capital injections 
(such reforms are underway in Berne and some other 
cantons). Since the 2009 crisis, the unemployment rate 
has been hovering around an average of 4.3 percent, 
and the federal ALV unemployment insurance fund has 
an accumulated deficit of some 5 billion Swiss francs.5 
Switzerland’s experience of the macroeconomic crisis 
that began in 2009 has been milder, but quite compara­
ble to that of the euro area countries that surround it. 
Figure 2.5 shows that, in terms of real per capita in­
come, the initial negative shock was shallower in 
Switzerland than in most of its neighbouring countries; 
consistently with Swiss stability, the subsequent rise 
was also much less dynamic than in Germany or 
Austria. The Swiss experience was comparable to that 
of Belgium or France in per capita terms, but better in 
total terms because population growth was faster in 
Switzerland during this period. The crisis was also not 
uniform across all regions of Switzerland. As Figure 2.6 
shows, the experiences of the seven NUTS­2 macro re­
gions of the Confederation were heterogeneous in the 
course of a crisis that, as was the case within and across 
other countries, featured particularly sharp declines 
and relatively quick recoveries in the manufacturing 
sector. Local economies where services or construction 
are more important sources of income tended to expe­
rience more persistent crises than those with a stronger 
manufacturing presence. Overall, the crisis experience 
was not significantly different, across regions of 
Switzerland and neighbouring euro area countries.6 
And like the crisis problems, the policies put in place to 
5  The portion of salaries over 126,000 Swiss francs is not included in 
the benefit replacement rate, but it has been subject to a 1 percent soli­
darity tax up to a ceiling of 315,000 Swiss francs since 2011, and will 
be taxed above this ceiling as of 2014.
6  Across the six euro area countries shown in Figure 2.5, the popula­
tion­weighted standard deviation of per capita annual real income 
growth rates was 1.0 percent in 2009, and 1.4 percent in both 2010 and 
2011; all country­specific growth rates differed from the population­
weighted average by less than 1.9 standard deviations. Across the re­
gions of Switzerland shown in Figure 2.6, the population­weighted 
standard deviations were 0.5 percent, 1.8 percent, and 0.7 percent in 
the same years. The only statistically significant different growth rate 
was the Lake Geneva region’s relatively shallow decline in 2009.
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address them were interestingly similar, but different in 
Switzerland, as we discuss below.
2.4.1 Finance and money
The systemic importance of Swiss banks goes far be­
yond the Confederation borders. The SNB and the 
government controversially organised a bailout of one 
of the two large Swiss banks, UBS. The operation was 
successful and ex­post profitable, but certainly very 
risky: It was possible for UBS to raise some equity 
(from a foreign sovereign fund) only because its woes 
narrowly predated Lehman’s bankruptcy, and the 
deepest phase of the financial crisis. Swiss policymak­
ers have since aimed to reduce the riskiness of the 
country’s banking system, aiming to protect its finan­
cial infrastructure from investment banking and trad­
ing operations, and requiring larger capital. Hosting 
two “too big to fail” banks is dan­
gerous for Switzerland, and the 
traditionalist component of Swiss 
public opinion does not like or 
trust big financial institutions and 
other international big business. 
But it clearly offers economic op­
portunity for at least some of the 
Swiss population, even though in­
surance, pharmaceuticals, and 
mid­size manufacturing are actu­
ally more important for the Swiss 
economy than banking.
In the crisis, the SNB chose to de­
fend a minimum exchange rate of 
1.20 Swiss francs to the euro for 
the same reasons that led its neigh­
bours to adopt and maintain a sin­
gle currency. Expectations of ap­
preciation alter the exchange rate 
in ways that threaten money’s role 
in denominating transactions. By 
accommodating portfolio shifts, 
and carrying risks that the public 
wants to avoid, monetary authori­
ties can continue to provide the 
safe and liquid transaction servic­
es that make it possible for a mon­
etary economy to function. 
As a Swiss franc denomination 
became more attractive, prevent­
ing appreciation required the ac­
commodation of an extremely large portfolio shift. By 
the end of 2012, the SNB had the fifth largest foreign 
currency reserves in the world, amounting to around 
75 percent of the country’s annual GDP. As Figure 2.7 
shows, the counterpart of this was a large increase in 
the Swiss monetary base in the form of central bank 
deposits. In the euro crisis phase of the Great 
Recession, exchange rate management preserved the 
Swiss economy’s ability to trade with its neighbours, 
preventing large income declines in the more export­
oriented Swiss regions, and actually intensified its 
European links. The accumulation of large euro­de­
nominated reserves at the SNB implies Swiss owner­
ship of a significant share of European debt. This 
does not entitle Switzerland to any right of control 
over euro area and country policies, but makes it as 
important for Switzerland as for euro area members 
to look for constructive solutions to debt problems. 
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Almost half  of the SNB’s foreign exchange reserves 
are denominated in euro. Debt restructuring is unlike­
ly to be a major issue, because about 70 percent of its 
total bond holdings are AAA­rated, but an increase in 
long­term interest rates would reduce the market val­
ue of those bonds. The SNB’s portfolio preferences 
triggers declines in the market value of peripheral as­
sets and in the interest yield of core bonds, and its at­
tempts to diversify the risk of its euro holdings tends 
to put pressure on the euro exchange rate with such 
currencies like the Swedish krona and the Australian 
dollar. Use of a common currency makes it easier to 
trade, but also more difficult to adjust to shocks hit­
ting regions, households, or firms within a country, or 
countries within a currency union. While the disad­
vantages of a common currency have become appar­
ent in the debt crisis, the SNB’s willingness to prevent 
revaluation and take on large and risky foreign ex­
change reserves (and the volatility caused on the fring­
es of the euro area and beyond by its attempts to man­
age the resulting risk) may cast a better light on the 
advantages of a single currency system. 
Within the European System of Central Banks, a role 
that is similar to that of the SNB’s foreign exchange as­
set purchases (meant to prevent a revaluation of the 
Swiss franc in the face of portfolio shifts) is played by 
the TARGET2 payment system balances (see Sinn and 
Wollmershaeuser, 2012; EEAG, 2013; Cour­Thimann, 
2013; for an explicit comparison between the 
TARGET2 balances and the Swiss reserves, see Sinn 
2012 and 2014). Relative to GDP, the TARGET2 bal­
ances are larger than the Swiss reserves for Luxembourg 
(255 percent by the end of 2012), but smaller for 
Germany (25 percent). As collateralised credit that 
pays interest (at the European 
Central Bank’s main refinancing 
rate), they are riskless within a 
well­functioning euro system. 
They are more controversial than 
Swiss reserves, however, because 
the collateral requirements for 
central bank refinancing were re­
duced below investment grade in 
the crisis countries, and positive 
TARGET2 balances would con­
stitute a legally dubious claim if  
the single currency were to col­
lapse. The Swiss reserves are in­
stead held in marketable assets 
with clear legal validity, yet ex­
posed to redenomination and oth­
er euro crisis risks. In fact, when 
the crisis calmed down and the interventions were 
stopped, the SNB reported a profit of about 6 billion 
Swiss francs in 2012, 4.5 billion Swiss francs of which 
was due to a rise in the value of its foreign exchange 
reserves. 
2.4.2 Fiscal policy
A small open economy is limited in the range of poli­
cies its government may adopt. It would be ill­advised 
for a small country to implement a public stimulus to 
support export­oriented industries. In the 1970s, 
Switzerland was severely affected by a worsening of 
the global economic climate, and the crisis was ampli­
fied by a very restrictive immigration policy, which 
caused a reduction in the population: In 1977 the pop­
ulation was 2.2 percent lower than in 1974, and this 
reduced domestic demand substantially. Among other 
woes, the Swiss watch making industry initially missed 
the move to quartz watches. Recovery from the crisis 
wan not brought about by fiscal policy, but by innova­
tion and trade. A revival of the watch making industry 
came with the introduction of cheap, but elegant plas­
tic Swatches, and Swiss tool makers and other indus­
tries regained strength when the world economy and 
neighbouring Germany recovered in the second half  
of the decade. 
The Swiss are weathering the current crisis well be­
cause they recognised that a fiscal stimulus would 
again be ineffective in an export­driven crisis and 
adopted a “Schuldenbremse”, a debt brake that lim­
its spending growth to average revenue increases over 
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a multiyear period, based on forecast revenues, and 
correcting for business cycle conditions. Some infra­
structure investment, financed through a special 
fund, as well as public transportation, is outside the 
structure of  the debt brake; so is the social insurance 
system, although there are many voices calling for an 
equivalent control mechanism. However, the excep­
tions are clearly defined, and this ensures that the fis­
cal constraint is more binding than would be implied 
by generic “golden rules” excepting investment, a 
spending category that under political pressure can 
be reconfigured to include almost anything (educa­
tion is investment in children and thus in the future 
of  the country, military spending is investment in se­
curity, cultural spending is investment in cultural 
capital etc.).
The debt brake was devised as a response to the expe­
rience of the 1990s, when in the wake of a property 
bubble bursting and a substantial economic slow­
down, the federal debt expanded from 12 percent of 
GDP in 1990 to 26 percent in 1998 (when because of 
the parallel expansion of cantonal debt, the total pub­
lic debt was at 56 percent of GDP). In the wake of the 
introduction of the debt brake in 2003, after a referen­
dum in 2001 where almost 85 percent of the voters 
supported the measure, the federal budget showed 
considerable surpluses, and continued in surplus 
through the post­2007 financial crisis. As a conse­
quence, the debt share is likely to fall to below 30 per­
cent of GDP by 2016. 
The Swiss introduction of a debt brake addresses 
problems that are common to many other countries. It 
came at a propitious moment, when strong global ex­
pansion allowed a substantial economic growth that 
generated fiscal surpluses, and when the budgetary 
cuts that were needed as part of the original reform 
impetus did not look so painful. The Swiss term for 
this type of fiscal control, “Schuldenbremse” or debt 
brake, became an internationally accepted concept, 
and Germany pushed successfully for it to play a cen­
tral role in formulating the European Union’s re­
sponse to its own fiscal crisis. Underlying the concept 
is a belief  that high rates of debt are likely to impose 
costs that lower economic capacity and growth, al­
though it has been notoriously difficult to establish a 
particular limit at which debt becomes dangerous, 
since the extent of danger depends directly on prevail­
ing interest rates and growth rates, but also on less 
tangible factors such as the degree of confidence in 
state capacity. One of the effects of a debt brake, how­
ever, is to raise the degree of knowledge about the like­
ly fiscal path, so that the market’s perception of state 
capacity increases.
What makes the Swiss approach conspicuously suc­
cessful in this more general context is the high degree 
of  democratic legitimacy. Switzerland’s adoption of 
the public borrowing limits in 2001 by a referendum 
majority of  85 percent compares well with the less 
democratic and much less effective implementation 
of  its European Union neighbours’ “Stability and 
Growth” and “Euro Plus” pacts, and is arguably more 
credible and permanent than even the balanced­
budget constitutional rules that member countries 
have to adopt. Like the overwhelming rejection of  a 
proposal to guarantee six weeks of  annual paid holi­
days, the success of  the debt brake proposal shows 
that pragmatic Swiss voters recognise economic con­
straints more clearly than those who, in other coun­
tries, are only too often attracted to myopic and pop­
ulist policies. 
Another way in which Switzerland can provide useful 
lessons for Europe is in its handling of local public 
debt. About one third of the general government debt 
is a liability of sub­federal entities, and all except five 
cantons also have debt brakes (the first measure, in St. 
Gallen, was introduced in 1929). The 2003 debt­brake 
law, moreover, sets tight quantitative limits on the abil­
ity of cantons to transfer fiscal liabilities to the federa­
tion. The fiscal responsibility of sub­federal govern­
ment levels had previously been made clear when the 
cantons of Berne, Solothurn, Geneva, Waadt, 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden, and Glarus were left alone 
as their cantonal banks had problems in the 1990s. 
The formal bankruptcy of a small and profligate com­
mune, Leukerbad, in 1998 (Blankart, 2013) eventually 
clarified beyond doubt that Switzerland’s fiscal feder­
alism excludes debt mutualisation. This, in turn, has a 
strong disciplinary effect. Swiss cantons and com­
munes keep their debt under control because they can­
not be expected to be bailed out. Their own debt­
brake rules are meant to signal to financial markets 
that they are fiscally responsible, and financial market 
interest spreads between the cantons, based on rating 
differences, ensure fiscal restraint and prevent exces­
sive debt accumulation. Similar arrangements are in 
place in the United States (see EEAG, 2013), but in 
the euro area, even though envisioned by Article 125 
TFEU, the no­bail­out principle has – depending 
upon interpretation – been set aside or its implementa­
tion remains unclear and untested.
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2.4.3 Tax competition
Like Luxembourg within the European Union and the 
small pebble states that pepper Europe (and like 
Delaware in the United States and such global tax ha­
vens as Bermuda or the Virgin Islands), Switzerland 
exerts tax competition pressure on neighbouring 
countries. This is superficially motivated by historical 
and cultural differences, and tolerated by national 
powers, possibly because the super­rich do not easily 
accept Leviathan state powers. The crisis is making a 
difference: As the usefulness of government powers 
becomes more apparent, tax havens are under attack. 
In 2013, the European Commission began a process 
of renegotiating its tax treaties with Switzerland, as 
well as with Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San 
Marino, and introducing a Directive that will extend 
the banking information exchange now applicable to 
savings to all income sources. 
Such tensions are clearly on the mind of Swiss public 
opinion and policymakers. The Swiss movie “Der 
grosse Kanton” depicts an intriguing solution to tax 
and other tensions with Germany: The Federal 
Republic joins the Confederation as a twenty­seventh 
canton, causing concern among the Swiss because of 
its large public debt, as well as of its sheer size and 
somewhat different approach to social organisation. 
The Swiss Army’s summer 2013 exercises considered a 
different scenario: Its first armoured brigade was 
tasked to deal with a multi­pronged invasion, aimed at 
the wealth of Western Switzerland’s bank vaults, by 
the “Sâone” splinter of a French nation destroyed by 
unsustainable public debt and the collapse of the euro. 
Questioned by the Geneva newspaper “Le Matin”, the 
unit’s commander emphasised that the military do 
need to train “in a realistic environment” and that the 
exercise had been planned in 2012 when fiscal relation­
ships were “less tense” between France and Swit zer­
land. He offered no information as to whether the sim­
ulated invasion was successfully repelled in the 
exercise. 
Not only concerns about less than peaceful interna­
tional relations, but also considerations of fairness are 
making tax competition increasingly less acceptable to 
the Swiss themselves. Following Zurich’s example in 
2009, several (German­speaking) cantons have abol­
ished by plebiscite the forfeit expenditure tax regime, 
which allowed foreigners with no Swiss labour income 
and high taxable income from abroad to be taxed only 
on an estimate of their expenditure on Swiss soil, and 
therefore to pay much lower taxes than Swiss citizens 
in the same situation. Those cantons’ voters accepted 
the budgetary implications of removing such an ag­
gressive tap into foreign tax bases. While similar plebi­
scites did fail in other (also German­speaking) can­
tons, Switzerland is slowly but clearly outgrowing tax 
competition. A federal plebiscite is pending on the for­
feit expenditure tax regime, and in October 2013 the 
Swiss Confederation’s government decided to join the 
OECD/Council of Europe multilateral convention on 
administrative assistance in tax matters, opening up 
the Swiss bank accounts of foreign taxpayers to inter­
national information requests.
2.5 Lessons for the future of Europe
Switzerland is only slowly completing its internal 
market, accepts tax and local public good competi­
tion across its cantons and communes, and maintains 
many barriers to international economic integration 
at the same time as it takes advantage of  external 
tax­competition opportunities. In these and other 
ways it differs from its neighbours, which have devel­
oped other mixes of  administration, authority, and 
social pressure to address the balance of  moral haz­
ard and reciprocal trust that was and remains diffi­
cult and fruitful for individuals in families, and for 
families in local communities. Just as Switzerland is 
becoming more European in these respects, so 
Europe may find it useful to become more Swiss in 
other respects.
2.5.1 Culture matters
It is certainly far from surprising to find that language 
and culture significantly influence economic interac­
tions within Switzerland. More generally, in Europe 
and elsewhere, language (and television, cellular net­
works, and other media) certainly shape economic 
boundaries even more forcefully than voting rights 
and tax obligations. But culture is not everything. Just 
as heterogeneity does not prevent individual interac­
tions (and, in fact, makes them more interesting), so 
cultural differences do not prevent economic and pol­
icy interactions across communities (and arguably 
make them more productive). Conflicts of economic 
interest are a more likely source of disagreement 
across regional entities than ethnic differences, and 
very common not only across, but also within nations, 
and not only between ethnic groups, but also within 
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families. Cooperation is fortunately also very com­
mon, and is based on mutually beneficial market ex­
changes, as well as on the enforcement of more or less 
democratically agreed behavioural constraints. In a 
well­organised society, taste and productivity differ­
ences are magnified by specialisation and generate 
economic gains from well­regulated trade, and cultur­
al differences are smoothed out to make communica­
tion and cooperation possible. Organising trade and 
enforcing rules requires the efficient communication 
of individual resources and needs, and need to be 
based on a clear framework of mutual understanding 
and trust. All of this can be achieved by different soci­
eties in different ways that evolve over time, and con­
tinue to exert an influence, even after they have long 
ceased to be superficially visible.
The Swiss solution to such problems and its evolution 
over time suggests that cooperation and trade across 
culturally different societies is possible and fruitful, 
but neither easy nor riskless. Like many Swiss things, 
the Konkordanzdemokratie is actually a product of 
the country’s history and cultural heterogeneity. It was 
introduced after the civil war, when the (protestant) 
merchant bourgeoisie defeated more conservative 
(and catholic) corporatist cantons. The Confederation 
had to manage the peaceful coexistence of cultures 
ranging from the Germanic, Catholic, rural, and con­
servative culture of the original cantons, to the 
Protestant, Romanic, and enlightened culture of 
Geneva, which had fought both the Savoy and the 
Germanic cantons to remain independent until 
Napoleonic times.
The United States were also initially socially and eco­
nomically diverse enough to engage in civil war in the 
1860s and have largely retained 
this heterogeneity. Their history 
offers not only a model for 
Europe’s need to unify its econo­
my and harmonise policies, but 
also represents a cautionary tale 
as regards the difficulty of doing 
so. While Alexander Hamilton’s 
famous negotiation in 1790 of an 
assumption of state debts by the 
federal government is often cited 
as a model for how a United 
States of Europe might be creat­
ed, the actual developments of 
that historical move are less than 
appealing (EEAG, 2013, offers a 
detailed review of experiences with state debt in the 
United States). The individual states went on a bor­
rowing binge in the late 1830s, which was followed by 
widespread default in the early 1840s. The revenue 
stream that was used to service the federal debt – the 
external tariff  – was a necessary part of the Hamilton 
scheme, and stirred the economic (and not only cul­
tural) tensions between the American North and the 
South that ultimately caused the War of Secession.
2.5.2 Dealing with diversity
Nations traditionally aim at homogenising diversity, 
but every society needs to manage unavoidable hetero­
geneity across ethnicities, families, and indeed individ­
uals. Experiences other than the Swiss and American 
ones can provide equally useful insights, and deserve 
to be at least briefly reviewed. Switzerland is very spe­
cial, but similar to other European countries in key re­
spects. Like San Marino, Monaco, and other small 
countries, Switzerland has been embedded for a few 
centuries in a Europe that was becoming increasingly 
nationalistic. Like Belgium, but unlike most of the 
countries generated by that process, it is rather less 
than fully homogeneous in terms of language, reli­
gion, and culture. Figure 2.8 reports fractionalisation 
indices for all EU27 countries with available data, for 
the United States, and for Switzerland. While 
Switzerland does stand out in terms of overall diver­
sity, two smaller countries are even more diverse in 
some respects, and Belgium is not far behind. 
Linguistic minorities are present and recognised in 
most European countries, and culture does vary very 
significantly even within countries where a unified lan­
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guage replaces, or coexists with, local dialects.7 Some 
European countries were put together through royal 
marriages, but most were drawn together by war – 
Bismarck’s “blood and steel” – and Switzerland is no 
exception to this rule, although the 1848 War of the 
cantons was brief  and not very violent. However, du­
rable cooperation cannot be ensured by force and re­
distribution: it requires the permanent conviction of 
citizens of all regions to participate in a mutually ben­
eficial deal. Public policies and institutions need to 
seek cooperative solutions to common problems, and 
to produce durable compromises cemented by the self­
enforcing realisation that breaking agreements in pur­
suit of immediate gains would entail larger losses. 
Cultural diversity has economic and policy implica­
tions. In Switzerland, it may lead Romanic speakers to 
enjoy spells of subsidised unemployment that are some 
seven weeks longer than those of their Germanic 
neighbours, but it does not lead the Swiss social insur­
ance system to envision language­specific entitlements. 
National policies also have vastly different implica­
tions across regions in countries as diverse as Italy, 
Germany, and Spain, but uneasy compromises be­
tween homogeneity and diversity are the price of com­
mon market and national solidarity. Nation states tra­
ditionally root the cooperation and solidarity they 
need in processes of cultural assimilation, market inte­
gration, and internal migration. In Switzerland, a diff­
erent sort of cooperation is rooted in the Konkordanz 
principle of mutually beneficial political trade and 
compromise between heterogeneous special interests 
with decentralised decision powers. The fundamental 
working principle for pragmatic compromises is a well­
established system of subsidiarity, with decisions being 
left to the smallest suitable territorial units in cases 
where compromises would be too difficult to craft. 
2.5.3 What about Belgium?
The comparison between Switzerland and Belgium is 
interesting not only because both countries include 
multiple ethnicities and main languages (and in 
Figure 2.8 they are close to each other and very far 
7 Within the Federal Republic of Germany, the historical pattern of 
Protestant expansion exerts a significant influence not only on current 
religious beliefs, but also on more general cultural and economic diff­
erences, arguably reflecting Protestant encouragement of reading and 
personal learning (Becker and Woessmann, 2009); and traces of the 
Roman Empire’s border are still visible at the so­called “Weisswurst­
äquator” cultural boundary which, while much less well defined, is 
somewhat similar to Switzerland’s “Röstigraben”. Regional heteroge­
neity within each European country can more generally be traced 
back to the socio­economic conditions prevailing in pre­national 
states (Tabellini, 2010).
from Switzerland’s neighbours), but also because they 
have similar values and lifestyles. Individual excellence 
tends to be viewed as domination and perceived nega­
tively in Switzerland (de Rougemont, 1965) as well as 
in Belgium: more troublesome neighbour countries do 
boast many more internationally visible heroes, crimi­
nals, inventors, scientists, and artists.8 
For our purpose of drawing lessons for Europe, differ­
ences across the two countries are more important than 
their similarities. Belgium’s economic performance is 
more than respectable, as shown in Section  2.2, and 
quite comparable to Switzerland’s. But its diversity­
management performance is worse than Switzerland’s: 
Francophones and Flemish speakers are increasingly 
disconnected in Belgium, where electoral results and 
political structures became so fragmented at one point 
as to make it impossible and apparently unnecessary to 
form a government for a time.
 
It is therefore interesting to try and relate Belgium’s 
and Switzerland’s different regional and ethnic cohe­
sion to differences between the countries’ structures 
and histories. Some institutional features may be rele­
vant. The central government plays a more important 
role in Belgium than in Switzerland, and this makes it 
harder to formulate policies when interests conflict 
across economic and cultural lines. In Belgium, many 
decisions have to be made or ratified by a plurality of 
government levels, because the structure of subsidiary 
powers is not as clear as it is in Switzerland. A broad 
majority of the international treaties signed by Belgium 
touches on both regional and federal competences. 
Ratification of such “mixed treaties” involves a large 
number of legislative bodies, each of which has veto 
power. While in Switzerland only cantons mediate be­
tween local communities and the centre, in Belgium 
there is an additional level of government: three re­
gions (one French­speaking, one Flemish­speaking, 
with 5 provinces each; and Brussels, which is officially 
bilingual). And while Switzerland has several bilingual 
(and one trilingual) cantons, within which stable lan­
guage borders exist, only one language is used in most 
of Belgium’s sub­federal entities. This may have made 
it less necessary to confront and resolve cultural issues, 
and Brussel’s residents (who speak and think in 
French) disrupt traditional language borders when 
they relocate to Flemish­speaking suburban areas.
8 Both countries have, of course, contributed very significantly to 
European culture. Famous Swiss artists include Paul Klee and 
Alberto Giacometti (the famous architect known as Le Corbusier, 
born in Switzerland, chose to become French), while Belgium’s recent 
contributions include Jacques Brel and many prominent comic­strip 
authors. 
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As for historical factors, there is no equivalent to 
Switzerland’s Wilhelm Tell in Belgian folklore. The 
country was not brought together by home­grown op­
position to external power, but created as a buffer 
state by external powers after the Napoleonic wars. 
That new state’s historical roots (in the ancient 
Kingdom of Burgundy, which at times also included 
part of what is now French­speaking Switzerland) 
were too loose to excite nationalist independence feel­
ings, but Belgium’s position among the powers did 
bring it to build a colonial empire (albeit on the initia­
tive and as personal property of its king), and did not 
allow it to stay out of European wars. By contrast, 
Switzerland’s internal cultural diversity naturally pre­
vented international projection in the form of coloni­
sation (hampered by lack of direct access to sea) or 
wars of aggression. The country’s cohesion was ce­
mented by successful neutrality­oriented organisation 
of military defence against clear and present external 
threats (de Rougemont, 1965).
The most important factor in Belgium’s poor diversity 
management, however, is arguably the interaction be­
tween historical heritages and regional economic de­
velopment patterns. Like those of Switzerland, 
Belgium’s regions and peoples were economically as 
well as culturally heterogeneous, and briefly fought 
each other in the nineteenth century. In Switzerland, 
the militarily and economically dominant component 
was Germanic; in Belgium, it was Francophone: In 
the recent past, globalisation has had very different 
implications for the regional specialisations that hap­
pened in Belgium to coincide with cultural bounda­
ries. While the French­speaking regions suffered the 
demise of European heavy industry and mining, the 
Flemish­speaking regions could take advantage of the 
trade and high­tech opportunities afforded by access 
to oceanic routes and by a more flexible mercantile 
culture. The Belgian experience of economic takeover 
by a previously dominated group has no parallel in the 
history of Switzerland, where the Germanic element 
exercised Konkordanz rather than centralised domi­
nance, and did not experience the relative economic 
decline that raises issues of socio­political as well as 
cultural cohesion in Belgium.
2.5.4 And what about Europe?
Geography and history play a crucial role in shaping 
the economic destiny of people and regions not only 
in Belgium or Switzerland, but in all of Europe. Social 
capital, culture, reforms, and hard work may certainly 
explain why some become or remain rich, while others 
stagnate or decline. The wealth of regions, however, 
also depends on luck, and on shifting patterns of 
trade. Control of the Gotthard and other crucial 
mountain passes was a key determinant of the Holy 
Roman Emperor’s decision to free the original Swiss 
cantons; Nuremberg and Samarkand were privileged 
crossroad markets until trade began to cross the At­
lantic; and Bavaria, Tyrol, Veneto were transformed 
from peripheral battlefields into prime production 
and trade locations by the process that, since World 
War II, has been removing the economic boundaries 
of European Nations.
Homogeneous national identities were the political 
and social element of the commercial and industrial 
revolutions that made Europe rich, but unstable, and 
prone to wars. To achieve its currently elusive “growth, 
stability, and cohesion” objectives, the European 
Union project aims to dissolve them into a new type 
of socio­economic framework.9 A common set of pol­
icies and institutions, however, is not easy to craft for a 
culturally heterogeneous society. Trust and cohesion 
cannot rely on traditional nationalistic feelings at the 
European level, and are even strained by economic 
woes and market failures within countries, often along 
ethnic and nationalistic lines as in the United 
Kingdom and Spain. 
In Switzerland, cultural heterogeneity is widespread 
and multi­dimensional. Borders across languages, reli­
gions, and traditional versus progressive cultures over­
lap far from perfectly. They do not separate the homo­
geneous sets of humanity that national states would 
like to be. In Switzerland, each individual belongs to 
several of a multitude of communities. This makes it 
natural for power to be dispersed, and for decisions to 
be collegially shared. The resulting “Konkordanz­
demokratie” is more conducive to conservative com­
promises than to the sweeping reforms that may be 
possible for the majoritarian decision­making pro­
cesses of national political systems. The stability fos­
tered by consensus­based democracy may support 
long­term investments and process innovation, but 
can reduce productivity growth in cases where drastic 
frontier innovations are necessary. Like other tradi­
9  The transition from national to inter­ or supra­national economic 
and policy relations effectively presents the same challenges and op­
portunities as that from the feudal to national level, extensively dis­
cussed by Adam Smith in Chapter IX of the Wealth of Nations 
(Bertola, 2007). Many of the same issues are now arising for China’s 
“hukou” system of local citizenship rights and obligations, which is 
hardly compatible with an urban­industrial socio­economic 
organisation.
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tional Swiss features, the Konkordanz style of politics 
is becoming less relevant as parties at the margins of 
the political spectrum gain political weight in 
Switzerland. At the same time, multiple cultural iden­
tities have become common in other countries (and it 
may not be a coincidence that “grand coalition” gov­
ernments have been formed recently not only in 
Austria, where they have been nearly as common as in 
Switzerland, but also in Germany and in Italy). 
Political developments are shaped by the evolution of 
communication and media technologies. While televi­
sion and newspapers are still largely national in 
Europe, face­to­face interactions can only work at 
much lower levels and are so crucial as to perhaps jus­
tify Tip O’Neill’s view that “all politics is local” and 
Montesquieu’s view that democracy can only work on 
a small geographical scale as expressed in his Spirit of 
the Laws. But in a modern economy, where long­range 
trade exploits specialisation opportunities and econo­
mies of scale trade, and public redistribution policies 
replace family or village solidarity, the conflicts of in­
terest that need to be addressed by political compro­
mises arise along dimensions that are not geographi­
cally or ethnically local. Belonging to the same age 
group or the same occupation is often a more power­
ful source of common interests (as student revolts and 
labour unrest powerfully showed around 1970) than 
belonging to the same family, or coming from the 
same small village. Technological progress reduces 
cultural as well as physical distances:10 Internet­based 
media and social networks are not constrained by geo­
graphical or political boundaries, and electronic trans­
lation may blur cultural boundaries even across the 
uneducated. As compromises between the economic 
advantages and policy disadvantages of diversity can 
no longer rely, as they did in the past, on the coinci­
dence of national geographical, cultural, and political 
boundaries, the constant communication and moni­
toring needed to build democratic consensus might 
become possible on a larger scale than that of the 
Swiss communes or of the Swiss Confederation, and 
may even become possible on the European Union’s 
continental scale. 
The current configuration of the European Union fea­
tures some, but by no means all of the key ingredients 
of a traditional state. It has a bureaucracy and some 
common rules, but no central decision­making power, 
10  The travel time from Geneva or Grisons to Berne in 1848, when 
the Swiss Confederation was established in 9 months, was measured 
in days (De Rougemont, 1965), and was much greater than air travel 
today from Stockholm or Athens to Brussels.
no common army or foreign policy, and no political 
sense of common purpose. While the currently mal­
functioning combination of international political 
compromises and supranational bureaucratic admin­
istration needs to be improved, it does not seem pos­
sible to replicate the dirigiste political model of nation 
states at the European level, with infrequent majority 
votes and the delegation of decision powers. 
Unfortunately, supranational politics do not appear 
to be the automatic consequence of economic integra­
tion that the founding fathers of the European Union 
hoped for. In Europe, there is an educated elite that 
feels comfortable in many countries, but a large major­
ity of each country’s citizens feels that migration 
would only offer access to low­paid jobs in other 
countries, and justifiably fears that, in the absence of a 
European harmonisation of social and labour market 
policies, economic integration undermines their own 
country’s familiar safety nets. To foster trust in a su­
pranational European socio­economic framework, it 
might be advisable to organise a mass version of the 
year­abroad experience that the Erasmus student ex­
change program currently offers rich university stu­
dents: Young Europeans of all social groups should be 
enticed or obliged to work for some period in another 
country and using another language, as proposed by 
the writer Umberto Eco in 2012. A “European social 
year” for young people might help to build a common 
identity across the borders of nations where military 
service served a similar purpose. 
It is hard, however, to envision development of a 
European identity so well­defined as to support supra­
national political decision processes. This difficulty is 
made evident not only by the failure of past French 
and German attempts to engineer continent­wide ver­
sions of their own nations’ conquest­based origins, 
but also by the very mixed success of the European 
Union elites’ top­down approach to supranational 
policy­making, which has proved unable to tackle the 
most politically important social and fiscal aspects of 
policy. The exercise of top­down decision powers has 
limited the democratic legitimacy of the European 
Union integration process, as shown by rejection of 
constitutional referenda and by the steady decline of 
European Parliament electoral turnout. Moreover, the 
idea that such issues as pension scheme generosity and 
bank supervision could be left to national subsidiarity 
was always theoretically dubious, and has been shat­
tered by a crisis that clearly showed that such impor­
tant matters cannot be left to uncoordinated national 
policies.
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Montesquieu thought that empires were the better 
way to organise larger units. For economic governance 
of economically and culturally heterogeneous areas, a 
structure in some ways similar to that of the ancient 
Holy Roman Empire, or of China, might indeed be a 
better model than the federal national structure of the 
United States or Germany. The European integration 
process should replace the opacity of deals between 
national political leaders with pragmatic, explicit, and 
accountable compromises between socio­economic 
conflicts of interests that do not necessarily occur 
across national boundaries. It should accept the limi­
tations that this approach implies for the scope and 
character of common policies and institutions, but 
also focus on the policy dimensions that do need to be 
harmonised. As in Switzerland, pragmatic policy ac­
tion is also needed in Europe and is crucial to the 
management of a common currency and an integrated 
financial and fiscal system, as well as of common ex­
ternal positions. Unification of the European product 
market logically requires a single European voice at 
the World Trade Organization, but external unity is 
lacking in many other respects.11 The slow and cum­
bersome organisation of the European External 
Action Service, headed since 2011 by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, contrasts sharply with the quick and 
divergent reactions from the member countries’ diplo­
matic services and foreign ministers to emerging crises 
like the current situation in Syria. The same security 
threats that in the past helped to build Swiss national 
identity cannot, unfortunately, be ruled out for 
Europe. As the United States retreats from the Middle 
East in the wake of its shale gas bonanza, Europe may 
need to develop a truly common foreign policy and 
military power that could, as in Switzerland, come to 
be seen as a necessary means for preserving peace. 
Although certainly unfortunate in other respects, 
armed neutrality may prove as helpful as it was in 
Swiss history in terms of fostering a European 
identity. 
2.6 Conclusion
At the same time as the Swiss Confederation imple­
ments some institutional features of the European so­
cio­economic system, the European Union may find it 
possible and useful to implement some Swiss institu­
11  The segmentation of European service markets, itself  rooted in 
historical and cultural heterogeneity, still makes it impossible to for­
mulate and defend a common position in services­trade negotiation 
(Bertola and Mola, 2010).
tional features that are looser and less centralised than 
in traditional nation states, but pragmatically focused 
on the administrative, legal, monetary, and fiscal in­
struments that support market relationships, and held 
together by shared external concerns. Imitation and 
learning, of course, are not the same as copying. 
Solutions need to be adapted to the problems that are 
evolving and to some extent converging in Switzerland 
and Europe: They entail reforms of legal, political, 
and policy frameworks, and need to be supported by a 
self­enforced sense that a future together is possible 
and fruitful. As in Switzerland, traditionalist views of 
the world will continue to interact with progressive 
ones in Europe too, while different cultures will con­
tinue to coexist and evolve. Europe cannot become en­
tirely German or French, but in some ways all 
Europeans can become more Swiss. In a possible fu­
ture, being Dutch or Portuguese might well become be 
as folkloristic within Europe as being from Uri has 
largely become in Switzerland, or being from Texas is 
in the United States, or as being Franconian (an eth­
nicity that Bavaria’s alliance with Napoleon deprived 
of polity status) already is within Bavaria and in 
Germany. 
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Austerity: 
Hurting but Helping
3.1 Introduction
Since the sovereign debt crisis erupted in the euro 
area, there has been much discussion about the costs 
and benefits of  fiscal adjustment, or austerity. While 
several euro area countries have experienced a rapid 
rise in their public debt, calling for a reduction in gov-
ernment deficits, the crisis has also plunged them into 
a deep recession. This, in turn, has limited their scope 
for reducing public deficits, and might even have re-
quired short-term deficit increases in some cases. 
However, the costs and benefits of  fiscal policy de-
pend heavily on the nature of  the recession. If  a reces-
sion is caused by a temporary demand shock, fiscal 
expansion can effectively offset its effect in terms of 
output and employment. If, however, it is caused by a 
permanent demand or supply shock, the benefits of 
fiscal expansion are far more limited. We argue that 
the shock that triggered the latest recession was of  a 
longer-lasting nature, meaning that the benefits of 
any fiscal expansion would have been limited. Neither 
austerity, nor the recession was completely avoidable 
as a result.
In our previous reports (EEAG, 2012; and EEAG, 
2013) we emphasised that the root of the euro area’s 
current problems lies in the external imbalances be-
tween its core and periphery countries.1 In the run-up 
to the crises optimistic expectations about income 
convergence generated an investment boom in the pe-
riphery, particularly in construction, accompanied by 
ballooning current account deficits financed by pri-
vate capital inflows. This expansion in demand gener-
ated a faster rise in prices, including real-estate prices, 
in the periphery than in the core. The rapid price rise 
eroded the competitiveness of the periphery countries, 
1 The periphery countries of the euro area are Cyprus, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Since Italy was also hit by the sovereign 
crisis, it is usually lumped together with the other five countries re-
ferred to as the GIPSIC countries. However, the roots of the Italian 
problem are rather different to those of the other five countries, as 
Italy has been facing serious structural problems and stagnation since 
the early 1990s. 
which reinforced the increase in their current account 
deficits. Importantly, the boom was also accompanied 
by a misallocation of resources across different activi-
ties and firms. Both relative prices and allocations 
were therefore misaligned on the eve of the crisis. 
After its onset, private capital flows stalled, and in 
some cases even reversed, and the investment boom 
collapsed, leading to a recession. Since it takes time to 
reallocate labour, for example from oversized cons-
truction industries to other industries, this shock has 
had a long-lasting impact.
The previous argument implies that some fiscal re-
trenchment is necessary for the rebalancing process in 
the periphery. Improving fiscal balances increases do-
mestic saving relative to investment, which helps to 
improve the current account. Moreover austerity, by 
improving fiscal balances and raising unemployment 
levels, also reduces aggregate demand, exerting down-
ward pressure on prices, without which an improve-
ment in competitiveness cannot be achieved. In addi-
tion, recession accompanied by relatively high unem-
ployment naturally emerges during a large-scale real-
location of productive resources, particularly of la-
bour across firms and industries. Moreover, recession 
tends to induce price and wage cuts, and hence leads 
to the necessary realignment of relative prices without 
which the competitiveness of the previously overheat-
ed economies cannot be re-established. 
This chapter explores the notion of austerity and dis-
cusses the fundamental trade-offs policymakers are 
facing when making decisions about the timing and 
size of fiscal adjustment. It looks at the stylised facts 
of austerity in the euro area and highlights the macro-
economic conditions that triggered it, examines the 
degree to which austerity has been implemented to 
date and its effect on the economy. We discuss why the 
shock that triggered the crisis, and eventually led to 
austerity, was more permanent in nature.
3.2 Austerity
There has been a great debate about austerity over the 
past few years. However, the debate often left it in the 
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dark what do we mean by austerity and how we meas-
ure it. In addition, to evaluate austerity, we should 
also be aware of the trade-offs governments face. 
Hence we start our analysis with a brief  discussion of 
the definition of measurement of austerity, and the 
fiscal policy trade-offs.
3.2.1 Definition and measurement
We use the term “austerity” to describe fiscal policy 
plans and actions to improve the primary balance of 
the general government i.e., the balance excluding in-
terest payments. Austerity measures generally include 
expenditure cuts and tax rises. Since we want to meas-
ure actual policy changes, we have to isolate the effect 
of  fiscal policy change on the primary balance from 
the change caused by the economic cycle, or one-off  
government measures such as bank bailouts. The 
most frequently used measure of  changes in fiscal 
policy is the cyclically-adjusted primary balance of 
the general government (see Box 3.1 for further dis-
cussion). This measure aims to correct for business 
cycle effects, however, it still falls short of  fully isolat-
ing fiscal policy intents from its outcomes.2 This nev-
ertheless remains the best measure available to assess 
fiscal policy actions.
2 This problem can potentially be serious. Riera-Chrichton et al. 
(2012) build a novel data set of the value added tax rates of 14 indus-
trialised countries. They find that cyclical value added tax revenue 
changes have very little correlation with actual changes in the value 
added tax rate. 
There are several pitfalls in the measurement of fiscal 
policy based on narrowly defined fiscal observables.
• The definition of  fiscal policy is somewhat more 
difficult when central banks carry out significant 
quasi-fiscal activities. In particular, as discussed 
extensively in our last report (EEAG, 2013) there 
are significant current account imbalances within 
the euro area. During the crisis, private capital 
flows were less and less willing to finance the cur-
rent account deficits of  the euro area periphery. In 
addition, some countries like Italy experienced 
capital flight during the crisis. The European 
Central Bank stepped in to finance these current 
account deficits, or to compensate for capital flight 
from these countries. If  a country with a flexible 
exchange rate were to face a similar balance-of-
payments crisis, and required external assistance, 
it would call upon the IMF. In such an instance the 
financial flows would be more transparently ac-
counted for, and they would appear on the general 
government accounts.
• Governments also accumulate implicit liabilities in 
the form of future pension and health care liabili-
ties. Currently these liabilities are not treated as 
part of government debt, and any action that the 
government takes to alter them may or may not 
show up in the government account. For example, 
the government may nationalise private pensions. 
The proceeds are viewed as government revenue 
and can be used to lower government debt, despite 
Box 3.1
Measuring cyclically-adjusted government balances and potential output
Cyclically-adjusted government balances measure government balances excluding the effects of the economic cycle and one-off  budgetary 
measures. When the economy is booming, tax revenues are above their long-term sustainable level, and when the economy is in recession, they 
are below it. Changes in fiscal policy are measured by changes in government balances, excluding these temporary effects, as such changes 
reflect government intentions more accurately. 
However, cyclically-adjusted government balances are not observable directly, they have to be estimated. Firstly, the output elasticity of vari-
ous tax revenues and the unemployment elasticity of government expenditure are estimated (see Girouard and André, 2005, for more detail). 
Secondly, estimates of potential output and the natural rate of unemployment are used to estimate cyclically-adjusted revenues and expendi-
ture, which together with unadjusted interest expenditure are used to calculate the cyclically-adjusted government balances. 
Potential output represents the level of output that can be maintained if  production factors are utilised at their long-term sustainable level. The 
percentage deviation of actual from potential output is referred to as the output gap. The estimates used here from the European Commission 
DG ECFIN / AMECO database are based on the production function approach. This approach calculates the capital stock, and the sustain-
able level of employment. The former is based on actual investment data, while the latter requires an estimate of the non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment. Finally, a statistically smoothed version of total factor productivity (TFP) is calculated whereby TFP is represented as 
the difference between actual output and the contribution of capital and labour to output.
As we can see, the estimation of potential output is a rather complicated process marred by several conceptual and statistical issues (see 
Darvas, 2013; and Graff and Sturm, 2011, for a discussion of these problems). More importantly, estimates of the output gap and potential 
output often prove highly unstable over time, as the estimates tend to undergo substantial revisions. These problems imply that caution must 
be exercised when interpreting output gaps or cyclically-adjusted government balances. For example, if  the actual deficit is large, and the esti-
mated output gap is small, then the estimated cyclically-adjusted government deficit is close to the actual one, and hence appears to be large, 
requiring a large fiscal adjustment. However, if  the output gap is mis-measured and is actually larger than the measured gap, then policymak-
ers may implement a larger than necessary fiscal adjustment. 
We will use these estimates despite the problems discussed above, as they reflect the best knowledge available about fiscal policy stance. 
Policymakers and researchers are aware of the issues involved. The European Commission set up the “Output Gap Working Group” to ad-
dress these problems, and to ensure that potential output and output gap estimates are technically robust and transparent.
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the fact that the government liabilities, including 
implicit pension liabilities, did not change.3
• The government can also use non-standard regula-
tory actions to implement fiscal policy. For exam-
ple, it can regulate the prices of prescription drugs 
thereby lowering health care costs in the short run. 
Similarly, it can stimulate aggregate demand by 
cutting or freezing the price of utilities supplied by 
the private sector, thus replacing a subsidy, which 
would have counted as government expenditure. 
Governments are more likely to implement meas-
ures of this kind if  they are under greater pressure 
to implement austerity measures.
Despite the problems stemming from quasi-fiscal ac-
tivities, our discussion of austerity will focus exclu-
sively on traditional fiscal variables.
3.2.2 Austerity trade-offs
Governments do not tend to implement austerity 
measures lightly as they face several trade-offs. The 
debate about austerity often overlooks these trade-
offs, or the costs, benefits and risks that policymakers 
have to consider. Here we spell out the three major rel-
evant trade-offs that policymakers need to take into 
account when implementing austerity.
Firstly, there is a trade-off  between the risk of default 
and the cost of austerity. On the one hand, if  public 
debt is on an explosive path at present, the govern-
ment may not be able to roll over its debt, forcing it to 
make an even more costly fiscal adjustment in the fu-
ture. On the other hand, fiscal adjustment today is 
costly in terms of output and employment. Hence the 
primary incentive to carry out austerity measures 
comes from the anticipated future costs of delaying it. 
Markets often give incentives not to postpone austeri-
ty measures when they demand higher interest rates 
for rolling over existing government debt. However, 
the empirical evidence that market pressure induces 
governments to carry out multi-year fiscal adjustment 
is weak. In a sample of 17 OECD countries Dell’Erba 
et al. (2013) find that only about one third of fiscal ad-
justments between 1980 and 2011 were related to mar-
ket pressure such as higher interest rates. In the other 
cases governments were reacting to weak macroeco-
nomic or fiscal fundamentals. The problem with this 
and similar empirical studies is that they typically 
measure the outcome of the interaction between fiscal 
3 See our country report on Hungary in EEAG (2012), for example. 
policy and sovereign debt markets. However, also the 
potential market pressure imposed by financial mar-
kets, even if  it never materialises, has an effect on gov-
ernments’ actions. Hence, the existing evidence cannot 
be interpreted as suggesting that existing or potential 
market pressure is not a major factor in governments’ 
austerity decisions, nor that these unobservable, but 
anticipated threats would indeed be carried out in the 
absence of a fiscal adjustment.
It has to be emphasised that a recession may also have 
benefits; a fact that is relevant for trading off  default 
risk versus austerity. The important benefit in the con-
text of the euro crisis that we would like to highlight is 
that austerity supports real devaluation, which is 
needed by the periphery countries in order to re-estab-
lish competitiveness. This may not be an important is-
sue if  austerity applies to an entire currency union, 
which is connected via flexible exchange rates with the 
rest of the world such as the USA or the entire euro 
area. However, it is of the utmost relevance when it 
comes to single countries or regions within a currency 
union, as austerity helps to achieve relative price 
adjustment. 
Secondly, there is a trade-off  between front-loading 
the fiscal adjustment, with high short-term costs in 
terms of employment and output, and the credibility 
of fiscal policy, as back-loading the programme may 
lead markets to believe that it will not be fully imple-
mented. The benefit from back-loading the pro-
gramme is that this process is spread out over many 
years, which lowers the cost in terms of output and 
employment. The main drawback is that if  implemen-
tation of the programme is too slow, it may lose cred-
ibility, hence market pressure in the form of higher in-
terest rates makes the slower programme more costly. 
Front-loading the adjustment may prove particularly 
costly if  the output loss generated by austerity leads to 
a higher, rather than a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. A 
higher debt-to-GDP, in turn, requires further austeri-
ty, leading to a vicious cycle of austerity measures and 
output loss. The risk of self-defeating austerity is like-
ly to be large if  the loss of output due to austerity is 
persistent. DeLong and Summers (2012) forcefully ar-
gued that in the presence of “hysteresis”, output loss 
may well be permanent. One prominent hysteresis ef-
fect comes from the labour market. The human capital 
of workers who are out of work for a prolonged peri-
od of time during a deep recession depreciates, leading 
to a permanent loss of productivity and income. 
Firstly, it is unclear whether such a displacement of 
78EEAG Report 2014
Chapter 3
workers and the accompanying loss of human capital 
is inefficient, as it may represent a necessary realloca-
tion of resources. We believe that this is likely to be the 
case in the current recession and will return to this is-
sue later. Secondly, the recent quantitative work of Bi 
et al. (2013) suggests that only very slow fiscal adjust-
ment is likely to avoid hysteresis effects. But it is un-
likely that such a lengthy process of fiscal adjustment 
can be implemented in a credible fashion. Hence such 
a program is likely to lead to higher interest on gov-
ernment debt, eventually forcing the government to 
front-load fiscal adjustment.
Thirdly, there is a trade-off between choosing expendi-
ture cuts and tax rises. On the one hand, the costs and 
benefits of each measure depend on the associated 
spending and tax multipliers. The existing evidence 
suggests that raising taxes is more costly in terms of 
output than cutting expenditure. In particular, there is 
the possibility that expenditure cuts can be expansion-
ary as they signal future tax cuts. The resulting wealth 
effect leads to an increase in demand. However, empiri-
cal evidence supporting the case for expansionary aus-
terity has proved rather elusive. Alesina and Ardegna 
(2010); and Alesina et al. (2012) present empirical evi-
dence based on assessing the impact of changes in cy-
clically-adjusted primary deficit on output to support 
the case for expansionary austerity. By contrast, 
Guajardo et al. (2011) use an alternative identification 
method based on a narrative account of actual fiscal 
intentions, and find no evidence for expansionary aus-
terity. The most recent study by Jordà and Taylor 
(2013) combines a narrative ap-
proach with a novel econometric 
identification method, and finds 
no evidence for expansionary aus-
terity. One reason why evidence is 
proving so elusive may lie in the 
theoretical mechanism by which 
such expansion is supposed to 
work (see Bertola and Drazen, 
1993). Fiscal austerity can be ex-
pansionary if  the private sector’s 
expectations about future taxes 
are permanently lower. Empirical 
measures of fiscal consolidation, 
even if  they are complemented by 
a narrative approach, do not cap-
ture all of the factors affecting pri-
vate sector expectations about fu-
ture fiscal policy, especially during 
times of crisis. 
3.3 Macroeconomic and fiscal conditions between 2007 
and 2009
The financial crisis slowed down the euro area econo-
mies. Policymakers in the euro area initially responded 
with a fiscal expansion to mitigate the recession. 
However, the fiscal expansion could not prevent the 
euro area countries falling into recession, and it only 
set the stage for the sovereign crisis.
3.3.1 Output, external balances and competitiveness
The member states of the European Union were se-
verely hit by the financial crisis, which triggered sover-
eign crises in various countries. Figure 3.1 shows the 
output gaps before the financial crisis in 2007, and in 
2009 when the European sovereign crisis started. The 
figure shows that while all euro area countries were 
growing above their respective sustainable trend levels 
in 2007, two years later all but one country were in re-
cession. Countries in which the output gap was the 
most positive in 2007 tended to suffer larger output 
losses by 2009. Interestingly, the output gap in 2009 
indicates that Finland was most severely hit, while the 
periphery countries did somewhat better, especially 
Portugal and Greece. It is quite clear that the euro 
area was in recession by the end of 2009.
The recession had a differential impact on the euro 
area countries as far as external balances are con-
cerned. Figure 3.2 shows the external balances, as 
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measured in national accounts, disaggregated into the 
balances of the three domestic sectors: households, 
corporations and the government.4 The left panel of 
the figure shows, as discussed in our previous reports 
(EEAG, 2012; and EEAG, 2013), that the periphery 
countries of the euro area operated large current ac-
count deficits. The figure also reveals that although 
government balances contributed significantly to this 
deficit in Greece and Portugal, private sector net bor-
rowing was even more important, which is consistent 
with the credit boom during the pre-crisis period.5
The 2008–2009 period, on the other hand, seems rather 
different. In the first phase of the recession, before the 
sovereign crisis, the external balances of the periphery 
countries deteriorated, but this time the deteriorating 
balances of the government were a major contributing 
factor. In particular, the household sector went from 
being a net borrower to a net lender in Ireland and 
Spain as households repaired their balance sheets. For 
example, households’ net borrowing amounted to 
about 8 percent of GDP on average prior to 2008 in 
Ireland, which turned into net lending by 2009. This 
reflected a huge adjustment on the part of the house-
hold sector. However, there was little sign that such ad-
justment was happening in Greece at the time. Greek 
4 Loosely speaking, these balances measure the difference between 
saving and investment in each sector. The sum of these balances cor-
responds to the difference between aggregate saving and investment. 
This equals net lending in the national accounts, which is conceptual-
ly the same as the current account. 
5 It is important to emphasise that sector balances are mere identi-
ties, thus they do not imply causal relationships.
households reduced their borrowing slightly, but gov-
ernment borrowing increased significantly.
As we discussed in our previous two reports (EEAG, 
2012; and EEAG, 2013), the deteriorating external 
balances went hand in hand with worsening competi-
tiveness in the periphery. Figure 3.3 shows the evolu-
tion of the price levels in the euro area countries. The 
increase in the price levels in the periphery significant-
ly outstripped the price increases in the core prior to 
2007. However, the first phase of the recession be-
tween 2008 and 2009 already induced some adjust-
ment in the periphery, with the exception of Greece. 
Households turned from net borrowers into net lend-
ers in Ireland and Spain, where price levels also rose 
more slowly than in Germany. Ireland, where house-
holds carried out the largest adjustment, experienced 
a decrease in its price level. 
3.3.2 The fiscal expansion of 2008 and 2009
The euro area countries carried out a fiscal expansion 
in the wake of the financial crisis. This was already 
suggested by Figure 3.2, which showed that the net 
borrowing of the euro area governments increased be-
tween 2008 and 2009 relative to pre-crisis levels. 
Figure  3.4 gives a more precise description of the 
change in fiscal policy, as it shows the cyclically-ad-
justed primary balance of the governments in 2007 
and 2009. Government balances deteriorated in all 
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but one country. In some countries like Germany and 
Italy it changed very little, while in others such as 
Greece, Ireland6 and Spain it deteriorated in a dramat-
ic fashion. The cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
deteriorated by more than 8 percent of potential GDP 
in Ireland and Spain, and by about 6 percent in 
6 We replaced the government expenditure figures, excluding the in-
terest payments of Ireland for 2009, with the average of 2010 and 
2011 to eliminate the effect of the bank bailout on Irish government 
expenditure. Using this figure, we also recalculated the deficit figure 
for Ireland for 2009.
Greece. Interestingly, Italy behaved very conservative-
ly in terms of fiscal policy, having maintained an al-
most unchanged primary surplus during 2008 and 
2009 relative to 2007. 
The crucial question, particularly in terms of the cur-
rent austerity debate, is how effective was the fiscal ex-
pansion of 2008 and 2009 in mitigating the recession? 
Figure 3.5 plots the change in the cyclically-adjusted 
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primary deficit between 2007 and 2009 against the 
output gap in 2010 and reveals that it was not particu-
larly effective. If  anything, greater fiscal expansion 
tended to be accompanied by a deeper recession. 
Greece, Ireland, and Spain engaged in a fiscal expan-
sion of over 6 percent of potential GDP between 2007 
and 2009, and these countries still experienced a nega-
tive output gap of over 4 percent in 2010. With the ex-
ception of Cyprus and Malta, all of the euro area 
countries had fallen into recession by 2010. Some 
countries, like Germany, experienced a relatively mild 
recession, but in Finland and Luxembourg the reces-
sion was deeper.
The effect of fiscal expansion on 
output in a recession depends on 
what type of shock caused the re-
cession. If  it was due to a tempo-
rary demand shock, fiscal expan-
sion is effective in mitigating the 
recession. If, on the other hand, 
the demand shock is longer-last-
ing or the recession was caused by 
a supply shock, fiscal policy is 
much less effective in dealing with 
it. Policy makers interpreted the fi-
nancial crisis of 2007–2009 as a 
temporary demand shock. They 
therefore engaged in a fiscal ex-
pansion to mitigate the recession-
ary effect of the financial crisis, 
but achieved relatively little. The 
fiscal expansion only seemed to 
lead to a rapid increase in the indebtedness of euro 
area governments as Figure 3.6 illustrates. Greek pub-
lic debt was already above 100 percent of GDP in 
2007, but increased by over 25 percentage points dur-
ing the following two years relative to 2007 GDP. 
Ireland’s public debt more than doubled during these 
two years, while public debt in both Spain and 
Portugal increased by over 10 percentage points. 
In short, the first two years of the Great Recession in 
the euro area were characterised by worsening macro-
economic conditions, and by attempts to mitigate the 
ESP
FIN
LUX
SVK
SVN
AUT
BEL
DEU
CYP
FRA
GRCIRL
MLT
PRT
ITA
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
O
ut
pu
t g
ap
 in
 2
01
0
−10 −9 −8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1
Change in cyclically-adjusted primary
balances 2007−2009
Source: DG ECFIN / AMECO and EEAG calcualtions, last accessed 5 November 2013.
Output gaps and changes in cyclically-adjusted primary balances
% of potential GDP
% of potential GDP
Figure 3.5
6.7
23.1
24.9
29.6
35.2
36.3
45.3
58.8
60.2
60.7
64.2
65.2
68.4
84.0
103.3
107.2
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Luxembourg
Slovenia
Ireland
Slovakia
Finland
Spain
Netherlands
Cyprus
Austria
Malta
France
Germany
Portugal
Belgium
Italy
Greece
2007
14.7
36.0
55.1
36.3
41.7
53.7
60.9
62.3
69.7
71.1
79.1
72.9
83.3
97.1
113.8
134.3
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Luxembourg
Slovenia
Ireland
Slovakia
Finland
Spain
Netherlands
Cyprus
Austria
Malta
France
Germany
Portugal
Belgium
Italy
Greece
2009
Source: Eurostat, last accessed 30 December 2013.
Public debt levels
% of GDP % of 2007 GDP
Figure 3.6
82EEAG Report 2014
Chapter 3
adverse effect of the financial crisis on output and em-
ployment via expansionary fiscal policy. However, 
these attempts were unable to change the course of the 
euro area economies, indicating that the shock that hit 
the economy was not a temporary demand shock. The 
euro area economies fell into a recession. The main 
outcome of fiscal expansion was rapidly accumulating 
public debt levels in the periphery, setting the stage for 
the subsequent European sovereign crisis. 
3.4 The fiscal retrenchment of 2009–2012
Fiscal expansion of 2007–2009 was followed by fiscal 
austerity of 2009–2012. Firstly, we discuss the stylised 
facts of austerity, then assess whether the austerity 
measures achieved one of their basic goals, namely, 
ensuring public debt sustainability. Secondly, we ana-
lyse the macroeconomic consequences of austerity.
3.4.1 Size of austerity
The sovereign crisis forced the hand of  the euro area 
periphery countries. Ireland, Portugal and Greece 
were shut out from the bond markets; in other words 
they were unable to sell bonds on the market at an in-
terest rate that was consistent with debt sustainability. 
If  a country is unable to issue debt, its government 
faces the difficult decision of  whether to try to solve 
the problem alone or seek external assistance. If  a 
country decides to solve its problem alone, the solu-
tion amounts to front-loading fiscal adjustment, as it 
has to eliminate its primary deficit overnight since it 
cannot borrow. Moreover, the country is likely to de-
fault on its existing debt, as it is unable to service this 
debt unless fiscal adjustment leads to a significant re-
duction in the interest premium on it.7 Thus, in the 
absence of  external assistance, a major fiscal adjust-
ment is required if  the country runs a primary 
deficit.
As fiscal adjustment is very costly in terms of  employ-
ment and output, the governments of  the periphery 
decided to seek external assistance from the Troika 
(ECB, IMF and European Commission). This exter-
nal assistance enabled them to back-load the fiscal 
7 The situation is somewhat different if  the government runs a pri-
mary surplus. In such instances, a default does not require a fiscal ad-
justment in the short run. However, the cost here is that the country 
will potentially be shut out from the international sovereign bond 
markets for a long time, which may prove costly in the future when the 
country wishes to borrow again.
adjustment required.8 The assistance was, however, 
conditional to highly criticised austerity measures, 
which actually reduced the cost of  fiscal adjustment 
relative to the cost that the markets would have im-
posed on these countries. In fact, the Troika repre-
sented the community of  states that offered public 
credit at more favourable conditions than markets 
would have provided private credit. What critics of 
austerity often fail to realise is that the Troika did not 
impose constraints on borrowing at market condi-
tions, but constraints on public or publicly guaran-
teed credit provided at the risk of  other countries. 
However, this does not mean that the Troika, or other 
agencies providing external assistance, should not 
carefully consider both the scope and the time path of 
their austerity-mitigating measures. 
Figure 3.7 shows the changes in cyclically-adjusted pri-
mary balances relative to potential output between 
2009 and 2012 and the size of the primary deficit in 
2012. Firstly, with the exception of Finland and 
Luxembourg, all of the euro area countries imple-
mented austerity measures. Greece stands out with a 
10+ percentage point improvement in its cyclically-ad-
justed primary balance. As many observers have noted, 
Greece implemented a very large adjustment, which 
deserves applause, as do the efforts of Ireland and 
Portugal. However, these austerity efforts have to be 
seen in context, given that the very same countries car-
ried out a fiscal expansion in the preceding two years. 
The Spanish and Irish austerity measures, in particu-
lar, did not even reverse the previous expansion, while 
Portugal’s austerity measures were about the same size 
as the fiscal expansion implemented during the two 
years previously. Greece’s austerity measures did in-
deed exceed the size of the previous two years’ fiscal 
expansions by about 5 percent of GDP, which is sig-
nificant. On the other hand, no other euro area coun-
try had lived beyond its means to a similar degree in 
terms of public debt and current account deficits rela-
tive to GDP as Greece. Finally, it should also be point-
ed out that the only non-periphery country hit by the 
sovereign crisis, Italy, acted with fiscal prudence: carry-
ing out very little fiscal expansion in 2007 and 2009, 
and implementing austerity measures of 3 percentage 
points of GDP between 2009 and 2012.
The size of the improvement in fiscal balances in the 
euro area between 2009 and 2012 seemed to be large, 
8 Greece received its first bailout in May 2010, and its second in 
February 2012. Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus received bailouts in 
November 2010, May 2011 and in March 2013, respectively. The 
Spanish government was not bailed out directly, but it received a bail-
out package in June 2012 to rescue its ailing banks, which would oth-
erwise have had to have been bailed out by the Spanish government.
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particularly in Greece and Portugal. However, one 
crucial question remains: Was this improvement 
enough? As we discussed earlier, there are two impli-
cations of austerity that can help to evaluate the suc-
cess of the policy. The first is whether it made public 
debt sustainable, and the second is whether it contrib-
uted to reducing the external imbalances of the euro 
area periphery. A discussion of the debt sustainability 
problem in this section is followed by an analysis of 
the imbalances issue in the next section.
3.4.2 Public debt sustainability
Testing for sustainability is usually an elaborate em-
pirical exercise. However, a simple indicator can be 
calculated that allows us to assess how much austerity 
has been achieved in terms of stabilising public debt 
levels. We can calculate the cyclical primary balance 
that is required to stabilise a given level of debt, and 
then compare it with the actual primary balance. It 
must be emphasised that calculations of this nature 
rely on several assumptions, hence the results should 
be interpreted with caution.9
The starting point of  this calculation is the account-
ing identity that describes the evolution of  nominal 
government debt. We denote the level of  nominal 
government debt at the end of  the period t by Dt, the 
nominal primary balance by St and the nominal inter-
  9 For a more elaborate calculation see Kanda (2011), for example.
est rate by it. Then the level of  debt at the end of  pe-
riod t is given by
!! = 1 + !! !!!! − !! .
Dividing both sides by the nominal GDP, we get after 
some manipulation
!! =
1 + !!
1 + !!
!!!! − !! ,
where the lower case letters denote variables relative to 
nominal GDP, and γt denotes nominal GDP growth. 
Rearranging the equation further gives us the follow-
ing relationship: 
!! − !!!! =
!! − !!
1 + !!
!!!! − !! .
If  the right hand side is zero, the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
constant and we have the following relationship be-
tween the level of debt, nominal interest rate on the 
debt, nominal GDP growth and the primary balance 
at which the level of debt is constant:
!!
∗ =
!! − !!
1 + !!
!!!! .
We set it  equal to the average effective interest rate on 
the government debt between 2005 and 2012, which, in 
turn, is calculated in each year by dividing interest ex-
penditure by the nominal gross government debt of the 
previous period. Similarly, γt is calculated as the average 
growth of nominal potential GDP between 2004 and 
2012. Finally dt–1 is set equal to nominal government 
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debt over the nominal potential GDP in 2012.10 The 
numbers used for the effective nominal interest rate, 
and nominal GDP growth are meant to capture some 
longer-term interest rate and growth rates. We will also 
briefly discuss some alternative scenarios.
The results from the sustainability calculations are 
shown in Figure 3.8. The interpretation of the calcula-
tions is straightforward: Without achieving the re-
quired primary balance debt is not sustainable at its 
current level. Bearing this in mind, we see that the cur-
rent level of debt is sustainable in Italy, Germany and 
Luxembourg. Since in all three countries the primary 
balance is better than the required one, the debt level 
is actually falling in these countries. In Spain, Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece, by contrast, current primary 
balances are not sufficient to sustain existing levels of 
debt. Debt levels in these countries are actually still 
rising. More specifically, the difference between the re-
quired and actual primary deficits is very large for 
Portugal, Cyprus, Spain and Ireland; interestingly, it is 
smaller in the case of Greece.
Two remarks need to be made about these calculations. 
Firstly, there is a great degree of uncertainty about the 
expected future path of nominal interest rates and nom-
inal GDP growth, the two key variables that determine 
the sustainability condition. For example, using the av-
erage growth rates over a period, which includes three 
years of strong pre-crisis growth, may be viewed as over-
10 Data from the DG ECFIN / AMECO Database, last accessed on 
5 November 2013, is used for the sustainability calculation.
ly optimistic. Hence one should interpret these figures as 
indicative. The periphery countries probably face a 
more, rather than a less serious sustainability problem 
than Figure 3.8 suggests, as it is unlikely that the nomi-
nal interest rate will be lower and/or the nominal GDP 
growth higher than the average between 2005 and 2012. 
Secondly, the debt sustainability problem may have been 
exacerbated by the realignment of relative prices. 
Rebalancing requires an improvement in competitive-
ness i.e., a slower rise of prices in the periphery than in 
the core. Hence, unless real growth is significantly higher 
in the periphery than in the core, it will be hard to main-
tain sustainable levels of public debt and improve com-
petitiveness at the same time without further improve-
ment in the primary balance. Faster real growth than the 
2005–2012 average, however, is not very likely.
3.4.3 Macroeconomic consequences
The debate about the macroeconomic effect of auster-
ity is essentially a debate about the size of the fiscal 
multiplier. Firstly, we review the literature about the 
size of the multiplier before turning to the analysis of 
the austerity in the euro area.
3.4.3.1 The multiplier
There is a fierce debate among economists about the 
macroeconomic effects of austerity. In recent years sig-
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nificant research efforts have been devoted to under-
standing the theoretical mechanism by which fiscal poli-
cy measures affect the aggregate economy, and to meas-
uring their effect. This line of argument asks a relatively 
simple question: How large is the fiscal multiplier?
The multiplier is typically less than one in the stand-
ard frictionless neoclassical model; see Baxter and 
King (1993). The reason for this is that an increase in 
government consumption makes households poorer 
since they expect future tax increases. They therefore 
reduce their consumption. As households lower their 
consumption of leisure, they increase their supply of 
labour, which leads to a rise in output. Since the sec-
ond effect typically dominates, the multiplier is posi-
tive, but less than one. However, the multiplier can be 
larger in the presence of price rigidities; see Christiano 
et al. (2011). The initial effect in a model with price ri-
gidities is similar to that of the neoclassical model. 
Households increase their labour supply in response 
to a rise in government expenditure, as they feel poor-
er. There is, however, an amplifying effect on labour 
supply in the presence of price rigidities. Namely, 
those firms who cannot raise their prices due to price 
rigidities face higher demand, hence they hire more la-
bour. The higher demand for labour drives up wages, 
as wages tend to be rigid only downwards, which in-
duces households to supply even more labour, leading 
to a further increase in output.
The multiplier may be even larger in recession when the 
nominal interest rate is at the lower boundary of zero. 
The rise in government expenditure raises demand. 
Higher demand leads to higher expected inflation, 
which generates a negative real interest rate as we are at 
the lower boundary. This induces households to save 
less and to consume more, which leads to a further rise 
in output. The size of the multiplier then ranges be-
tween 1.5 to 2.5, according to Christiano et al. (2011) 
and it varies across recessions and expansions, as was 
also confirmed by the recent empirical study of 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013). Generally, em-
pirical estimates of the multiplier vary between 0.5 to 
3.5; see Ramey (2011) for an overview. After carefully 
reviewing the evidence, she concludes that a plausible 
range of estimates is between 0.8 and 1.5. If indeed the 
size of the multiplier is large, and 1.5 is already signifi-
cant, then austerity measures have a strong negative ef-
fect on output and employment during a recession. 
We have already seen, however, that fiscal expansion 
was not particularly effective in mitigating the reces-
sionary effects of the financial crisis between 2008 and 
2009 as the shock was probably a combination of a 
longer-lasting supply and demand shock. After re-
viewing the stylised facts about euro area austerity, we 
will discuss why fiscal policy may prove less effective if  
there is a large misallocation of resources at the begin-
ning of the recession, if  there are large external imbal-
ances to correct, and if  there is significant risk of a 
break-up of the euro area. 
3.4.3.2 Austerity in the euro area between 2009  
and 2012 
We turn now to a few stylised facts about the recession 
in the euro area between 2009 and 2012. Figure 3.9 
provides us with more clues about how austerity meas-
ures affected the economy. Here we plot the actual 
change in real GDP between 2009 and 2012 against 
the change in cyclically-adjusted non-interest expendi-
tures and revenues of the government, respectively. 
The left part of the figure shows the standard effect of 
expenditure cuts: They have a negative effect on out-
put. However, the strong negative effect of expendi-
ture cuts on output again is primarily driven by 
Greece. Without Greece the effect still appears to be 
negative, but is much more muted, as shown by the or-
ange line in the diagram. An additional observation 
we can make is that the loss of output over these three 
years was relatively modest, except for Greece. Over 
this period, GDP declined by about 3  percent in 
Portugal, by less than 2 percent in Spain, and in-
creased by about 2 percent in Ireland. Among the pe-
riphery countries only Greece’s GDP declined dra-
matically, by over 15 percent. In Italy, the only crisis-
hit country from the core, GDP remained more or less 
at the same level. This means that the automatic stabi-
lisers did work, and offset the negative effects of aus-
terity to some extent. 
Given the relatively modest size of  output loss, with 
the exception of  Greece, it is rather puzzling why the 
impression arose that the periphery of  the euro area 
had been plunged into a deep recession. The answer 
is provided by the next graph, Figure 3.10, which 
plots changes in real GDP against changes in em-
ployment. Here we can see dramatic changes both 
between Q3 of  2007 and Q3 of  2009, and between Q3 
of  2009 and Q3 of  2012. Over these two periods em-
ployment fell by over 15 percent in Greece, by about 
15 percent in Spain and Ireland, and around 10 per-
cent in Portugal. 
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Moreover, the graph also reveals another difference 
between the euro area core and periphery. The change 
in output was larger than the change in employment in 
the core countries both between Q3 of 2007 and Q3 of 
2009 when output fell, and between Q3 of 2009 and 
Q3 of 2012 when output rose. By contrast, the change 
in output was smaller than the change in employment 
in the periphery countries during both periods with 
the exception of Greece, where employment only 
changed more than output between Q3 of 2009 and 
Q3 of 2012. In other words, labour productivity ap-
pears to be pro-cyclical in the core countries, but 
counter-cyclical in the periphery.
Labour productivity tends to be pro-cyclical in gener-
al. The degree of pro-cyclicality diminished over the 
three decades, but it did not become counter-cyclical.11 
This fact is significant because it suggests that this re-
cession in the periphery countries is unusual as labour 
productivity has increased. The standard explanation 
11 See Galí and van Rens (2010) on vanishing pro-cyclical pro- 
ductivity.
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of why labour productivity may fall during recessions 
is that firms facing a temporary demand shock retain 
more workers than they need to produce their current 
level of output (labour hoarding). They do so to mini-
mise the cost of laying-off workers in a recession and 
rehiring them in a recovery. The fact that labour pro-
ductivity has risen in the periphery may suggest that 
firms did not expect their output to return to pre-crisis 
levels any time fast. In other words, they realised early 
on that they faced a more persistent demand and/or 
supply shock and laid off  workers even faster than 
their output fell as a result.12 
Reasons why firms in the periphery thought that they 
face more permanent shocks, can be gauged from 
Figure 3.11. This shows the changes in employment 
between Q3 of 2007 and Q3 of 2009 and between Q3 
of 2009 and Q3 of 2013 across six major industries of 
the economy. Firstly, the fall in employment in both 
periods occurred primarily in goods production, in 
construction, and in trade and transport. About half  
of the overall employment loss in Spain and Ireland, 
about one third in Portugal and about one fifth in 
Greece occurred in the construction sector. As we dis-
cussed earlier, the investment boom that started in ear-
ly 2000 collapsed, hitting the construction sector par-
ticularly strongly. Secondly, the rise in employment in 
12 It is worth noting that the observed increase in labour productivity 
during the latest recession is unlikely to be caused by the fact that less 
productive firms and jobs are eliminated first in a recession, thus rais-
ing the productivity of the remaining market players. This is improb-
able because this happens in all recessions, but labour productivity is 
still pro-cyclical and more recently a-cyclical. Hence something else 
has to have happened this time.
both periods occurred in the service industries, exclud-
ing trade and transport. More specifically, the rise in 
employment in some industries occurred at the same 
time as the fall in employment in others.
One interpretation of these facts is that the investment 
boom in the periphery was accompanied by a massive 
misallocation of capital and labour across sectors. 
Once the crisis hit, many firms realised that the previ-
ous employment levels in their industries were not sus-
tainable, and employment levels in their particular in-
dustries would be permanently lower. This induced a 
massive reallocation of labour (and capital) across in-
dustries in the periphery countries. For workers, 
changing industries is costly, and usually takes a long 
time, hence employment levels are likely to recover 
only gradually and over time. 
As productive resources are reallocated across indus-
tries, the periphery countries are making slow, steady 
progress in realigning their relative price levels. 
Figure 3.12 shows that the price level in all periphery 
countries grew more slowly than in the core between 
Q3 of 2010 and Q3 of 2013. In particular, the price 
level in Greece fell during this three year period. 
However, Italy, the only core country that was hit by 
the sovereign crisis, and had a competitiveness prob-
lem, did not improve the latter much relative to 
Germany. 
The dangers of deflation in the euro area cannot be dis-
cussed without taking into account the realignment of 
2007Q3−2009Q3 2009Q3−2013Q3
%%
Source: Eurostat, last accessed 30 December 2013.
a) Data is seasonally adjusted and adjusted by working days. The numbers on the bars indicate the sum of the changes in employment in the six major 
industries of the economy.
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relative prices. As the price levels of the periphery coun-
tries have to fall to support the reduction in their exter-
nal deficits, during such a process average inflation in 
the euro area is likely to be low, suggesting that defla-
tion may well occur on average. However, unlike in the 
United States, deflation in the euro area would be desir-
able if inflation would be negative in the periphery 
while remaining at 2 percent in the core, (Sinn 2013).
We now turn to the actual external balances of the euro 
area countries, which can be disaggregated across the 
three sectors of the economy as shown in Figure 3.13. 
All periphery countries improved their external balanc-
es. The improvements were accompanied by a large in-
crease in the private sector’s net 
lending i.e., increased saving over 
investment of the sector. In all pe-
riphery countries, the corporate 
sector’s net lending position im-
proved as the corporate sector re-
paired its balance sheet by bor-
rowing less and saving more be-
tween 2010 and 2012 than between 
2008 and 2009.13 Households also 
improved their net lending posi-
tions in Ireland and Portugal, but 
not in Spain. More worryingly, 
Greek households were still net 
borrowers of almost 10 percent of 
GDP at the end of 2012. A sus-
tainable improvement in external 
balances requires that both do-
mestic prices and domestic demand are consistent with 
this improvement. In the case of Greece, domestic pri-
vate savings can be interpreted as showing that the 
household sector’s net lending position is still too low.
3.4.4 Austerity and external adjustment in the  
euro area
The euro area periphery has been in recession since 
2008, and austerity is increasingly blamed for eco-
13 It is important to note that the improvement in corporate sector 
net lending was partially due to the bailout of banks in Ireland and 
Spain.
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nomic sluggishness. However, our analysis suggests 
a more intricate relationship between austerity and 
recession. Although austerity undoubtedly contrib-
uted to the recession, it was also driven by the mas-
sive reallocation of  production factors needed to 
correct the pre-crisis misallocation. Finally, both 
austerity and the recession have contributed to the 
realignment of  relative prices, which is a prerequisite 
for the reduction of  external imbalances in the 
periphery.14
During the boom years prior to the crisis, the periph-
ery countries experienced exuberant investment activ-
ity and private capital inflow, but lost their competi-
tiveness, accumulated large current account deficits, 
and suffered the misallocation of their productive re-
sources. Private capital flows stalled, and in some cases 
even reversed, after the financial crisis, resulting in the 
collapse of the investment boom and leading to a 
recession. 
Initially policymakers in the periphery perceived the 
financial crisis as a temporary demand shock and, 
with the exception of  Ireland, reacted with fiscal ex-
pansion in 2008 and 2009 to offset the recessionary 
effects of  the crisis. However, the shock turned out 
to be a combination of  longer-lasting negative de-
mand and a supply shock. The negative demand 
shock in the periphery was more permanent than in 
a normal recession because households in the pe-
riphery downwardly revised their expectations re-
garding the speed of  convergence with the euro area 
core. A more permanent supply shock originated 
from the pre-crisis misallocation of  production fac-
tors. Once the crisis erupted, many firms realised 
that the employment levels of  the boom years would 
prove unsustainable not only in the short run, but 
also in the long term. Thus, production factors, par-
ticularly labour, had to be reallocated across firms 
and economic activities, resulting in sharply falling 
employment levels. 
The financial crisis led to the sovereign crisis in 
three ways. Firstly, the tax revenues of  the boom 
years, particularly from the construction industry, 
were not sustainable in the long run. The sharp de-
cline in these tax revenues had a negative effect on 
government balances. Secondly, the collapse of  the 
14 Austerity or fiscal consolidation does indeed contribute to the im-
provement in the current account. In their careful empirical study 
based on a narrative approach to identifying fiscal shocks, Bluedorn 
and Leigh (2011) find that 1 percentage point of GDP fiscal consoli-
dation raises the current account balance-to-GDP ratio by about 0.6 
percentage points. This is a fairly large effect.
construction boom led to rising delinquency rates 
on loans at the periphery banks. As the quality of 
the loan portfolio of  the periphery banks deterio-
rated, governments had to bail out some of  them, 
which lead to a further worsening of  fiscal posi-
tions. Thirdly, the initial efforts of  the periphery 
governments to offset the recessionary effects of  the 
financial crisis turned out to be ineffective as they 
faced a longer-lasting demand and supply shock, 
instead of  a temporary demand shock. But the ex-
pansion itself  led to a further deterioration in the 
fiscal balances.
The on-going adjustment in the euro area periphery 
is characterised by slowly declining prices relative to 
the core, by the reallocation of  resources across ac-
tivities, and by slowly improving fiscal and external 
balances. The adjustment in prices is crucial both for 
external balances and labour reallocation. However, 
it is hampered by several factors. Firstly, prices are 
sticky, hence shocks are absorbed by a fall in output 
and employment to a larger extent. Secondly, exten-
sive credits by the national central banks and fiscal 
rescue funds reduce pressure to implement the aus-
terity mea sures and hence slow the speed of  reforms. 
Thirdly, expectations regarding the future path of 
prices were influenced by expectations of  the break-
up of  the euro area. If  the euro area breaks up, pe-
riphery countries’ exchange rates will devalue, and 
their prices will rise relative to the core countries. 
When such a break-up is expected, then prices in the 
periphery rise faster (fall slower) than in the absence 
of  such expectations. In other words, the expecta-
tion of  a break-up slows down internal devaluation 
in the periphery countries. Fourthly, labour market 
rigidities in the periphery countries make labour re-
allocation particularly slow, leading to a prolonged 
recession. 
The adjustment towards a labour allocation and rela-
tive prices that are consistent with smaller external 
balances is accompanied by a recession, as is usually 
the case with any large-scale reallocation of labour. 
The recession provides incentives for periphery firms 
to reduce their prices and wages, which induces the re-
allocation of labour. Consequently austerity did not 
cause the recession in itself, but it contributed to it. 
How much austerity was really needed, or what com-
bination of austerity and debt forgiveness was and is 
required, are issues that remain open to debate. In par-
ticular, a credible long-term fiscal framework could 
have given credibility to a fiscal policy, thereby reduc-
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ing the need for front-loading the programme (see 
Blanchard and Cotarelli, 2010). 
3.5 Conclusion
Since the sovereign debt crisis erupted in the euro 
area, there has been much discussion about the costs 
and benefits of  fiscal adjustment, or austerity during 
a recession. However, it also has to be emphasised 
that austerity and recession are part of  the adjust-
ment process. During this process the external im-
balances of  the euro area periphery countries are re-
duced, relative goods prices fall to compensate for 
the excessive inflation before the crisis and the pro-
duction factors that were misallocated in these coun-
tries during the pre-crisis boom get reallocated to 
their long-term sustainable use. Hence, neither aus-
terity nor the recession was completely avoidable.
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Banking Union:
Who ShoUld Take Charge?
4.1 Introduction
Despite considerable scepticism and some opposition, a 
European Union (EU) scheme for a banking union for 
the euro area is taking shape. An EU Regulation for the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) came into force 
in November 2013. In November 2014 the European 
Central Bank (ECB) will take over supervision of the 
130 largest and systemically most important financial 
institutions in the euro area (see European Union, 
2013a). Prior to November 2014 the ECB will carry out 
an assessment of the balance sheets of those institu-
tions, with the intention of identifying and remedying 
existing problems: the so-called legacy issues. 
It is generally agreed that there are four essential compo-
nents of a banking union: a single supervisor, a single reg-
ulator, a single resolution mechanism, and a common sys-
tem of deposit insurance. The schemes for the supervisor 
and regulator have now been agreed upon and passed 
into law. The European Commission put forward a pro-
posal for a single resolution mechanism in July 2013. This 
proposal was discussed at meetings between the 
Commission and ECOFIN in December 2013. An agree-
ment based on it is close and is likely to pass into law early 
in 2014 after negotiations with the European Parliament, 
despite several remaining points of contention between 
the Commission and ECB on the one hand, and various 
member states, notably Germany, on the other. 
There is no common euro area system of deposit in-
surance as yet, but national schemes protect deposits 
of up to 100,000 euros. Changes were agreed in 
December 2013 intended to make these national 
schemes more similar and more robust.1 
1  The proposed modified directive requires the banks in each member 
state to pay into a fund that will hold 0.8 percent of covered deposits. 
This funded scheme replaces a variety of poorly funded or unfunded 
schemes. Bank funding replaces taxpayer funding or ex-post funding 
from the banking industry, and the time taken to receive payments from 
the scheme will be gradually reduced from 20 to 7 days. (European 
Commission, “Commissioner Barnier Welcomes Agreement between 
the European Parliament and Member States on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes,” MEMO 13/1176, Brussels, 17 December 2013, http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-1176_en.htm.)
The push for a banking union actually revives an old idea 
that was not put into practice. In the original version of a 
plan for a central bank that would run a monetary un-
ion, the central bank had overall supervisory and regula-
tory powers. That demand met strong resistance, above 
all from the German Bundesbank, which worried that a 
role in maintaining financial stability might undermine 
the future central bank’s ability to focus on price stability 
as the primary goal of monetary policy. There was also 
bureaucratic resistance from existing regulators. In 1990, 
Jacques Delors noted that the European Commission 
approached the question of banking supervision with an 
“open mind,” and that the European System of Central 
Banks should simply “participate in the coordination of 
national policies, but would not have a monopoly on 
those policies.”2 In October 1990, when the alternates 
(deputies) to the European central bank governors dis-
cussed the draft articles for the central bank statute, 
Bundesbank Vice-President Hans Tietmeyer restated the 
sceptical position of his institution, which worried con-
sistently about the moral hazard implications of central 
bank involvement in supervision. If the central bank 
took on the responsibility of regulating, it would also de-
liver an implicit commitment to rescue banks should 
there be any bad developments that it had overlooked. 
Tietmeyer provided a neat encapsulation of the German 
philosophy of regulation: 
“This did not mean from the view of the Board of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank that the ECB should not 
support the stability of the financial system, but 
that it should never be written down; this would be 
moral hazard.”3
The ECB was thus not given overall supervisory and 
regulatory powers, and until the outbreak of the fi-
nancial crisis in 2007/2008 this was not thought to be a 
problem (James, 2012). 
4.2 Why the push for a banking union?
A banking union represents an unusually ambitious 
institutional change, shifting the responsibility for 
2  Committee of Governors, meeting 243, Basel, 13 March 1990.
3  Committee of Governors, alternates meeting, 16 October 1990.
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bank supervision and regulation to a central euro area 
institution, the ECB, and setting up a centralised fund 
for bank resolution. The arguments for it include: 
• Fiscally weak governments and fragile banking 
systems have become too closely connected.
• Many banks operate across national boundaries 
within the euro area. For these banks, regulation 
and supervision is better done by one supervisor; 
resolution of such banks is cleaner and more 
quickly done by a single euro area authority than 
by national authorities attempting to coordinate 
with each other.
• National regulators have become too close to the 
banks they regulate, too susceptible to political 
pressure, too prone to delay intervention and have 
incentives to offload costs onto the euro area as a 
whole. Centralised supervision will be better 
supervision.
• There are euro area-wide spillovers from a bank 
failure in a member state; even small banks can 
have systemic effects. 
• It is efficient to pool resources to provide insurance 
for the costs of bank failure, rather than having in-
dividual members states pay for failures that occur 
in each jurisdiction. Pooling resources addresses 
the problem of institutions that are “too big to fail” 
to some extent.
• If  the ECB is to act as lender of last resort to euro 
area banks, it needs information on their solvency, 
the authority to supervise them, control and the 
ability to resolve failing institutions. 
The principal arguments against a banking union 
are that:
• It is effectively not an insurance scheme, but an ex-
post mutualisation of write-off losses of banks re-
sulting from funding near bankrupt states and dubi-
ous real-estate projects in southern Europe and 
Ireland; while it is officially argued that the banking 
union will exclude the socialisation of write-off loss-
es on legacy assets, such a socialisation may, in fact, 
have been the true reason why policymakers have re-
cently pressed so urgently for the banking union.
• It places too much power and responsibility in the 
hands of the ECB, which itself  is the largest credi-
tor of the endangered banks. Having contented it-
self  with below-investment grade collateral, the 
ECB will therefore seek resolution methods that 
shift the burden of write-off  losses onto the tax-
payers of the still-solvent states of the euro area. 
• As the banking union promises even more mutuali-
sation of bank debt in the future, it will artificially 
dampen interest spreads below differences in bank-
ruptcy risks and encourage zombie banks to buy 
even more government bonds and zombie govern-
ments to unload even more debt on their local 
banking sectors, as both know that they can shift 
their problems onto other shoulders if  necessary. 
This will further strengthen the problematic link 
between banks and their sovereigns. 
• As the ECB is a technocratic institution that gives 
small and large countries the same weight in the 
ECB Council, it is likely to come up with biased 
resolution decisions, which necessarily imply a fis-
cal redistribution of wealth between the countries 
of the euro area that, if  anything, would have been 
a genuine task of parliaments. 
The argument that weak sovereigns and fragile bank-
ing systems have become too closely connected has 
been made repeatedly and evidence for it has accumu-
lated since 2010. In cases where member states have 
bailed out their banking systems, the ensuing increase 
in their national debt has worsened or totally destabi-
lised public finances. Ireland is a prime example: When 
it bailed out its banks in 2009 and 2010 national debt 
rose from 44.2 percent of national income at the end 
of 2008 to 91.2 percent at the end of 2010. Bank fail-
ures and publicly-funded recapitalisations have also 
worsened the public debt problems of Greece. The 
public finances of Cyprus were overwhelmed by the 
costs of re-organising and recapitalising its banks in 
2012. Meanwhile, the government of Spain is refusing 
to accept EU funds to recapitalise the banking system 
unless this can be done in such a way as not to affect 
the national debt. 
Conversely, in member states whose sovereign bond 
yields have soared to great heights in the financial 
markets, commercial banks increasingly invested their 
funds in local government bonds during the crisis. As 
Figure 4.1 shows, the bank-held government bonds of 
the crisis countries were not primarily held in interna-
tionally diversified portfolios, but as a sample of the 
world’s largest 64 banks shows, they were concentrat-
ed in the portfolios of the respective national banks 
and remained concentrated there to an even greater 
degree when the crisis struck. Greek government 
bonds, which like the government bonds of Portugal 
and Ireland have been given non-investment grades by 
the rating agencies, are practically no longer held by 
banks outside Greece nowadays. 
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However, the problematic kind of symbiosis between 
banks and sovereigns goes further than is commonly 
reported. While sovereigns bail out the banks, and 
banks hold government bonds in exchange, the banks 
then typically use these government bonds as collater-
al when borrowing the funds they need for buying the 
government bonds from their national central banks. 
Thus, in fact, there is not only a bilateral link between 
banks and their sovereigns, but also a link between 
both of them and the respective national central 
banks, which are state-owned institutions. Due to the 
sharing of income from monetary operations, the po-
tential write-off  losses from lending to insolvent banks 
are, however, socialised among the participating cen-
tral banks of the Eurosystem, and hence among the 
national governments entitled to collect the national 
central banks’ profit distributions. 
Despite this socialisation, the di-
rect link between the banks and 
their own sovereigns has implied 
that the cost of borrowing faced 
by households and firms has risen 
in line with the interest on state 
bonds. This has led to higher bor-
rowing costs for the private econ-
omy in the periphery than in the 
core, further deepening the reces-
sion there. The ECB has inter-
preted this phenomenon as an in-
dication that its monetary policy 
is not transmitted effectively to 
the member states and used this 
failure as an argument to further 
expand the socialisation of risk 
by reducing the collateral require-
ments for its refinancing credit 
below investment grade. This, in 
turn, led to the huge TARGET2 
imbalances that peaked at one 
trillion euros in summer 2012 
(compare Sinn, 2014). 
The linkages between the per-
ceived financial robustness of 
governments and the borrowing 
costs of banks in the same coun-
try are illustrated by differences in 
interest rates on loans to busi-
nesses across the euro area in 
Figure 4.2. Before the crisis, in 
2007, the gap between the highest 
rates (Portugal) and the lowest 
(France) was around 2 percentage points. In 2013 this 
gap was around 4.5 percentage points, with Greece 
and Portugal having the highest rates, while France re-
mained the lowest. This data does not convey the full 
extent of the differences in credit conditions between 
euro area members, because it does not reveal the dif-
ferences in the availability of loans, or the conditions 
under which loans were granted to businesses (as 
shown by the strength of their “business case” for the 
loan, for example). 
The same message is conveyed by data on credit de-
fault swaps (CDS), where there is a striking similarity 
between government CDS spreads and banks’ CDS 
spreads. Some data are provided in Figure 4.3. In May 
2012, CDS spreads on Spanish and Italian govern-
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ments were just under 6 percent, and the CDS spread 
on banks in those two countries ranged between 4 per-
cent and 8 percent, for Ireland the figures are 7 percent 
for government and 10 percent for banks, and for 
Portugal about 13 percent for government and 
10–12 percent for banks. For Greece the figures were 
much higher. For other euro area countries (not facing 
public debt problems) the sovereign spreads were be-
low 2 percent and the bank spreads below 4 percent. 
This contrasts with the pre-crisis situation in December 
2007 when sovereign CDS spreads were low – all less 
than 0.2 percent – and the banks’ spreads ranged from 
0.25 percent to 0.85 percent.
More detailed analysis of the effects of the financial 
crisis on the costs and availability of funding for euro 
area banks is provided by van 
Rixtel and Gasperini (2013). 
Their data and analysis reinforce 
the message summarised here, 
namely that the gap between the 
highest and lowest costs of funds 
for banks across euro area states, 
and similar gaps in the costs of 
borrowing for their customers, 
have widened substantially since 
the financial crisis. 
The variations in funding costs 
for banks, households and small 
firms across the euro area reflect 
the tendency of markets to differ-
entiate between borrowers by their repayment proba-
bilities, reversing the initial period of reckless lending 
and borrowing in neglect of the bankruptcy risks. It is 
revealed by the fall in cross-border exposure of banks 
in the EU since 2008 (see Figure 4.4). There has been a 
bigger percentage fall in intra-EU exposure to euro 
area periphery countries than in overall foreign expo-
sures or exposure to emerging-EU countries.
Many commentators have remarked on the trend to-
wards fragmentation in the euro area’s financial mar-
kets. The Financial Times has argued that debt delev-
eraging will continue to hamper the euro area’s recov-
ery, as will its financial “Balkanisation,” or the retreat 
of banks behind national borders, with large differ-
ences in interest rates paid by households and compa-
Source: Dell'Ariccia et al. (2013).
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nies in various member states.4 The euro area, says the 
Financial Times, remains a story of the “periphery” 
versus the “core.” ECB president Mario Draghi was 
quoted as saying that: 
“Fragmentation is basically a little better than it 
was four months ago, but rather than observing 
dramatic improvements month by month, we are 
observing, by and large, a static situation.” 
 
The view of the European Commission is that:
“Swift progress towards a banking union is indis-
pensable to ensure financial stability and growth in 
the euro area and in the whole internal market. It is 
a crucial step to overcome the current financial 
fragmentation and uncertainty, to ease funding 
conditions for vulnerable sovereigns and banks and 
break the link between the two, and to re-launch 
cross-border banking activity in the internal mar-
ket to the benefit of both euro area and non-euro 
area member states. Building on the regulatory 
framework common to the 28 members of the in-
ternal market (single rulebook), the European 
Commission has therefore taken an inclusive ap-
proach and proposed a roadmap for the banking 
union with different instruments and steps, poten-
tially open to all Member States but in any case in-
cluding the 18 currently within the euro area.” 
(European Commission, 2013)
Failures of cross-border banks and their resolution 
have highlighted the weaknesses of handling these is-
sues at national level, when it is necessary to coordi-
nate the actions of separate national regulatory au-
thorities and find agreement on the distribution of the 
costs of resolution. 
4.2.1 Complex and cross-border bank resolutions
The serial bailouts of Dexia provide an example of the 
problems for the authorities created by cross-border 
banks, the weakness of stress tests, and the difficulties of 
unravelling the complexities of the balance sheets of 
such institutions. Dexia, once the world’s largest lender 
to municipalities, has been bailed out three times, in 
2008, 2011, and 2012. In 2008, it had a balance sheet of 
650 billion euros, including 125 billion euros in exposure 
4  R. Atkins (2013), “Eurozone: ‘Balkanisation’ Remains a Serious 
Concern for Currency Bloc,” Financial Times, 20 November, http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/526bcafe-47a1-11e3-9398-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz2r8K9YOR2.
to the United States sub-prime property market. To bol-
ster Dexia’s balance sheet, Belgium, France and 
Luxemburg injected 6.4 billion euros of capital. Further 
euro area debt problems led the same three countries to 
rescue Dexia again in 2011 with guarantees of 90 billion 
euros, following difficult negotiations between France 
and Belgium over the share that each would provide.5 
Despite its exposures to Greece, Portugal, and other 
governments, Dexia passed stress tests in July 2011 with 
flying colours. Its Tier 1 capital ratio was 10.3 percent, 
whereas the required ratio at that time was 6 percent. In 
November 2012, however, France and Belgium added 
5.5 billion euros of additional capital. At the end of 
2012 Dexia still had substantial exposures to various 
governments: France 8 billion euros, Italy 38.4 billion 
euros, Spain 24 billion euros, and the United States and 
Canada 35 billion euros. By July 2013, France had lost 
6.6 billion euros on the Dexia bailouts (according to the 
Financial Times). It appears that in 2008, Dexia had re-
classified 100 billion euros of trading assets as loans so 
that it did not have to mark them to market, hoping to 
hold them to maturity and avoid losses, meanwhile in-
creasing the apparent strength of its balance sheet. But 
this did not occur. A 2013 report by the Cour des 
Comptes, the national auditor of France, is highly criti-
cal of Dexia’s supervisors, firstly for their failure to an-
ticipate the risks that Dexia faced, and subsequently for 
their failure to address the problems they found.6 
The bailout of Fortis, which operated in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxemburg, is another example of 
the problems of cross-border resolutions.7 Fortis 
emerged as an enormous banking, investment man-
agement and insurance conglomerate following a 
spate of mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s and 
2000s, with a share value of 46 billion euros in 2006 
according to Forbes Magazine. It was undermined by 
the costs of acquiring part of ABN-AMRO Bank in 
2007. The Benelux countries put in 11.2 billion euros 
of capital and substantially nationalised the bank. 
Later, amid acrimonious disputes among shareholders 
and the governments involved, the bank was broken 
up and various parts of it were sold off.8 
5  S. Neville (2012), “Belgium and France Take Control of Dexia,” 
The Guardian, 8 November, http://www.theguardian.com/business/ 
2012/nov/08/france-belgium-dexia.
6  H. Carnegy (2013), “France’s Losses on Dexia Bailout Hit €6.6 bil-
lion,” Financial Times, 18 July, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ff693d70-
efb5-11e2-8229-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2oCYnJfYC.
7  N. Tait (2010), “IMF Seeks Bank Crisis Agency,” Financial Times, 
20 March, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7b3bf52e-33c0-11df-8b99-00144 
feabdc0.html#axzz2oCYnJfYC.
8  A long and thoroughly referenced article in Wikipedia provides in-
tricate detail of these disputes, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fortis_ 
%28finance%29,accessed on 22 December 2013.
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4.2.2 Lessons from the Spanish experience
The experience of Spain with the failure and recapitali-
sation of several savings banks – the Cajas – in 2012 il-
lustrates the problems of having regulators who are too 
close to the institutions they regulate. Political pressures 
discouraged the Banco de Espana from acting more 
promptly; and the problem had grown much worse by 
the time it eventually did take action (Wyplosz, 2012).
The Spanish banking group Bankia collapsed in May 
2012, by which time Spain was not able to borrow 
from the markets, forcing it to seek European help. 
Had the problems emerged sooner, when Spain had a 
low debt to GDP ratio, it would not have been neces-
sary to resort to outside help. “The three most prob-
lematic Cajas (Bankia, CatalunyaCaixa and 
Novagalicia) had capital deficits (to be covered partly 
or fully by the taxpayer) of 54 billion euros – over 5 
percent of Spanish GDP[...]” (Garicano, 2012). An 
external report by management consultants Oliver 
Wyman showed that the Cajas covered up losses 
through 2008, 2009, and 2010. A succession of failures 
starting in March 2009 revealed bigger losses than had 
been reported. Nevertheless, the Banco de Espana did 
not investigate the whole savings bank system. 
Garicano (2012) proposes four explanations: (i) 
Regulators do not like to expose their own previous 
errors; (ii) Dynamic provisions, while good for damp-
ening cyclical fluctuations, enabled the losses to be 
concealed for longer, and the provisions were not ac-
tually big enough, amounting to only 3 percent of 
GDP at the height in 2004; (iii) Spain did not have an 
appropriate resolution framework until summer 2012; 
(iv), the main reason in Garicano’s view, is the politi-
cal control of the cajas: “[...] the supervisor, confront-
ed with powerful and well-connected ex-politicians, 
decided to look the other way in the face of obvious 
building trouble.”
The experience of the Spanish banks and Dexia shows 
that regulatory agencies tend to be close to bank inter-
ests and often do not operate in line with taxpayers’ 
best interests. When banks have branches in various 
countries they need to be supervised by an interna-
tional agency that operates under strict democratic 
control to protect the electorate against write-off  loss-
es. Experience also shows that supervision and resolu-
tion have to go hand-in-hand.
The European decision to introduce a banking union 
has largely been pre-empted by the ECB Council’s deci-
sion to act as a lender of last resort to troubled banks in 
the euro area, helping them by underbidding the inter-
bank market with refinancing credit at conditions in 
terms of maturity, interest rate and collateral require-
ments at which private banks were unwilling to offer in-
terbank credit. TARGET2 balances accumulated as a 
result that peaked at 1,000 billion euros in summer 2012 
in the GIPSIC countries,9 as we reported in our previous 
reports (EEAG, 2012; EEAG, 2013). By its own statutes 
and the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB was not intended to 
be a lender of last resort; it was intended not to provide 
banks with implicit bailout insurance and not to en-
courage excessively risky behaviour. However, when the 
crisis came, it bailed out the banks and their sovereigns 
to avoid the bankruptcies that would otherwise have oc-
curred. Taking these much disputed prior decisions as 
given, it is understandable that the ECB now wants to 
supervise the banks to minimise its own investment risk. 
While the potential write-off losses would be fully so-
cialised among the euro countries because they would 
reduce the seignorage from monetary policy operations, 
the ECB certainly does not want its balance sheet to be 
fraught with the consequences of failed bailout opera-
tions. However, the ECB cannot perform the superviso-
ry function effectively, because it has too little informa-
tion about banks’ situations; and it has no authority to 
close down or restructure insolvent banks. 
“Intervening as lender of last resort, the ECB 
would provide money without any control.” 
(Wyplosz, 2012) 
This may lead to a tragedy of  the commons.10 The na-
tional authorities have an incentive to delay acknowl-
edging that banks are in trouble as long as possible, 
inviting the central bank to provide cheap refinancing 
credit to mitigate what appears to be a mere liquidity 
crisis. After the rescue, the liquidity crisis turns into a 
solvency crisis, but as the ECB has already been 
dragged in, the foreseeable write-off  losses have al-
ready been socialised either directly, via the ECB’s 
system of profit sharing, or indirectly via fiscal rescue 
schemes like the EFSF or ESM bailing out states, 
which bail out local banks and protect the ECB as 
their main creditor. Spain is an example of  this se-
quence of  events.
In the early stages of the development of a banking un-
ion, during 2012, plans for a single supervisory mecha-
9  GIPSIC countries include Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy 
and Cyprus.
10  Compare Blankart (2012), Tornell and Westermann (2012), and 
Wyplosz (2012).
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nism and a common regulatory regime met with general 
acceptance, while a single resolution mechanism seemed 
much more controversial, ran into greater opposition, 
and seemed far less likely to get off the ground. Some 
commentators feared that a half-baked banking union 
might emerge. They argued that a partial banking union 
may be worse than no union at all (Wyplosz, 2012). For 
example, in a situation where there is only a supervisor 
who only looks at large banks and no resolution author-
ity or deposit scheme, a public debt restructuring would 
lead to bank failures, and the ECB would incur write-off  
losses from lending to local banks without having been 
able to constrain these banks’ actions. 
Basically, there are two ways out of the common pool 
problem. Either the Eurosystem’s degree of loss social-
isation is reduced or central control is enhanced. The 
former would imply a return to the system of harder 
budget constraints intended by the Maastricht Treaty 
whereby the ECB stops bailing out banks and their 
sovereigns with cheap refinancing credit provided to 
banks collateralised with below-investment grade gov-
ernment bonds. TARGET2 balances would be settled, 
in such a way that interest differentials would emerge 
reflecting differences in bankruptcy probabilities, and 
markets would be responsible for the allocation of cap-
ital to rivalling risky assets. Alternatively, the policy of 
undercutting market conditions to eliminate risk 
premia in interest rates would continue, but constraints 
would be imposed on banks and their sovereigns to 
prevent moral hazard, to ensure prudent lending and 
borrowing and to steer the allocation of scarce capital 
to rivalling uses. Intermediate solutions would, of 
course, also be possible. 
The euro area countries, meanwhile, have agreed to 
lean very much towards the second option. The ECB 
will continue to act as a lender of last resort, but it will 
also act as a single regulator, supervisor and resolution 
authority. In addition, there will be a common deposit 
insurance system. Setting the new system up requires a 
transferal of powers from member states to the euro 
area authorities, which will imply the transfer of re-
sources between countries. A revision of the Maastricht 
Treaty may possibly be needed to achieve this.
4.3 Banking union in the context of European Union 
policy interventions since the financial crisis
Proposals for a banking union emerged in 2012 after a 
long series of initiatives by the European authorities 
to address problems arising from the global financial 
crisis, the long recession that followed it, and the per-
sistent problems of bank failure and unsustainable 
public debt in the euro area. 
There have been four groups of  initiatives. Firstly, 
schemes for lending to – or bailing out – govern-
ments that face problems with borrowing in capital 
markets; secondly, schemes for improving the super-
vision and regulation of  financial markets; thirdly, 
attempts to revive the surveillance and coordination 
of  fiscal policies; and fourthly, replacement lending 
by the ECB in terms of  buying government bonds 
and providing refinancing credit at increasingly low 
collateral standards.
To assist euro area member states in financial difficulty, 
two temporary programmes were established, the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), 
succeeded in October 2012 by the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), which has been set up as a perma-
nent mechanism, enshrined in the Treaty Establishing 
the ESM and in a change in the EU Treaty, and is able 
to lend up to 500 billion euros. The ESM has so far 
agreed to loan 9 billion euros to Cyprus as part of a 10 
billion euro package in May 2013, and 100 billion eu-
ros to Spain for the recapitalisation of its banking in-
dustry, agreed in late 2012, of which only 41.4 billion 
euros have been drawn to date. Previously the EFSF 
and EFSM had made loans, generally as part of larger 
support packages. These loans include 144.6 billion eu-
ros in EFSF loans to Greece made from 2010 onwards, 
loans to Ireland of which 17.7 billion euros came from 
the EFSF and 22.5 billion euros from the EFSM in 
2010, and loans to Portugal of 26 billion euros each 
from the EFSF and the EFSM (parts of a 78 billion 
euro loan package agreed in 2011).11
At the same time as the establishment of these loan fa-
cilities for distressed governments, there has been a se-
quence of initiatives intended to improve banking 
supervision and regulation. In 2010, a European 
Systemic Risk Board was set up to deal with macro-
prudential regulation, and three new European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) were founded to deal 
with micro-financial supervision: the European 
11  Wikipedia has an informative and thoroughly referenced article on 
the various European rescue schemes (EFSF, EFSM, and ESM) and 
the loan packages that have been agreed, which can be accessed from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Stability_Mechanism; com-
pare also Ifo Institute (2014), The Exposure Level – Bailout Measures 
for the Eurozone Countries and Germany’s Exposure, http://www.cesi-
fo-group.de/ifoHome/policy/Haftungspegel.html.
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Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and 
the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA).12 Together these authorities form the 
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). 
Meanwhile, banking regulation is being changed by 
the introduction of the Basel III capital requirements. 
The Basel III global regulatory standards on bank cap-
ital adequacy and liquidity were issued in December 
2010. Based on these standards, the European 
Commission published a new Capital Requirements 
Regulation (CRR) and Capital Requirements Directive 
(CRD IV) in June 2013. Financial institutions will be 
required to apply the new rules from 1 January 2014, 
with full implementation on 1 January 2019. The EBA 
will be heavily involved in ensuring the implementation 
of the CRR and the CRD IV.
To address the issues that lead to high public debt in the 
first place, the EU has developed a Fiscal Compact to 
revive and reinforce the old Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), to reinforce the surveillance and monitoring of 
public deficits by the EU authorities, to improve coordi-
nation of fiscal policies, and to limit the size of deficits 
(European Council, 2012). This came into effect on 
1 January 2013 for the 16 countries that had ratified it 
by that point, and for other countries on the date when 
they actually ratified it. Compared to the old SGP it im-
poses a tighter definition of a balanced budget, is more 
explicit about the speed at which an excessive level of 
public debt has to be brought down, and requires mem-
ber states to establish an independent fiscal advisory 
council to keep the deficit under surveillance and guar-
antee that their fiscal position are in balance or in sur-
plus, by the definition used in the treaty. 
At the same time as these structural changes were intro-
duced, the ECB has tried to ease monetary conditions in 
the crisis countries, to mitigate their recession, to keep 
inflation from going negative (thus slowing down or pre-
venting the necessary realignment of relative prices), to 
ease liquidity and funding problems faced by the banks, 
and to make it easier and cheaper for governments to 
borrow. The ECB lending rate was brought down to al-
most zero in the wake of the financial crisis and has re-
mained there. Long Term Refinancing Operations have 
been used to make banks more independent from the 
capital market. The balance sheet of the ECB has been 
12  Council of European Union, “Financial Supervision: Council 
Adopts Legal Texts Establishing the European Systemic Risk Board 
and Three New Supervisory Authorities,” PRESSE 303 16452/10, 
Brussels, 17 November 2010, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ue-
docs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/117747.pdf.
increased several-fold, paralleling the effects of similar 
actions undertaken by the US Federal Reserve and the 
Bank of England. A relocation of refinancing credit 
through an aggressive collateral policy has reshuffled 
funds from those member states with an excess, mainly 
in northern Europe, to those with a shortage, mainly in 
the south (Sinn and Wollmershaeuser, 2012; Sinn, 2012 
and 2014), via the bailout of banks and their sovereigns 
with public international credit. 
Finally, in September 2012, the ECB announced that it 
would be willing to use Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMTs) to buy the public debt of euro area members 
receiving assistance from ESM programmes in second-
ary markets under certain conditions and in potentially 
unlimited amounts. Before this announcement, yields 
on the debt of financially weak euro area sovereigns like 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece, had periodically ris-
en to high levels, typically after some piece of news had 
alarmed the markets, giving rise to fears that the public 
debt and banking crises may re-intensify. Repeated as-
surances from the European authorities were not able 
to quell such fears. There had been much talk of the EU 
needing a “big bazooka” to fend off any conceivable 
speculative attack on its public debt markets and bank-
ing systems. The OMT announcement finally achieved 
the desired effect of calming markets by offering inves-
tors free-of-charge CDS-like insurance when buying 
government bonds, and has continued to maintain sta-
bility.13 Following the insurance offer, yields on Italian 
and Spanish government debt immediately fell to their 
lowest level for several months.
Despite all these efforts, problems remain. The meas-
ures outlined above leave much of the work of banking 
supervision and regulation in the hands of national reg-
ulators. The cost of recapitalising or winding-up, or of 
resolving failed banks by some other means, remains at 
the level of EU member states. There is a growing belief  
in the crisis countries that this is not satisfactory. 
4.4 Proposals and political progress with banking union
4.4.1 Supervision and regulation
Official proposals for a banking union emerged from the 
European Council and the euro area summit meeting on 
28–29 June 2012, and more detailed plans were set out 
by the European Commission in September 2012 when 
13  This is seen as remarkable in some quarters, as not a shot has yet 
been fired.
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the SSM was proposed (European Commission, 2012). 
The essence of this proposal was the plan that the ECB 
should have “ultimate responsibility for all specific su-
pervisory tasks related to the financial stability of all 
euro area banks.”14 The proposal envisaged that nation-
al supervisors would “continue to play an important 
role in day-to-day supervision and in preparing and im-
plementing ECB decisions.” At the same time, the 
Commission proposed that the EBA should develop a 
Single Supervisory Handbook “to preserve the integrity 
of the single market and ensure coherence in banking 
supervision for all 27 EU countries.”
The Commission set out an ambitious timetable for 
implementing a banking union, aiming for the Council 
and Parliament to adopt the plan by the end of 2012. 
According to this timetable, the SSM would have been 
in place by 1 January 2013, with the ECB able to “de-
cide to assume” supervisory responsibilities over any 
credit institution, “particularly those which have re-
ceived or requested public funding;” from 1 July 2013 
all banks of major systemic importance should have 
been supervised by the ECB; and, from 1 January 2014, 
this mandate should have been extended to banks of 
all sizes. 
The proposals gave the ECB very wide-ranging re-
sponsibilities and powers:
“The ECB will become responsible for tasks such 
as authorising credit institutions; compliance with 
capital, leverage and liquidity requirements; and 
conducting supervision of financial conglomerates. 
The ECB will be able to carry out early interven-
tion measures when a bank breaches or risks 
breaching regulatory capital requirements by re-
quiring banks to take remedial action.”
In the event these proposals were not put into effect 
according to the Commission’s timetable. They were 
finally agreed in October 2013, and the ECB will as-
sume ultimate responsibility for supervision of all 
euro area banks on 4 November 2014 (European 
Union, 2013a). The ECB will directly supervise the 
largest and most internationally active banks, with the 
option to take over direct supervision for the others in 
cases where it believes this to be appropriate, while the 
national authorities will be in charge of the day-to-
day supervision of smaller banks. The banks under di-
rect ECB supervision are those with assets worth over 
14  European Commission (2012), “Commission Proposes New ECB 
Powers for Banking Supervision as Part of a Banking Union”, Press 
release IP/12/953, Brussels/Strasbourg, 12 September, http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-953_en.htm.
30 billion euros, those whose assets exceed 20 percent 
of the host country’s GDP, those located in a country 
that has requested or received assistance from the 
EFSF or ESM, or those which are among the three 
largest financial institutions in a country. 
While the SSM appears to give the ECB many powers 
that were previously held by the EBA, the EBA is to 
continue to exist, and it will be responsible for develop-
ing the “single rule book” that will guide the regulation 
and supervision of banks in the euro area. The 
European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union have passed a regulation amending the role of 
the EBA and setting out its interactions with the ECB 
with its new roles (European Union, 2013b). 
4.4.2 The Single Resolution Mechanism
In July 2013 the Commission proposed a procedure 
for resolving – winding-up – failed banks with a 
“Single Resolution Mechanism” (SRM) and a “Single 
Bank Resolution Fund” (SRF), see European Com-
mission (2013). The Commission argues that the 
SRM will bring important benefits, as compared with 
a network of  national procedures and funds. They ar-
gue that:
• Strong central decision-making will ensure rapid 
and effective decisions being made, avoiding unco-
ordinated action, minimising negative impacts on 
financial stability, and limiting the need for finan-
cial support;
• A centralised pool of bank resolution expertise and 
experience will deal with bank failure better than 
individual national authorities with fewer resourc-
es and experience;
• The SRF will pool resources across countries and 
protect taxpayers better than national funds, and 
provide a level playing field across participating 
member states;
• The SRF sidesteps problems of coordinating the 
use of national funds; 
• The SRF eliminates the dependence of banks on 
sovereign creditworthiness.
It is proposed that the SRM commences operations in 
January 2015. The proposed legal basis for the SRM is 
Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), “which allows for the 
adoption of measures for the approximation of na-
tional provisions aiming at the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.”
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Under the proposal, a Single Resolution Board (SRB) 
will be set up to prepare and monitor resolution decisions 
centrally, which, it is asserted, will command the confi-
dence of member states that the resolution process is of a 
high quality and is impartial (particularly as regards the 
local effects of resolution decisions). The resolution pro-
cess will be initiated by the European Commission.
The Commission argues that its proposal satisfies the 
principal of subsidiarity because resolutions of failing 
banks create spillovers across national boundaries. 
Undertaking them at the European level allows such 
resolutions to be performed consistently across coun-
tries, following the same set of rules, and internalises 
what would otherwise be external effects (spillovers). 
It is claimed that the SRM will be able to exploit econ-
omies of scale not available to national procedures; 
and that national resolution procedures that may dif-
fer from one member state to the next might under-
mine the stability and integrity of the single market. 
“Whilst the establishment of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism ensures a level playing field in the su-
pervision of banks and diminishes the risk of for-
bearance, the SRM ensures that when a bank fail-
ure occurs, restructuring can be carried out at the 
least cost, creditors receive fair and equal treat-
ment, and funding can be quickly deployed to its 
most productive use across the internal market.”
The proposal contains provisions for resolving an in-
stitution by (i) selling all or part of it to another viable 
institution (the sale-of-business tool); selling part of 
the resolved institution temporarily to another (the 
bridge institution tool), typically creating a “good 
bank;” (iii) selling impaired assets to a public body to 
manage them (the asset-separation tool), typically the 
case of the “bad bank;” (iv) bailing-in creditors of the 
institution (the bail-in tool); that is, imposing losses 
on shareholders, bondholders, depositors (those de-
posits that are not protected by the 100,000 euro de-
posit guarantee schemes) and other creditors. 
The intention to “bail-in” creditors has been loudly 
trumpeted. It is cited as a means of eliminating or re-
ducing the costs to taxpayers and reducing moral haz-
ard, improving the incentives of the owners of and 
lenders to banks to more closely monitor the latter’s 
activities, and encouraging banks to take fewer risks, 
as their cost of capital will become more sensitive to 
the riskiness of their portfolios. The cost of resolution 
should to be borne by the creditors of the failed insti-
tution and the banking sector. The Commission, the 
SRB and the national resolution authorities should 
organise bank resolutions so as to minimise the need 
for extraordinary public support.
However, the bail-in tool is hedged about with restric-
tions that may, in practice, limit its usefulness. Losses 
will be imposed on creditors in reverse order of senior-
ity, which is unexceptionable; but several classes of 
creditors are automatically exempted from bail-in. 
These classes include: covered deposits; secured liabil-
ities including bonds; liabilities to employees in the 
form of wages, salaries and pension benefits; commer-
cial claims for goods and services critical for the daily 
functioning of the institution; liabilities to a payments 
system with a remaining liability of seven days; and 
inter-bank liabilities with an original liability of less 
than seven days. Furthermore, additional liabilities 
may be excluded in exceptional circumstances. The 
question is: what fraction of the institution’s liabilities 
can be bailed-in? Will there be sufficient funds to ab-
sorb the losses on the asset side and resolve the institu-
tion without needing outside assistance?
Implicit in the Commission proposal is that at least 8 
percent of an institution’s total liabilities and own 
funds should be available to be bailed-in.15 
15  The availability of sufficient own funds and aggregate liabilities for 
bail-in is mentioned at least three times – on two of which occasions 
the figure of 8 percent is given – in the Commission’s proposal of 
10 July 2013 for the SRM and SRF (European Commission, 2013):
 (i) In the Explanatory Memorandum, page 13, is the following 
paragraph: “The primary objective of the Single Resolution Fund is 
to ensure financial stability, rather than to absorb losses or provide 
capital to an institution under resolution. The Fund should not be 
considered as a bailout fund. There might be however exceptional 
circumstances where, after sufficiently having exhausted the inter-
nal resources (at least 8 percent of the liabilities and own funds of 
the institution under resolution), the primary objective could not be 
achieved without allowing the Fund to absorb those losses or provide 
the capital. It is only in these circumstances when the Fund could act 
as a backstop to the private resources.” 
 (ii) In the preamble to the proposal, paragraph 45 states that: “To 
avoid institutions structuring their liabilities in a manner that im-
pedes the effectiveness of the bail in tool, the Board should be able 
to establish that the institutions hold an aggregate amount of own 
funds, subordinated debt and senior liabilities subject to the bail-in 
tool expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities of the institution, 
that do not qualify as own funds for the purposes of Regulation (EU) 
No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 and 
of Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council17, which institutions should have at all times.”
 And (iii) in the proposed regulation itself, Part II, Title 1, chapter 3, 
Article 24, paragraph 7 provides “The [Single Bank Resolution] Fund 
may only make a contribution referred to in paragraph 6 provided 
that the contribution meets both the following criteria: (a) a contribu-
tion to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not 
less than 8 percent of the total liabilities including own funds of the 
institution under resolution, measured at the time of resolution ac-
tion in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 17, has 
been made by shareholders and the holders of other instruments of 
ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other eli-
gible liabilities through write down, conversion or otherwise; (b) the 
contribution from the Fund does not exceed 5 percent of the total 
liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, 
measured at the time of resolution action in accordance with the valu-
ation provided for in Article 17.”
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Nevertheless, resolution will sometimes require funds 
that the failed institution itself  and its creditors are un-
able to provide. To meet these needs, the Commission 
proposes a SRF so that any costs incurred in connec-
tion with the use of the resolution tools that are not 
borne by the shareholders and the creditors of the in-
stitution under resolution will be borne by the financial 
industry. The Commission is at pains to emphasise that 
the Fund is not supposed to be a bailout fund, but is 
only there to ensure financial stability, not to absorb 
losses or provide capital to an institution that is being 
resolved. The argument is that the existence of a fund 
that can, if  necessary, provide a back-stop for dealing 
with a failed institution, removes the danger of conta-
gion from one institution to another, and from one 
member state to another. This positive spillover effect 
of the fund provides a justification for its being based 
on contributions from all of the participating member 
states. Pooling resources in the fund also allows for a 
much bigger fund to be amassed and provides better 
insurance. The proposal states that:
“Since losses from any future shocks in the banking 
industry are likely to be concentrated at a specific 
moment of time in some Member States, a common 
European private backstop mechanism, as opposed 
to national backstops taken individually, will be 
more effective in absorbing such shocks through ex-
ante and, in extreme cases, ex post contributions 
from the whole Euro-area banking industry. 
Therefore, by pooling resources at the European 
level, the Fund will provide a bigger “firepower” 
and will increase the resilience of the banking sys-
tem. At the same time, spreading extraordinary ex-
post contributions evenly across banks in all partici-
pating Member States will reduce the level of such 
contributions for each bank, limiting any pro-cycli-
cal effect of such contributions.
Moreover, a mechanism where loss absorption 
reaches beyond national borders can effectively 
break the vicious circle of the interdependence be-
tween the banking crisis in a given Member State 
and the fiscal position of the sovereign. In this 
manner, the current burden on some Member 
States would have been mitigated if  a Single 
Resolution Fund had existed since the start of the 
financial crisis.”
The intention is that the fund will hold at least 1 per-
cent of the covered deposits in the banking system of 
the participating member states. The Commission ar-
gues that this should be sufficient, provided that credi-
tors are bailed in to the extent of at least up to 8 per-
cent of the total liabilities and own funds of the insti-
tution under resolution. This would correspond to a 
fund of around 55 billion euros, based on 2011 data 
on banks and an estimate of covered deposits in the 
euro area. The Commission envisages a 10 year transi-
tional period before the fund reaches its target level, 
possibly up to 14 years if  it has to make large disburse-
ments in the interim period. This means annual con-
tributions from the banking industry to the fund of 
around 5.5 billion euros a year. After the build-up 
phase, the banks would have to make contributions as 
their contribution basis grows or if  the fund is whit-
tled away by disbursements. 
“[…] Contributions will be calculated in line with 
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive on 
the basis of banks’ liabilities excluding own funds 
and covered deposits, and adjusted to their risk 
profile. This means that banks which are financed 
almost exclusively by deposits will in practice have 
very low contributions. Of course, these banks will 
contribute to national deposit guarantee schemes.”
While many of  the features of  the Commission’s 
proposal described above have survived negotiations 
among member states and the Commission in 
December 2013, and are likely to survive further ne-
gotiations with the European Parliament in 2014, 
the proposals for providing funding for bank resolu-
tions before the SRF is fully established (which will 
not be until 2026), and the proposed procedures for 
arranging a resolution, were the subject of  much de-
bate and argument. An agreement was reached on 
18 December 2013.16 
In the ten-year period between 2016 and 2026, while 
the SRF is being accumulated, the funding of  bank 
resolutions (beyond what can be achieved by bailing-
in shareholders and other creditors) will fall partly 
on (a) the resolution fund of  the country in which the 
resolved bank is located, and partly on (b) the collec-
tive resolution funds of  all the other member coun-
tries of  the SRM. The proportions will gradually 
shift from (a) to (b) over the ten year period. At the 
end of  the period, the separate national funds (or 
16  Council of the European Union (2013), “Council Agrees General 
Approach on Single Resolution Mechanism,” PRESSE 564, 
17602/13, Brussels, 18 December, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/140190.pdf and 
European Commission (2013), “Commissioner Michel Barnier’s 
Remarks at the ECOFIN Council Press Conference,” MEMO 
13/1186, Brussels, 19 December, http://europa.eu/rapid/press- 
release_MEMO-13-1186_en.htm?locale=en.
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compartments, as the official documents describe 
them) will no longer exist, and the fund will be fully 
mutualised. 
The SRF may, of course, not be big enough to cover 
the costs of bank resolutions, not only during the 
build-up period 2016–2026, but also in the steady state 
thereafter. Where then will the resources be found? A 
so-called back-stop to the SRF is needed, and the 
form it should take was one of the hotly contested is-
sues at the December 2013 ECOFIN meetings. The 
plan is that, during the build-up period, financing will 
come from “national sources backed by levies on 
banks, or from the European Stability Mechanism, in 
accordance with agreed procedures.”17 During this 
ten-year period, a common backstop will be devel-
oped, which will come into operation “at the latest af-
ter 10 years,” and which will allow the SRF to borrow, 
and recoup the costs by imposing more levies, includ-
ing ex-post levies, on the banking sector. 
How will bank resolutions be triggered? Who gets to 
decide on the form of resolution (i.e., whether it in-
volves splitting an institution into bad and good 
banks, selling off  all or parts of it to other banks, 
winding it up, and bailing-in creditors)? And who 
pays? The proposed mechanism seems baroque and 
cumbersome. The resolution of a bank can be trig-
gered either by the ECB notifying the SRB that a bank 
is failing or is likely to fail, or by the SRB itself; and 
the SRB will then draw up a scheme for carrying out 
the resolution. Decisions by the SRB will come into 
force within twenty-four hours of their adoption. 
However, the Council of the EU is able to object to or 
demand changes.
The proposed SRB itself  is a complex body. Most 
resolution plans would be drawn up by a relatively 
small body, the “executive session” of  the SRB, con-
sisting of  the executive director, four full-time ap-
pointed members, and representatives of  the member 
states involved in the resolution. If, however, the res-
olution was big enough, then the “plenary session” 
of  the SRB would be responsible for the decision; 
and a two-thirds majority of  board members repre-
17  Council of the European Union (2013), “Council Agrees General 
Approachon Single Resolution Mechanism,” PRESSE 564, 17602/13, 
Brussels, 18 December, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_
data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/140190.pdf. See also Council of the 
European Union (2013), “The Statement of Eurogroup and ECOFIN 
Ministers on the SRM backstop,” 18 December, http://www.consili-
um.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/140206.pdf.
senting at least 50 percent of  contributions (to the 
SRF) would be required.18
 
According to current plans, the SRM will come into 
force on 1 January 2015 and its provisions for bailing-
in bank creditors and resolving failing banks will ap-
ply from 1 January 2016. What happens in the period 
before 1 January 2016? In this period, the resolution 
of failing banks and the problems revealed by the 
ECB Comprehensive Assessment will fall on national 
resources, and countries will be able to apply for assis-
tance from the ESM “in accordance with agreed 
procedures.” 
4.5 Issues, problems and controversies
Following the agreements reached on the SRM and 
the SRF in December 2013, the media and commenta-
tors have been quick to assess the European Banking 
Union as an unwieldy affair, a typical European com-
promise, and at best, a partial success. The long transi-
tional period (until 2026), before the costs of resolu-
tion will be completely mutualised, partly addresses 
the legacy issue. It delays the ex-post separation of the 
banking sector from the state of the public finances, 
but encourages the separation insofar as it reduces the 
possibilities of national governments selling their debt 
to their domestic banking sectors, thus making it a 
community problem that would later have to be solved 
with international fiscal transfer schemes aimed at sta-
bilising insolvent states to avoid the losses from bank 
recapitalisations. The resolution procedure is com-
plex, slow, and involves too many people. The SRF is 
tiny, and the ability to impose losses on bank creditors 
is limited by the long list of exemptions from bail-in.
4.5.1 Legacy problems
One of the issues that plagues the set-up of a banking 
union is the existence of undiscovered problems (non-
performing loans, asset portfolios that have fallen 
greatly in terms of value etc.) in the balance sheets of 
euro area banks, problems that exist prior to the date 
18  The SRB will feature an executive director, four full-time appoint-
ed members, and representatives of the National Resolution 
Authorities of all the participating countries. All these individuals will 
be involved in a plenary session of the SRB. “The plenary session 
would be responsible for decisions that involve liquidity support ex-
ceeding 20 percent of the capital paid into the fund, or other forms of 
support, such as bank recapitalisations, exceeding 10 percent of 
funds, as well as all decisions requiring access to the fund once a total 
of 5 billion euro has been used in a given calendar year. In these cases, 
decisions would be taken by a two-thirds majority of the board mem-
bers representing at least 50 percent of contributions.”
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on which the banking union takes effect, and which 
will require banks to be re-capitalised, shut down, 
merged, or dealt with in some other way. There is a 
clear incentive for member states not to reveal such 
problems before the inception of a banking union, in 
which case they would have to pay for the costs them-
selves. On the contrary, they will have every incentive 
to keep quiet until a later date once the banking union 
is obliged to undertake the necessary resolution and 
the costs can be shared across the union. The legacy 
issues are the same as pre-existing medical conditions, 
which a new private medical insurance policy would 
refuse to cover. As Buch and Weigert (2012) observe: 
“Legacy problems obstruct the transition to a new 
long-run institutional structure in many ways. For 
example, enforcing the Fiscal Compact would re-
quire significant improvements in fiscal indicators 
in some countries. In addition, as long as banks 
carry non-performing assets on their balance sheets 
and as long as losses on these assets have not fully 
been acknowledged, introducing pan-European 
deposit insurance would amount to the introduc-
tion of an insurance system after the insured event 
has already happened. This would entail severe 
moral hazard problems. Hence, a consistent and 
credible framework for bank resolution and re-
structuring must be a core element of a banking 
union. Yet, progress towards financial sector re-
form to date has been slow, and key elements of the 
reform package are unlikely to be introduced in the 
near future. In this sense, “legacy” problems not 
only refer to debt overhang but also to delayed fi-
nancial sector reforms.”
The EU regulation establishing the SSM discusses leg-
acy issues in some detail. In theory they will be dealt 
with by the asset quality review – The Comprehensive 
Assessment – undertaken by the ECB between late 
2013 and October 2014 (European Central Bank, 
2013). The assessment will include three elements: a 
supervisory risk assessment, an asset quality review 
and a stress test. The assessment will cover 130 institu-
tions, which together account for 85 percent of euro 
area bank assets. The supervisory risk assessment will 
examine inter alia the banks’ liquidity, leverage and 
funding. The asset quality review will examine asset 
valuations, the classification of non-performing loans, 
valuation of collateral, and provisions against losses. 
The stress test will be a forward-looking view of 
banks’ ability to absorb various shocks and will be 
performed in collaboration with the EBA.
Following this Comprehensive Assessment, some 
banks may be required to take action. This includes 
recapitalisation, profit retention, issuing equity, re-ori-
entation of funding sources, asset separation and sales 
of assets, as appropriate. Banks will be required to 
have a ratio of Common Equity Tier 1 capital of 
8 percent of risk-weighted assets. As risk-weighted as-
sets often only account for a fifth of all assets, given 
that banks’ lending to other banks and government is 
privileged with risk weights of only 0.2 and zero re-
spectively, this is an extremely soft constraint that can-
not be expected to really lead to prudent banking. 
The December 2013 agreement on the SRM and the 
SRF between the Commission and the Council makes 
clear that the costs of dealing with legacy problems 
should be met by the member states where the failing 
banks are located. In the period between 2016 and 
2026 after the bail-in principle has begun to apply, but 
before the SRF is fully funded, the share of costs that 
are mutualised gradually increases, from zero in 2016 
to 100 percent in 2026. If  the states cannot bear the 
costs, they can borrow for that purpose from the ESM 
under the usual conditions: Borrowing countries will 
need to provide fiscal and structural adjustment plans 
and have them approved. 
ECB President Mario Draghi has said that some banks 
need to fail the stress tests, to establish the tests’ credi-
bility.19 There is much fighting talk about the rigour 
and transparency of the Comprehensive Assessment, 
but recent past experience with stress tests is not en-
couraging. On many occasions banks have passed with 
flying colours, as in the case of Dexia, detailed above, 
only to be felled soon afterwards by some unrevealed 
problem or unanticipated financial shock. The effec-
tiveness of this Comprehensive Assessment in weeding 
out legacy problems will be essential if  the suspicions 
of governments in northern Europe that the banking 
union is another means of passing the costs of bank 
failures in the southern periphery (Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and Ireland) onto them are to be 
dispelled.
Estimates of the capital shortfall that might be re-
vealed range between 50 billion euros and 600 billion 
euros (Merler and Wolff, 2013). These figures put the 
smallness of the SRF, and indeed the ESM, into per-
spective. If  capital shortfalls turn out to be large and 
occur in countries that already have problems with 
19  M. Steen (2013), “Draghi’s Blunt Warning on Bank Stress Test,” 
Financial Times, 23 October, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a27d75d0-
3bb5-11e3-b85f-00144feab7de.html.
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high public debt and deficits, they may cause more in-
stability in the financial markets in the short and 
medium-term. 
4.5.2 Need to build new institutions and capacity
New euro area institutions will be needed and addi-
tional capacity, as well as extra skilled personnel in su-
pervision, regulation etc.
“Creating a new pan-European supervisor ‘from 
scratch’ is a daunting task and a very expensive one 
too, especially given the EU’s current state of fiscal 
finances. The infrastructure that needs to be put in 
place and the highly skilled employees that will 
need to be hired in such a short period of time 
should not be taken lightly.” (Ioannidou, 2012)
The ECB needs to recruit several thousand people to 
staff  its new departments responsible for supervision 
and regulation. The process is taking place in 2013 
and 2014, with many regulators being hired from na-
tional regulatory agencies. The ECB will work in col-
laboration with established national bodies. This nev-
ertheless represents a major challenge and it remains 
to be seen how successfully effective departments can 
be assembled.
4.5.3 Conflict of interest at the ECB
One of the arguments in favour of moving to a euro 
area regulator is that it will avoid regulatory forbear-
ance. The regulator will be less likely to be influenced 
by local concerns and lobby groups. 
“Moving supervision to a European level will also 
increase the distance of supervisors from powerful 
national lobbies, reducing the scope for regulatory 
forbearance. As the financial crisis highlighted, 
there is a tendency by national supervisors to side 
with their troubled banks in hiding information 
from the public and other supervisors, delaying the 
recognition of losses, postponing corrective meas-
ures, and resulting in larger eventual losses. The 
lack of sufficient independence of some national 
supervisors from the executive (in combination 
with insufficient and explicit powers to intervene) 
magnifies this problem. This problem is also at the 
heart of the current vicious cycle between bank 
and sovereign risk.” (Ioannidou, 2012)
However, as a counter argument, there is an issue that 
the ECB may face a conflict between its pursuit of 
macroeconomic stability and its objective of financial 
stability. The pressure to maintain financial stability 
may induce the ECB to create more liquidity, or do so 
on easier terms, for the banking system, to promote 
financial stability, even at a time when macroeconomic 
stability demands tighter monetary actions. Monetary 
policy is usually countercyclical, while regulation and 
supervision tend to be pro-cyclical. The ECB may 
prove a more forbearing regulator than a local one. 
There is evidence from the US Fed to support this 
idea. The ECB may need to erect Chinese Walls be-
tween its different activities. 
Moreover, there is the problem mentioned at the out-
set, namely that the ECB is the banks’ biggest creditor 
and would therefore directly suffer write-off  losses 
should a bank fail and be resolved. While this fact may 
induce the ECB to be a tough regulator in the future, it 
will surely tend to make it a soft regulator in the pre-
sent when setting up stress tests to uncover hidden 
write-off  losses from legacy assets. Unfortunately, it 
must be feared that the ECB will turn a blind eye to 
the legacy debt problem and seek solutions that sweep 
the true problems under the carpet until after the so-
cialisation scheme is in operation. 
On the positive side, it can be argued that information 
obtained from bank supervision activities may improve 
macroeconomic forecasting. 
“Problems in the banking sector may serve as an 
early indicator of deteriorating macroeconomic 
conditions.” (Ioannidou, 2012)
There remains the unanswered question of whether 
the new arrangements give too much power to a single 
institution, which is not democratically controlled and 
in which the small countries, for whom the incentive to 
free ride on community funding is by definition bigger 
than for big countries, enjoy disproportionate voting 
rights in ECB decision-making.
4.5.4 Getting the banks to pay
The official aim of a banking union is to reduce the 
burden on the taxpayers of resolving failed banks, and 
getting the banks themselves or their creditors to pay. 
Imposing losses on shareholders and other creditors 
as far as possible through the bail-in tool is an essen-
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tial plank. It is reinforced by the 55 billion euro SRF, 
fed by the proceeds of a levy on banks. However, some 
banks may fail and need resolution well before the 
fund is up and running and the fund may be insuffi-
cient to meet the costs, even if  all of the legacy prob-
lems have been funded separately. 
Some commentators argue that a levy on banks will 
act as a tax on banking, raising the cost of intermedia-
tion. Activity may be diverted into other channels, 
which may be less efficient and also prone to crises and 
breakdowns, just as much as banks.
“Banks will pass on much of the tax, dependent on 
market structure, to other creditors in the guise of 
lower interest rates, higher charges and fewer ser-
vices to depositors, and higher rates and charges to 
borrowers. In short, bank spreads between deposit 
and lending rates would rise.” (Goodhart, 2012)
Arguably there are difficulties with any scheme of im-
posing a levy on banks. Ex post levies tend to fall on 
prudent banks that avoided failure at a time when they 
and the whole banking system were weak. Ex ante tax-
es may be set in such a way so as to discourage risky 
behaviour, and thus act both as an incentive to good 
behaviour and as a way of funding future recapitalisa-
tions. The possible problem here is that, having paid 
the tax in advance, banks may feel entitled to a bailout 
(recapitalisation) and even to have their shareholders 
bailed out, rather than be liquidated or taken into 
public ownership. Goodhart (2012) writes that while 
academics may argue for ex ante taxes, bankers prefer 
ex post levies and they are more likely to win the 
argument. 
Various methods of bailing-in bank creditors are not 
costless, at least from the point of view of the banking 
industry. Calls on unsecured bond-holders through 
“CoCo” bonds (Contingent Convertible) may raise 
the price banks have to pay to raise long-term fund-
ing. It is worth noting, however, that even CoCos do 
not prevent costs from arising for taxpayers, since 
many unsecured bank bonds are owned by pension 
funds and insurance companies.
While it is true that imposing a levy on deposits will 
raise banks’ operating costs, and that banks will pass 
these costs on to borrowers and depositors, this is no 
bad thing. Quite the opposite: it is as things should be. 
These changes in banks’ funding arrangements are in-
tended to correct for externalities: costs that banks 
have been imposing on the rest of society to bail out 
and recapitalise failed institutions. Requiring banks to 
base a larger fraction of their funding on equity rather 
than debt, requiring the use of CoCos, and imposing a 
levy on banks to pay for a resolution fund, are actions 
that will reduce the likely future calls of the banking 
industry on the rest of the economy and reduce the 
amount of volatility in economic activity caused by 
banking panics and failures. Correcting externalities 
generally moves the economy closer to an efficient al-
location of resources. The cost of banks’ raising equi-
ty has been subsidised in the past by the implicit bail-
out guarantee. Without it, this cost would have been 
higher. If, as a result, the cost of the services provided 
by banks goes up, this is merely removing the effects 
of a subsidy that should not have been there in the first 
place (Sinn, 2003a; Sinn, 2003b; Sinn, 2010, chapter 4; 
Admati and Hellwig, 2012). 
The banks have often claimed that raising capital re-
quirements, as is happening alongside the banking un-
ion proposals under Basel III and the EU’s CRD IV, is 
costly, as the required return on capital is much great-
er than the yield on bonds. It has been claimed that 
higher capital requirements will cause funds to be tied 
up, sitting idle and unable to be loaned out to busi-
nesses. However, these arguments are simply wrong. 
They are dealt with at length by Admati and Hellwig 
(2012), Miles (2013), and Miles et al. (2012). 
The argument that banks holding more capital caus-
es resources to be kept idle and unable to be loaned 
out, appears to confuse the asset and liabilities side 
of  the balance sheet. It may be true that if  a bank 
holds more of  its assets in the form of  cash or re-
serves, then fewer funds are loaned out. But equity 
and debt are liabilities of  the bank, and as such, they 
constitute alternative means of  funding its lending 
activities. Using a greater proportion of  equity to 
debt does not cause resources to be kept idle. Miles 
(2013) shows that the margin of  banks’ lending rates 
over the interest paid on the bonds they issue has not 
changed systematically; and despite large increases in 
leverage over long periods of  time in the UK and US, 
there is no evidence of  their using less equity and 
more bonds having lowered the margin. The appear-
ance of  a high required return on equity is given by 
the market value of  banks’ equity being much less 
than their book value. But this, in fact, means that 
financial markets set a lower value on the value of 
the banks’ assets than is attributed to them by the 
conventions of  accounting (Merler and Wolff, 2013). 
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Lastly, the cost of  equity capital is lower than it may 
seem because having more equity lowers the riskiness 
of  the returns both to the bank’s bonds, and to its ex-
isting equity, and therefore lowers the returns on the 
bank’s existing liabilities. 
Consequently, there are good reasons for requiring 
banks to fund their operations with a considerably 
higher ratio of equity to debt. 
4.5.5 Sovereign debt on banks’ balance sheets
One of the links that binds the fortunes of the banking 
sector to the state of the public finances in the host state 
is the large fraction of the banks’ assets that consists of 
sovereign debt. Data from the ECB show that, at the 
end of August 2013, over 10 percent of Italian banks’ 
total assets were government bonds, as compared with 
6.8 percent at the beginning of 2012. The correspond-
ing figures for Spain are 9.5 percent and 6.3 percent; for 
Portugal 7.6 percent and 4.6 percent. Most of the in-
creases are in bonds issued by the banks’ own govern-
ments. Government bonds had grown to 5.6 percent of 
total euro area bank assets at the end of August 2013 
from 4.3 percent at the beginning of 2012.20 
The attraction of sovereign debt for the banks is that no 
capital needs to be held against it. Government bonds 
are not risk-weighted. Banks have been able to obtain 
liquidity from their central banks at very low cost, 
through the ECB’s recycling of reserves from northern 
to southern Europe, which they have been able to invest 
in higher yielding sovereign bonds. This is another 
means by which banks have been able to raise profits 
and improve their balance sheets (insofar as they retain 
these profits, rather than distributing them). It is a sub-
stantial hidden subsidy to the banking industry.21 
To break this link, rules may be needed to limit banks’ 
exposure to particular borrowers and types of asset; 
the risk-weighting of sovereign debt needs to be re-
considered; and a third element is that fiscal deficits 
need to be brought under control so to reduce the sup-
ply of these assets.22
20  C. Thompson and P. Jenkins (2013), “Bank Exposure to EU 
States’ Bonds on Rise,” Financial Times, 13 October, http://www.ft.
com/intl/cms/s/0/9b6fb558-3270-11e3-b3a7-00144feab7de.html. 
21  To indicate the scale of the subsidy, if  the banks can invest 1 tril-
lion euro of reserves (the approximate size of the TARGET2 balanc-
es) which costs them 0.25 percent, in sovereign debt at 6 percent per 
annum, the profit is 57.5 billion euro per annum.
22  J. Weidmann (2013), “Breaking the Sovereign-Banking Nexus,” 
Financial Times, 1 October, http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/
EN/Standardartikel/Press/Contributions/2013_10_01_weidmann_ 
ft.html.
4.5.6 Concentration, competition, and Too Big to Fail
The belief  that some banks are too big to be allowed 
to fail, and therefore had to be recapitalised by gov-
ernments, has contributed to public debt problems 
since 2007. However, the changes that have taken 
place, recapitalising banks, forcing through consolida-
tions, mergers and takeovers, have increased concen-
tration in banking and have effectively made the phe-
nomenon of banks being too big to fail worse, not bet-
ter. Despite the de-leveraging undertaken by banks, it 
is still true that the banking systems of many countries 
have gross assets worth several times their country’s 
GDP, particularly in small economies, so their govern-
ments, already heavily indebted, would not be able to 
recapitalise them in the event of a major failure, with-
out increasing national debt to unsustainable levels.23
4.5.7 Sovereign default risk, re-denomination risk, and 
other risks affecting borrowing costs 
Breaking the bank-sovereign link is not an end in it-
self, of course. Some see the ultimate goal as making 
the cost of borrowing for households and enterprises 
independent of the state in which they are located in 
the euro area. The cost of borrowing for households 
and firms should be the same throughout the euro 
area, they maintain, so as to achieve an efficient allo-
cation of resources across it. If  there were a single 
market in banking, a household or firm would be able 
to borrow from any bank in the euro area, not neces-
sarily one located in the same member state. The cost 
of borrowing would then reflect the risks associated 
with the loan the household or enterprise wanted to 
take out; and bear no relation to the risks of default 
by the government of the member state in which the 
household or enterprise is resident. 
This view implicitly assumes that the European nation 
states have already been dissolved by creating a European 
federal state with a joint budget and a joint tax system. 
In fact, however, this is not the case and cannot be antici-
pated – through monetary or fiscal policy measures, de-
cided by technocratic bodies stretching their mandate – 
changes which ought to require a change in the EU 
Treaty. As long as joint fiscal responsibility through a 
joint tax system and federal budget has not been created, 
a state, its banks and its companies are sitting in one 
boat and mutually sharing idiosyncratic country risks. 
23  G. Tett (2013), “Insane Financial System Lives Post-Lehmann,” 
Financial Times, 12 September, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
e622fa00-1bbf-11e3-b678-00144feab7de.html.
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If  there is a possibility of the member state in question 
leaving the euro area, then there may be an increased 
chance of the borrower in question being unable to re-
pay, or of the loan being redenominated into a new 
currency, and this will affect the cost of borrowing. 
There may be a possibility of additional taxes being 
imposed on a borrower in a member state in fiscal dif-
ficulties, or of interest payments being taxed. These 
payments will and should also affect the cost of loans, 
so as not to water down responsibilities, not to distort 
the allocation of resources and not to create incentives 
for excessive risk-taking. 
4.6 Conclusions
In principle, a banking union is a natural development 
for the euro area, further integrating the banking in-
dustry across member states and moving in the direc-
tion of completing the single market. If  the euro area 
was an association of similar countries, symmetrically 
placed, the problems of implementing a banking un-
ion would be relatively straightforward. Among a 
group of basically similar countries disturbed by 
shocks that are to some degree idiosyncratic, but with 
large banking industries, with some financial institu-
tions that are too big for an individual country to re-
capitalise, were they to fail, and with many financial 
institutions operating across the region and beyond, a 
suitably designed banking union could contribute to 
greater financial stability. It would involve no ex ante 
redistribution between countries. There may be some 
redistribution ex post depending on where bank fail-
ures occurred. But largely it would operate as a mutu-
al insurance scheme, spreading risk through the re-
gion, and pooling resources needed to resolve the 
problems caused by failed banks. 
The clear problem is that the euro area is very far from 
being such a symmetrical arrangement among similar 
states. Indeed, some members of the euro area have 
sound public finances and relatively well-supervised 
and regulated banks; while others have highly precari-
ous, if not actually unsustainable, public finances and, 
to varying degrees, fragile financial industries with po-
tentially large exposures to non-performing loans and 
other assets that are actually worth less than their re-
corded values and are overly-exposed to the sovereign 
debt of the country in which they are located. While the 
second group of countries are the likely beneficiaries of 
a banking union, and are keen on establishing one, the 
first group of countries are less enthusiastic. There is 
the prospect that the banking union may simply take 
resources from sound banking systems in the north to 
bail out unsound banking systems in the south.
By reducing the costs of funds for banks in the south, 
the banking union may have the effect of also reduc-
ing the costs of public borrowing for southern euro 
area states, and reducing the financial pressure on 
them to restrain public borrowing and make their fi-
nances sustainable. 
The extent to which this problem emerges in practice 
depends on how a banking union is implemented. A 
key factor is how “legacy problems” are defined and 
dealt with. If  there is a forensic examination of the 
balance sheets of all the banks in the euro area and a 
thorough identification of all the institutions in need 
of recapitalisation, resolution or closing down before 
the banking union comes into force, so that all these 
costs could be borne by the member states in question 
(or by existing provisions for lending to member states 
such as the EFSF and the ESM) and not mutualised 
through the banking union, the problem of the union 
being a scheme to transfer resources might be avoided. 
However, this is obviously unlikely to happen. The 
identification of legacy problems is likely to be highly 
imperfect and massively contentious. It will meet with 
fierce resistance in the troubled southern periphery 
countries, and, unfortunately, the ECB, the southern 
banks’ largest creditor, can hardly be expected to have 
an incentive to pull the hidden write-off  losses out 
from under the carpet.
The effects of the banking union will also depend on 
how effectively bank supervision and regulation is 
conducted after it has been set up, as well as on how 
the fiscal policies of member states evolve. The SSM is 
intended to ensure common standards of supervision 
and regulation across the union. There is less likely to 
be a persistent transfer of resources via the union to 
countries with a history of less rigorous supervision, 
the more uniformly the SSM can be applied. 
To the extent that fiscally weak sovereigns are linked 
with fragile banking systems because banks buy up 
sovereign debt to use it as collateral for ECB funds, 
the risk weighting applied to sovereign debt by the reg-
ulator will be important. Clearly treating sovereign 
debt as risk-free has been inappropriate and needs to 
be changed. Banks in countries with fragile banking 
systems need to hold more diversified portfolios of as-
sets. Finally, the rigour with which the EU Fiscal Pact 
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is applied in future will affect the European Banking 
Union. The smaller the amount of public borrowing 
by heavily indebted states, the lower the likelihood of 
banks in those states overloading their balance sheets 
with the local sovereign’s debt. 
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